Bury the Graveyard

If you want to figure out a way forward for Afghanistan, fake history is not the place to start.

BY CHRISTIAN CARYL | JULY 26, 2010

It's the mother of all clichés. Almost no one can resist it. It's wielded by everyone from thoughtful ex-generals to vitriolic bloggers. It crops up everywhere from Russia's English-language TV channel to scruffy Pakistani newspapers to America's stately National Public Radio. The Huffington Post can't seem to live without it, and one recent book even chose it as a title. Afghanistan, we're told, is "the graveyard of empires."

The Victorian British and the Soviet Union, the story goes, were part of a long historical continuum of arrogant conquerors that met their match in the country's xenophobic, fanatical, trigger-happy tribesmen. Given a record like that, it's obvious that the effort by the United States and its NATO allies to stabilize the shaky government in Kabul is doomed to fail.

Look, failure is always a possible outcome, especially judging by the way things have been going lately. But if the United States and its allies end up messing up their part of the equation, blame it on their bad policy decisions. Don't blame it on a supersimplified version of Afghanistan's history -- especially if you prefer to overlook the details.

As Thomas Barfield pointed out to me the other day, for most of its history Afghanistan has actually been the cradle of empires, not their grave. Barfield, an anthropologist at Boston University, has been studying Afghanistan since the early 1970s, and he has just published a book -- Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History -- that takes issue with the hoary stereotypes that continue to inform our understanding of the place.

One of those myths, for example, is that Afghanistan is inherently unconquerable thanks to the fierceness of its inhabitants and the formidable nature of its terrain. But this isn't at all borne out by history. "Until 1840 Afghanistan was better known as a 'highway of conquest' rather than the 'graveyard of empires,'" Barfield points out. "For 2,500 years it was always part of somebody's empire, beginning with the Persian Empire in the fifth century B.C."

After the Persians it was Alexander the Great's turn. Some contend that Alexander met his match in the Afghans, since it was an Afghan archer who wounded him in the heel, ushering in a series of misfortunes that would end with the great conqueror's death. Ask anyone who believes this is why Greek coins keep cropping up in Afghan soil today -- in fact, Alexander's successors managed to keep the place under their control for another 200 years. Not too shabby, really. And there were plenty of empires that came after, thanks to Afghanistan's centrality to world trade in the era before European ocean fleets put an end to the Silk Road's transportation monopoly.

What about the popular accounts that insist, awe-struck, that even Genghis Khan was humbled by the Afghans? Poppycock, says Barfield. Genghis had "no trouble at all overrunning the place," and his descendants would build wide-ranging kingdoms using Afghanistan as a base. Timur (know to most of us as Tamerlane) ultimately shifted the capital of his empire from provincial Samarkand to cosmopolitan Herat, evidence of the role command over Afghanistan played in his calculations. Babur, who is buried in Kabul, used Afghanistan to launch his conquest of a sizable chunk of India and establish centuries of Muslim rule. Afghans seemed pretty happy to go along.

In fact, Afghan self-rule is a relatively recent invention in the full sweep of the country's history, dating to the middle of the 18th century -- and it took another century for Afghanistan to earn its reputation as an empire-beater. That's when the Afghans trounced a British invasion force, destroying all but one of 16,000 troops sent to Kabul to teach the Afghan rulers a lesson.

But context is everything. Everyone tends to forget what happened after the rout of the British: In 1842 they invaded again, defeating every Afghan army sent out against them. True, they didn't necessarily achieve their aim of preventing Tzarist Russia from encroaching on Central Asia; that had to wait for the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), when they succeeded in occupying much of the country and forcing its rulers to accept a treaty giving the British a veto over future Afghan foreign policy. Then there's the fact that the First Anglo-Afghan War preceded the end of the British Empire by more than a century. London, it should be noted, never intended to make Afghanistan part of its empire. Britain's foreign-policy aim, which it ultimately achieved, was to ensure that Afghanistan remained a buffer state outside the influence of imperial competitors, such as the Russians.

JOEL SAGET/AFP/Getty Images

 

Christian Caryl is a contributing editor to Foreign Policy. His column, "Reality Check," appears weekly on ForeignPolicy.com.

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MATTRODRIGUE

8:59 PM ET

July 26, 2010

Vulgar political science

This article reminded me a lot of one of Quentin Tarantino's movies: a lot happened, a LOT was said, and yet the work actually contributes any new knowledge to its form. This article attempts to replace a hoary historical construction of Afghanistan with a new, shinier, yet equally useless (and racist) characterization centering on Afghanistan's actual vulnerability. Is this scholarly writing or pro-US military boosterism?

 

CJ1958

5:53 PM ET

July 27, 2010

want to hear another one?

Another hoary old cliche has always been 'we're only doing it for their own good', which is not only intellectually dishonest but morally reprehensible. I don't think that one is actually working on the hearts and minds of the general public right now. President Obama's reaction to the Wikileaks has been pathetic and can only ensure that the Afghan theatre's curtains are going to be tightly closed once and for all.

 

DIMITRI K.

11:38 PM ET

July 27, 2010

that's what built the Soviet Union in Afghanistan:

1. GES Puli Khumri-II capacity of 9 MW for district. Kungduz 1962
2. TPP with nitrogen fertilizer plant capacity of 48 MW (4x12) 1 part - 1972 II place - 1974 (36 MW) Expansion - 1982 (up to 48 MW)
3. The dam and power plant "uppity" on the River. Kabul capacity of 100 MW expansion in 1966 - 1974
4. Transmission lines with substations from hydroelectric Puli Khumri-II to the town of Baghlan and Kunduz (110 km) 1967
5. Transmission line from the substation 35 / 6 kW of thermal power plants in the nitrogen fertilizer plant to the city of Mazar-i-Sharif (17,6 km) 1972
6-8. Power substation in the north-western part of Kabul and power lines - 110 kV power substation from "Eastern" (25 km) 1974
9-16. Eight oil storage tanks with total capacity of 8300 cu. m 1952 - 1958 years.
17. The pipeline from the place of gas to nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif 88 km in length and carrying capacity 0,5 billion cubic meters. meters of gas per year 1968 1968 ?.
18 - 19. The pipeline from gazopromysla to the Soviet border length of 98 km, 820 mm in diameter, up to 4 billion cubic meters. meters of gas per year, including air passage through the river Amu Darya 660 m long in 1967, aerial crossing pipeline-1974.
20. Looping on the main gas pipeline 53 km in length in 1980
21. Transmission line - 220 kV from the Soviet border in the vicinity of Shirhan to the town of Kunduz (first stage) 1986
22. Increased oil depot in the port of Hairaton 5 thousand cubic meters. M 1981
23. Tank farm in the town of Mazar-i-Sharif with a capacity of 12 thousand cubic meters. m 1982
24. Petrol station in Logar capacity of 27 thousand cubic meters. m 1983
25. Tank farm in the town of Puli - Khumri capacity of 6 thousand cubic meters. m
26-28. Three motor companies in the city of Kabul on 300 trucks "Kamaz" each 1985
29. Automotive service facility fuel trucks in Kabul
30. Service station car "Kamaz" in Hairaton 1984
31. Decoration gazopromysla in the vicinity of Shiberghan power of 2,6 billion cubic meters. meters of gas per year in 1968
32. Decoration gazopromysla on the field "Dzharkuduk" with its complex structures for desulfurization and the preparation of gas for transportation in the amount of up to 1,5 billion cubic meters. meters of gas per year in 1980
33. Booster compressor station at gazopromysle "Hodge-Gugerdag, 1981
34-36. Nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif capacity of 105 thousand tons of urea per year with a residential village and building a base in 1974
37. Auto Repair Plant in the city of Kabul, the capital repair capacity of 1,373 vehicles and 750 tons of metal per year in 1960
38. Airport Bagram "with a runway of 3000 m in 1961
1939. The international airport in Kabul with the runway 2800h47 m 1962
40. Aerodrome "Shindand" with a runway of 2800 m in 1977
41. Line of multichannel communication from the city of Mazar-i-Sharif to Hayraton 1982
42. Fixed satellite communication station Intersputnik type "Lotus"
43. House-building factory in Kabul capacity of 35 thousand square meters of living space in the year 1965
44. Increased house-building plant in Kabul to 37 thousand square meters. m of living space in the year 1982
45. Asphalt-concrete plant in the city of Kabul, paving of streets and delivery of road vehicles (delivery of equipment and technical assistance made through IMT) 1955
46. River port Shirhan designed to process 155 tonnes of cargo per year, including 20 thousand tons of oil products in 1959 increased in 1961
47. Highway bridge over the River. Khanabad near the village of Alchin length 120 m in 1959
48. Roads "Salang" through the Hindu Kush mountain range (107,3 km tunnel 2,7 km at an altitude of 3300 m), 1964
49. Reconstruction of technical systems the tunnel Salang, 1986
50. Roads Kushka - Herat - Kandahar (679 km) from the cement-concrete pavement in 1965
51. Roads Doshi - Shirhan (216 km) with black finish in 1966
52-54. Three road bridge across the river Kandaha province. Kunar in areas Bisuda, cameo, Asmar long, respectively 360 m, 230 m and 35 m in 1964
55. Roads Kabul - Jabel - US-Seraj (68,2 km) 1965
56-57. Two road bridge over the river and the Salang Gurband to 30 m each in 1961
58. Central repair shops for repair of road construction equipment in the city of Herat in 1966
59. The road Puli Khumri, Mazar-e-Sheriff Shibergan length of 329 km with a black finish in 1972
60. The road from the highway Puli Khumri-Shibergan to Hayraton on the bank. Amu length of 56 km
61. Road / railway bridge over. Amu 1982
62. The grounds of the storage terminal on the left bank. Amu Darya in the Hairaton
63. Kindergarten for 220 beds and a nursery for 50 places in the city of Kabul in 1970
64. City electric network in the city of Jalalabad in 1969
65-66. City electric network in the cities. Mazar-i-Sharif and Balkh in 1979
67-68. Two neighborhood in Kabul total area of 90 thousand square meters. m 1978
69-74. 6 meteorological stations and 25 posts of 1974
75-78. 4 conditioners
79. Center for Maternal and Child 110 visits per day in the city of Kabul in 1971
80. Geological, geophysical, seismic and drilling for oil and gas in northern Afghanistan 1968 - 1977 years.
81. Integrated search and surveying work for solid minerals
82. Polytechnic Institute in Kabul in 1200 students in 1968
83. College for 500 students for the training of Petroleum Geologists and miners in the town of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1973
84. Automotive Technical School for 700 students in Kabul
85-92. 8 vocational schools to train skilled workers 1982 - 1986.
93. Boarding School on the basis of an orphanage in Kabul in 1984
94. Bread-baking plant in Kabul (silo capacity of 50 thousand tons of grain, two mills - 375 tons per day milling, bakery 70 tons of bread per day) 1957
95. The elevator in the town of Puli Khumri capacity of 20 thousand tons of grain
96. The bakery in Kabul capacity 65 tons of bread per day in 1981
97. The mill in the town of Puli Khumri capacity of 60 tons per day in 1982
98. The bakery in the town of Mazar-i-Sharif with production capacity of 20 tons of bakery products a day
99. The mill in the town of Mazar-i-Sharif with production capacity of 60 tons of flour a day
100. Jalalabad irrigation canal with a knot head intakes on the River. Kabul, 70 km long with a hydroelectric power 11,5 tys.kVt 1965
101-102. Dam Sard with reservoir capacity of 164 million cubic meters. m, and irrigation networks in the dam to irrigate 17.7 hectares of land 1968 - 1977gg.
103-105. Two multi-agricultural farm "Gazibad" with the territory of 2.9 ha, "Hulda" on the territory of 2.8 ha, and irrigation and reclamation of land preparation in the area of Jalalabad to the canal area of 24 thousand hectares in 1969 - 1970.
106-108. Three veterinary laboratories to combat infectious diseases of animals in the cities. Jalalabad, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat, 1972
109. Processing plant citrus and olives in the city of Jalalabad in 1984
110. Control seed laboratory for grain crops in Kabul
111-113. Three soil-agrochemical laboratory in years. Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad
114-115. Two cable cranes in the area of Khorog and Qala-Khumb 1985 - 1986.
116. LEP-220 kV State Border of the USSR-Mazar-Sheriff 1986
117. Complete laboratory analysis of solid minerals in Kabul in 1985
118. Elevator with a capacity of 20 thousand tons of grain in Mazar-i-Sharif
119. Station maintenance trucks on 4 posts in Pul-Humrm
120-121. 2 hlopkovh seed lab in years. Kabul and Balkh
122. Polyclinic insurance company public servants at 600 visits per day in Kabul
123-125. Stations of artificial insemination in the cities. Kabul (Binigisar), Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh), Jalalabad
126. Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the PDPA in 1986
127. Development of technical and feasibility of establishing two state farms on the basis of the irrigation system "Sard"
128. 10 kV power transmission line from the state border in the area Kushki to the station. Turgundi with the substation - "-
129. Gas-filling station in Kabul capacity of 2 thousand tons per year
130. Base MIA Hairaton for unloading and storage spetsgruzov (on contract terms)
131. Reconstruction of the railway station Turgundi 1987
132. Restoration of the bridge over the river. Samangan
133. Gas-filling station in Hairaton capacity of 2 thousand tons of liquefied gas
134. Looping 50 km pipeline USSR - Afghanistan
135. Refurbishment work on trunk roads
136. Secondary school for 1300 students in the city of Kabul with a number of subjects taught in Russian
137. Installation for processing gas condensate diesel fuel production capacity of 4 thousand tons per year for gazopromysle Dzharkuduk
138. MGB base in the port of Hairaton
139-141. Three concreted area in Hairaton
142. The company on a progressive assembly of a bike capacity of 15 thousand units per year in Kabul in 1988

And what you have built in Afghanistan?

 

DIMITRI K.

11:59 PM ET

July 27, 2010

This avganskie teroristy

This avganskie teroristy killed our guys YOUR ARMS. Now they have these weapons to kill you. It's retribution from God!
Your military is officially supported by the drug industry, which poisoned Russian children. They justify this by saying that now is the only way to make money in Afghanistan. You have to go through retribution from God for this! Maybe we should pay for the scalps of Americans? Then Avgantsev will be 2 ways to earn!

We Shuravi! And again we return!

 

GEORGEKZ

2:58 AM ET

July 27, 2010

111

When thinking about the US engagement in Afghanistan (and retrospectively about all the previous attempts to bring this unfriendly region under control), one should probably walk down memory lane and remember the Vietnam War, which turned out to be an ultimate failure for Americans. While American generals were threatening to take Vietnam back into the stone age, the Vietnamese rebels just smirked and said that they were still living in the stone age. The same story with Afghanistan. It's difficult to make a person die for somebody else's aberrant ideas if he has something sizeable to lose. Conversely, if the life is filled with daily sorrows and unending frustrations, extremist ideas will make a successful run at finding their own place in an upset mind. Afghanistan is just a very poor country which lingers in the state of complete disarray and total uncertainty. And the Afghans just wouldn't like to see some extraneous power take the reins in their own country without having some tangible benefits from this change of play, as nobody is keen to invest in their economy.
I am always surprised to read such nonsensical conclusions, as the one made in this article. Just imagine an old illiterate warrior who spent his childhood in a remote mountain village looking after the scarce cattle and made his adult living fighting the Soviets remarking that what Afghanistan needs is fair elections. It's become a fashion that over-optimistic authors tending to regard war-torn regions as lacking pure and simple democracy and human rights prescribe an injection of fair elections to change the trend and bring everything back to a normal life. Nothing will change, as fair elections is just a scintilla of what needs to be done. You cannot impose the idea of fair elections on the people who used to submit to the will of their senior tribesmen and local chieftains for centuries without ever asking why them and why me.

 

NICOLAS19

4:06 AM ET

July 27, 2010

excuses for failed conquest

God… you never learn. These were the same arguments in the Vietnam war over and over again. Can’t you read your own lines properly? They say something like that:
- „The fact that we are here for 9 years without making any progress doesn't necessarily mean we’re doing badly.”
- „One stray Afghan man allegedly said he loved our western model! Please disregard the fact that 9 years of ceaseless insurgency clearly means they don't want us there!”
- „All the previous colonialist conquerors managed to subjugate Afghanistan. We can be just like them, yeah!”

 

MARVEL

9:58 AM ET

July 27, 2010

You guys are unfair

The author never says we are winning in Afghanistan, never says we should win in Afghanistan, and actually says very little about the current conflict at all. The article is about a common misconception, which should be clarified. That is all. And the fact is most Afghans really do not like the Taliban. They don't like the US too much either, but they welcome foreign aid in order to build infrastructure, particularly schools and hospitals. Of course, alienating local power brokers by empowering a corrupt central government ignores the reality that tribal elders have always been and always be key contributors to Afghan stability. Nicolas19 says we have been battling 9 years of ceaseless insurgency, but that is far too simplistic. In my opinion, the single biggest issue we face is that Afghanistan is soooo complicated that no one strategy will achieve success. Every region requires a tailored approach. Counterinsurgency means devolving authority to local commanders who have the power to evolve at the tactical level. Hopefully, Petraeus will make sure that happens.

 

ASHOK2718

4:05 PM ET

July 27, 2010

A dialogue

Child : Water, water ...........I need some water. Some clean drinking water which doesn't kill me by giving me diarrhoea.
Khan : hey little guy have an iphone

Child : (2nd because the first one died of thrist) : food
Khan: IPHONE

Child: (3rd one) how do you charge its batteries ?
Khan: With more expensive solar panels

so on so forth

 

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6:17 PM ET

July 27, 2010

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DIMITRI K.

1:19 AM ET

July 28, 2010

"Bury the Graveyard"

Maybe best to help bury the undertakers?

 

DIMITRI K.

1:57 AM ET

July 28, 2010

History Avganistana americaine

Well, it's a barbaric country, which, nevertheless, wishes to have in their democracy, but because of its backwardness, and despite the assistance of the civilized world can not understand how to do it. But despite their savagery, backwardness, and inability to create a democracy, avgantsy a freedom-loving and hungry for democracy, the people, who strongly resisted all attempts to impose a dictatorship of the northern aggressor. Avganskie peasants preferred to die, but do not stoop to the Soviet KGB. The desire for freedom and private property in avganskogo people was so strong that he realized sovetsoe guide desperate, to understand all the futility of his existence and dissolve itself. Unfortunately avgantsy (people as naive as it is peaceful) succumbed to the influence of the Soviet Union and now a pitiful handful of backward members of this freedom-loving people endeavor to prevent avganskomu people and volunteers from the Western armies bring to this land of freedom mnogostrodalnuyu democracy and prosperity.

 

KONSTANTIN_TS

3:56 AM ET

July 28, 2010

The problem of Afghanistan is not in the wild and angry Afghans.

The problem of Afghanistan is not in the wild and angry Afghans.
The problem around Afghanistan. In those countries that have pilfered this country each in its side.
As this was during the invasion of Macedonia, which put a spoke in the wheel Persians,
English, who opposed the Russian in Afghanistan,
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which opposed the United States ...
Today, the U.S. seems to have faced there with the interests of the Arab oil magnates, China, Russia ...
It was only agreeing with them, you can withdraw from Afghanistan is not big losses ...

And the Afghans themselves are accustomed to simply enjoy and take money for that fight on the side of the man who pays more ... It's their business since the dawn of time ... Remember what he did Tamirlan and his tribe, before he seized the throne in Samarkand ... Incidentally, by poor knowledge of the history Wed Asia - Timur never transferred the capital to Herat ...

 

KMC2K9

3:45 PM ET

July 28, 2010

With Afghanistan such a

With Afghanistan such a battlefield and pakistan having massive problems with insurgents not only fighting in Afghanistan but Pakistan as well there is also the problems with trucks and vans that are taking supplies to troops in afghan as militia take control of these and have to be paid to protect or in some cases not harm the vechiles this is why many in Pakistan prefer not choose van driver jobs because of the massive dangers that surrond driving vechiles to afgan through pakistan.

With the president hopeful that this war can be completed quickly i really have to disagree more hope then anything.

just my few cents...

 

TYRTAIOS

5:44 PM ET

July 28, 2010

Nuanced history?

I sense some nuanced manipulating of historical events. As examples: Chinggis Khan and his Devil’s Horsemen, had the luxury of employing a scorched earth policy that even today is responsible for some of Afghanistan’s arid regions, but alas, would upset most Westerners at the breakfast table were we to apply that operational tactic. Maybe we should though?

To say that the introduction of Stinger missiles was the main game changer for the Muj to mount a comeback is also not a fair analysis. The Soviets forces were never compatible with training-up an Afghan army in the first place, preferring to play one commander off the other, least one become emboldened and lead a coup against a central government seen even less legitimate than Karzai. In addition, the Kremlin never really had an accurate picture of what was happening due to watered-down reports sent back by KGB/GRU personnel leery of displeasing their minders, and you'll note Kabul survived for three years after the Soviet withdrawal when support was cut-off due to the implosion of the Soviet Union, seen early on by Gorbie.

As for Alexander of Macedonia being shot in the heel? It was more likely the chest; possibly his early chroniclers thought to liken the incident along the lines of Achilles?

In my opinion, Afghanistan measures time in generations and understands that in time all invaders or occupyers must leave. . . .some sooner than others and in that sense, it is a graveyard of empires.

 

MALIKA79

3:08 PM ET

August 3, 2010

The history of Afghanistan is

The history of Afghanistan is very saturated. There was no single empire. Amanda from hidden object games news, crazy taxi tips, best mahjong clubs, hidden object games free.

 

DAVID LOYN

5:29 AM ET

August 13, 2010

Let's get the history right first

As one of the authors who has contributed a little to the ‘Graveyard of Empires’ tag for Afghanistan, I take issue with almost all of this piece – although have not yet read Thomas Barfield’s book. My own book ‘In Afghanistan’ (Palgrave Macmillan) tells the story of the last two centuries of foreign engagement in Afghanistan, beginning with the first British diplomatic mission in 1809.

Afghanistan’s reputation as unconquerable predates the nineteenth century. Long before it was called ‘Afghanistan’ it was known as ‘Yaghistan’ – the land of the unruly. Indian memories of Afghan conquerors went back to Sultan Mahmud, in the eleventh century, whose hordes would regularly sweep out of Ghazni and loot their way across the subcontinent.

There had been several major campaigns into India from Afghanistan in the eighteenth century, and that first British mission at the beginning of the nineteenth century was made once Britain had imposed its will on India, and did not want it threatened from the west.

The British ‘Army of Retribution’ in revenge for the defeat of 1842 may have sacked Kabul, and secured a military victory, but to no end. Britain accepted the right to rule of Dost Mohammed – the very king they had gone to war to unseat. Similarly the second British war in 1878 was undertaken to dismember Afghanistan and extend British influence to confront Russia in the north of Afghanistan, rather than across the North West frontier. The result was the opposite of what was intended – unifying Afghanistan and confirming the importance of the North West frontier, which Britain then drew a disastrous border along (providing a haven for al-Qaeda and the Taliban out of the reach of US ground forces inside Pakistan today).

None of this means that stability and security for Afghanistan now are impossible –although huge mistakes were made by the US-led invasion force in the early years, in particular empowering warlords.

Corruption and mismanagement at the centre, and the porous border from the east remain tough challenges. But the stabilisation project in the south and east is in much better shape than it often looks on the TV news. I was in Lashkar Gah, the main town in Helmand province, last week, and was struck by how normal life felt. Give the Afghans security and a sense of fair government and things could still turn out right – although the odds do not favour success.

And in all the arguments about whether this is a graveyard of empires – Britain learnt two lessons in the nineteenth century: firstly that unity in Afghanistan has often been hard to achieve, except against a foreign invader; and secondly that Afghan deployment of radical Islam to rally support against foreigners has a long history.

 

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7:38 AM ET

August 16, 2010

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August 16, 2010

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CASSANDRAAA

8:16 PM ET

August 16, 2010

Get out?

So, bottom line, you are saying we should get the hell out of Afghanistan, right?