Cozying Up to the Taliban

In recent months, humanitarian groups in Afghanistan have begun to cooperate much more closely with the Taliban to deliver their services. Is that a bad thing?

BY APRIL RABKIN | AUGUST 17, 2010

KABUL—It was a shock to everyone when 10 aid workers were killed in Afghanistan's remote Badakshan Province earlier this month. The Taliban claimed responsibility, reporters catalogued the victims' work, and expats across the country felt a shiver. But what surprised the humanitarian groups here most was that it happened at a time when all other signs were pointing in the opposite direction: Recent months have seen increasing cooperation between the Taliban and humanitarian groups and fewer targeted killings of aid workers.

Humanitarian groups have always had to strike a delicate balance of distance and cooperation with the Taliban. Aid workers provide services in territory under militant control -- which is a fair amount of Afghanistan these days. Recently, however, that cooperation has grown even closer and more explicit; aid groups have held meetings with the Taliban to negotiate for their safety, even producing a written document of permission from the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, in one case.

Aid workers' safety has generally improved through the shield of agreements and understandings, even if the recent slaughter shows cracks in the armor. As Nic Lee, director of the Afghan NGO Safety Office, an organization that advises aid groups on security, told me, "There's not a [militant] campaign against NGOs." If anything, humanitarian groups are getting cozier with the Taliban.

The reason for the cooperation is to keep aid workers and their services safe, says Laurent Saillard, director of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. It's an uphill battle, he told me, with national NGO staff are kidnapped at a rate of "10, 15, 20 people" per week. "So you can guess [that] there are a lot of NGOs in contact with the Taliban," he said. The Taliban has largely opened the door to NGOs; whereas insurgents from abroad, including Iran, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan have a "reputation [of being] much tougher when it comes to foreigners."

Well-known humanitarian groups such as Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) have all negotiated for their protection. And recently, the relative strength and organization of the Taliban has made it an easier task. Michiel Hofman, the organization's country representative, met face to face with Taliban commanders in the chain of command between March and May 2009 in order to re-establish the organization's presence in Afghanistan, he told me in an interview. MSF had pulled out of Afghanistan after five of its own employees were murdered in 2004. "The [Taliban] chain of command is more coherent in 2010 than 2004. It was much more fragmented then. That's why it's easier to establish these agreements." What exactly the agreement says is confidential, but what's clear is that MSF now has access to operate in Taliban controlled areas so long as its employees are clearly differentiated from NATO troops. Today, all MSF workers wear clearly marked vests with the group's insignia, front and back.

Equally strange bedfellows are now working in southern and eastern Afghanistan on a polio vaccination campaign. The effort is led by Unicef and the World Health Organization -- with the cooperation of both the Taliban and President Hamid Karzai's central government. For much of recent memory, Afghanistan was a country where polio vaccination was seen by clerics as a conspiracy to poison or sterilize Muslim children. Now, volunteers carry a letter of approval with Mullah Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban, as a signatory, the Wall Street Journal reported last January. The International Committee of the Red Cross acted as a go-between to negotiate, its spokesman, Bijan Frederic Farnoudi told me. The Journal story makes clear that the collaboration runs deep: "Red Cross workers coordinate with the Taliban almost daily their movement through insurgent-dominated areas. And the organization has established channels of communication that allow it to receive responses on requests sent to the Taliban's senior leadership within hours."

The International Assistance Mission (IAM), the organization whose workers were killed last week, has taken a different approach, negotiating mainly with local authorities and village elders, says director Dirk Frans. The IAM has been in Afghanistan since 1966, and the group has honed its strategy over the years. "When mujahedeen were fighting over Kabul [in the 1990s,] part of the town with the eye hospital was under one commander, but [hospital] staff lived under another commander. The mujahedeen agreed that, for a certain part of the day, there would be no fighting so that we could go from one section of town to another," recalled Frans. "We worked here when the king was in power, and when the Russians were in power ... then the mujahedeen, then the Taliban. Whoever is in control, that's [who] we relate to." What went wrong in Badakshan Province wasn't the IAM's local strategy; it was a local change of power. The area fell from NATO to Taliban control in late July, and it was right around that time that the aid workers showed up. With a new boss in town and old alliances in freefall, "They were in the wrong place at the wrong time."

REZA SHIRMOHAMMADI/AFP/Getty Images

 

April Rabkin is a freelance journalist in Afghanistan.

MARTY MARTEL

11:01 AM ET

August 18, 2010

Pakistan has cozied up with Taliban since 2001 and even before

Actually this cozying up to the Taliban has been going on for a long time with US turning blind eye to it.

US ally Pakistan has been harboring Haqqani’s HQN network in North Waziristan and Mullah Omar’s QST network in Baluchistan ever since Bush allowed Musharraf to spirit away by airlift hundreds, if not thousands, of Taliban operatives cornered by the advancing Northern Alliance in Kunduz in November, 2001. Pakistan relocated those Taliban cadres including Mullah Mohammed Omar in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan and Haqqani network (HQN) in North Waziristan from where Mullah Omar’s QST and Haqqani’s HQN have been planning raids in Afghanistan ever since.

US has knowingly tolerated this Pakistani duplicity ever since so there is nothing new in what April Rabkin reports.

As long as US government and news media continue to ignore Taliban’s Pakistani connections in fueling and sustaining Afghan insurgency as reported by Matt Waldman in ‘The sun in the sky‘ on 6/13/10, corroborated by WikiLeaks leaks on 7/25/10 and then further corroborated by Chris Alexander, Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan from 2005 until 2009 in his article on 7/30/10 titled ‘The huge scale of Pakistan‘s complicity‘, problems faced by US Afghan mission will continue to not only persist but compound.

All American officers in southern Afghanistan know that they can not prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line in North Waziristan and Baluchistan are neutralized. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line. This is where rubber meets the road for the famous General.

General McChrystal had warned about Pakistan’s sheltering of Taliban terrorists in his August 2009 report to Obama: Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year‘.

But Defense Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus have continued to justify Pakistani government’s (Pakistani Army as well as civilian government) terrorist connections by always evading to answer most fundamental question - why haven’t they ordered drone attacks on Mullah Omar’s QST in Baluchistan?

As Afghan President Karzai told a news conference in Kabul on 7/29/10 after WikiLeaks leaks, “The time has come for our international allies to know that the war against terrorism is not in Afghanistan’s homes and villages. But rather this war is in the sanctuaries, funding centers and training places of terrorism which are in Pakistan. Our international allies have the ability to destroy these Pakistani sanctuaries, but the question is why they are not doing it?“

With the trio of Pakistan apologists - Gates, Mullen and Petraeus - guiding US Afghan policy, no wonder US Afghan mission is headed for failure.

 

DWANA OTA

11:37 AM ET

September 15, 2010

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