Our Man in Sanaa

Why the big problem with Yemen is Yemen's president.

BY ELLEN KNICKMEYER | OCTOBER 1, 2010

SANAA, Yemen -- The scene in Yemen's capital Sept. 20 was almost embarrassing, according to those who looked on: John Brennan, the influential White House counterterrorism advisor, was trying to leave Sanaa after a fly-in, fly-out visit with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh about his country's burgeoning al Qaeda branch.

But Saleh was too busy pleading for U.S. cash to let the 25-year CIA veteran drive away, according to people familiar with Brennan's visit. Clutching Brennan by the arm, Yemen's burly president of 30-plus years stood at the open door of Brennan's limo, pressing his appeals that the United States pay up now, not later, on the $300 million that Barack Obama's administration is planning to give Yemen over the near term to help it combat al Qaeda. (Someone finally eased shut the limo door on the Yemeni leader, allowing Brennan to get away, witnesses said.)

And everyone knows what will happen if Saleh doesn't get more free money, because it's a threat Saleh and his officials use at every opportunity to demand international aid: Without an urgent and unending infusion of foreign cash, it will lose its fight against the aggressive Saudi and Yemeni offshoots of al Qaeda that Saleh long allowed -- though he doesn't admit that part of the story -- to make their home here in Yemen.

"No friend of Yemen can stand by when the economy of that state comes close to collapse ... or when the authority of the government is challenged by extremism, by violence, by crime, or by corruption," British Foreign Secretary William Hague said on Sept. 24 in New York, striking the spunky, this-is-Yemen's-finest-hour theme at a "Friends of Yemen" conference of officials of roughly 30 countries gathered together to brainstorm propping up the Arab world's poorest and most chaotic country despite Yemen's best efforts to collapse.

Yemeni Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawar echoed the World War II theme when it came to hinting what kind of money international donors might want to drop on the dresser on the way out -- that is, if they want Yemen to fight al Qaeda.

"Certainly, we need a Marshall Plan for supporting Yemen. I believe the amount needed is around 40 billion dollars," Mujawar told the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. (Yemen's annual GDP is a mere $27 billion.)

Reviewing Yemen's recent history suggests a different idea: The big problem with Yemen isn't al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Nor is it the Zaidi Shiite rebellion in Yemen's north or the separatist movement in Yemen's south. It isn't the 40 percent unemployment. It isn't the near one-in-10 childhood mortality rate or the malnutrition that causes more than half the country's children to be stunted. Although all those factors exist, tragically, in this hospitable, ancient, and beautiful country, and all are grave, none of them is Yemen's main problem.

No, the big problem with Yemen is Yemen's president -- Saleh.

AFP/Getty Images

 

Ellen Knickmeyer is a former Associated Press bureau chief in Africa and Washington Post bureau chief in the Middle East who is now doing research in Yemen.

TYRTAIOS

8:48 AM ET

October 2, 2010

A deal with the devil

A nice view of Sana'a from the hills above that doesn't do this ancient city justice for those looking for the unspoiled charm of a city untouched architecturally, or otherwise, by western influence.

Anecdotally, President Salih welcomed many of Saddam Hussein's former intelligence officers who sought refuge in the country after the U.S. invasion in 2003, and has incorporated their talents, honed to perfection under Saddam, to improve his government's capabilities to repress Yemenis - something I would imagine hasn’t escaped our own intelligence field officers, who now probably work with them.

I think we have made a deal with the devil, and unfortunately, given the average male Yemeni’s proclivity for chewing khat for endless hours a day, seven days a week, squandering more family income on that product than groceries, I doubt the U.S. could help most citizens of that country to finally have a say, whether we put conditions on financial aid or not.

 

FADHL

10:32 AM ET

October 10, 2010

really?

i find your comment quit disgusting and dishonoring, first you fetishize the architecture and then you question an entire populations will for happiness or at least a go at it... Yemeni or something else, thats racist buddy.

 

AFARIS

10:37 AM ET

October 2, 2010

One of The Best and Concise Articles

One of the best and concise articles about Yemen President's role in the mismanagement and corruption in the country.

As a former advisor at the Presidential Palace, I am no opponent and even belong partially to the regime's tribe, yet I can say with all sincerity that this man is a belligerent dictator, a tyrant; and another Saddam Hussein in the making.

I call upon all donors to refrain from feeding up this regime with cash dough, since it will end up being stolen, misused and even channeled to regime-affiliated mockup Islamic terrorists to engender further financial aid, with no end at sight.

As the article concludes, the United States would help most by allowing Yemen's citizens, and potentially better Yemeni, but non-religious leaders, to finally have a say, since the Islamists can potentially be even worse.

Abdulla A. Faris
Former Technical Advisor,
The Presidential Palace and Prime Ministerial Office
http://www.facebook.com/Abdulla.Faris

 

CLIVE

2:42 PM ET

October 3, 2010

Have seen him in Eid prayer interesting capture on camera

If you have missed an interesting capture on Eid prayers. He shook hands with many people for no more than two seconds before guards come to push greeters. Later seen in a long and intimate conversation with AbdulMajid AlZindani - the mastermind of Salafia-Wahabia-Qaedia in Yemen. I think that was a miscalculation by camera directors. This should give a clue where US tax payers money are being diverted to.

 

MARTY MARTEL

2:44 PM ET

October 3, 2010

Our men (and women) in Islamabad are far bigger problem

Our men in Islamabad have been far bigger problems for US than our man in Sanaa as Ellen Knickmeyer has to know.

Let us just look at last 15 years or so.

While being forced to join US fight against Taliban in 2001 under the threat of dire consequences by Richard Armitage, General Musharraf played a duplicitous game ‘running with the hares while hunting with the hounds‘.

Let us NOT forget that Pakistan’s democratic government of Pakistan chose of its own free will, to facilitate relocation of Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996.

Let us NOT forget that Pakistani Army and ISI created what ex-CIA official Bruce Reidel called 'this jihadist Frankenstein monster' on their own with full financing provided by Pakistan’s democratic governments during 1990s.

Al Qaeda, Taliban, LeT, JeM, JuD, HuJi and countless other terror outfits have been spawned in Pakistan, the official ’terror center’ of the world as per CIA with the help, support and sanctuary provided by the Pakistani State that is owned by Pakistani Army that uses ’terrorism’ as an official tool of state policy to further its own objectives.
Let us NOT forget that Osama bin Laden had publicly congratulated Pakistan in 1998 for exploding world’s first Islamic nuclear bomb.

Let us NOT forget that Pakistani Army used to provide military protection to Osama bin Laden during his umpteen visits to Pakistan. Let us NOT forget that Osama bin Laden has received many dialysis treatments at Pakistan’s military hospitals.

Let us NOT forget that Osama bin Laden had made huge campaign contributions to Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s election campaigns in 1990 and 1996. Let us NOT forget that ex-prime minister Nawaz Sharif has personally met Osama bin Laden at least three times in Saudi Arabia at Nawaz Sharif’s own request.

Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton’s national security advisor told 9/11 Commission in March, 2004 that ’Pakistani Army was the midwife of Taliban’. UN report on Bhutto killing published in April, 2010 confirmed this fact when it stated that "The PAKISTANI MILITARY ORGANIZED AND SUPPORTED THE TALIBAN TO TAKE CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN IN 1996“.

Declassified DIA Washington D.C., "IIR (intelligence Information Report) Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan," dated November 7, 1996 states how "Pakistan's ISI is heavily involved in Afghanistan," and also details different roles various ISI officers play in Afghanistan. Stating that Pakistan uses sizable numbers of its Pashtun-based Frontier Corps in Taliban-run operations in Afghanistan, the document clarifies that, "these Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary combat“.

Declassified U.S. Department of State, Cable "Pakistan Support for Taliban" from Islamabad dated Sept. 26, 2000 states that "while Pakistani support for the Taliban has been long-standing, the magnitude of recent support is unprecedented." In response Washington orders the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to immediately confront Pakistani officials on the issue and to advise Islamabad that the U.S. has "seen reports that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance and military advisors. [The Department] also understand[s] that large numbers of Pakistani nationals have recently moved into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, apparently with the tacit acquiescence of the Pakistani government." Additional reports indicate that direct Pakistani involvement in Taliban military operations has increased.

 

YEMENI

12:11 AM ET

October 4, 2010

Obama-Saleh, a marriage of convenience

Dear Mr. Knikmeyer, I would like you to help by asking your government to stop funding the Saleh regime. This is not America's war nor is it the Yemeni people's war, this is the Yemeni Royal's family war.

Let me elaborate further:

- The Royal family of Yemen (yes the Royal family), has no tool or leverage over the west and the neighbouring country other than the fear from Al-Qaida and of a failed state at an important part of the world.

- The Royal family has no leverage over the Yemeni public and the Yemeni tribes other than the military power and bribery (much of which comes from the Saudis).

- The central government does have good reach over most of Yemen (at least militarily), if it needs something or someone it can get it (except in Sa'ada in the North which was orchastrated to be that way by the regime, but that's a different story).

- The Royal family (especially the president) are not honest, contrary to Yemeni values of honor and tradition, he does not keep his word and many will confirm that he has no difficulty in lying.

- The Royal family's primary concern is not nation building but the transfer of power to the new generation, in strengthening the president's son and getting as much money as possible. They know that by shifting the Qaida-Mania to Yemen will mean more funding, training and support to the military establishment and more acceptances to the blue blooded kids.

- All the religious school are penetrated by the government and its security establishment, Omar Farouq (the Nigerian kid) like all foreigners in Yemen, could not have flew to Yemen multiple times, attended training camps, met with extremistis and acquired explosives without the Yemeni government knowing of it (it is even claimed that he met Alawlaki several times).
May I also remind you of the multiple escapes of the most dangerous prisonser - including 30 prisoners that fled the most secure prison in the country by digging their way out using spoons over a period of several weaks, if you believe that this was not orchastirated by the security establishment than I will have my friend (a wealthy Nigerian prince) contact you to let you know how to make 10 million dollars.

- The American government surely knows the above facts but its a marriage of convenience. The vulnerbale Obama adminstration's plan is: "let's make Saleh happy which will buy us some peaceful time, and enable us to make strikes against al-qaida that will make the Obama administration seem strong in national security and in hunting America's enemies. While Saleh will use this marriage-of-convenience to gain support for his sons and make money as well as occassionally take out some of his enemies by deploying the new resources.

Mr Knikmeyer, this not the American people's war nor is it the Yemeni people's war. We do not want your money. If you want to help the Yemenis ask questions about the way the country and elections are run demand actions or do nothing at all but do not give this regime any money or arms, it will only be used against our future - us the people of Yemen.''

The few extremists in the mountains and valleys in Yemen are a result of the much bigger problems of the failed state and are not the cause; if you want to help, help by staying away not by making our problems bigger

 

YEMENI

12:24 AM ET

October 4, 2010

Correction

Inadvertently referred to Ms. Knikmeyer as Mr. Knikmeyer.
Thanks for your efforts, Ms. Knikmeyer.

Yemeni

 

AYMANHAMIDI

1:52 PM ET

October 4, 2010

Our man in Sanaa

The article is excellent and is a must-read for all policy makers and advisors. There is however one mistake: The Zaidis did not take up arms against the government in 2004. For over a year they engaged in Tjinamen-square style protests. Salih feared that Husayn al-Huthi's charisma would be contagious; when he sent the army to arrest him, fighting broke out (see more on the subject in my article in Middle Eastern Studies, March 2009).

 

CYBERFOOL

9:22 AM ET

October 7, 2010

Send Afganistan a message

And a side benefit in letting the Yemeni government fall is that our folks in Afganistan can just point to Yemen and say, "You too, unless you reform".