The Power Struggle Among China's Elite

Reminbi revaluation, South China Sea brinksmanship, a Nobel scuffle. What's making the Chinese act so crazy? Hint: it's election season in Beijing and no one really knows who's in charge.

BY KERRY BROWN | OCTOBER 14, 2010

When U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates landed on Oct. 10 in Hanoi, he hoped to demonstrate Washington's commitment to stability in Southeast Asia. It turns out he was pushing on an open door: Countries in the region are deeply anxious about Beijing's naval buildup and its recent aggressive moves to turn the Pacific Ocean into a Chinese lake.

Meanwhile, Beijing is lashing out at the West over human rights, the environment, and the valuation of its currency, leading many to argue that China's rise is finally beginning to have the destabilizing impact so long predicted by some leading international relations scholars and pundits. But many observers are missing another important driver of Beijing's recent assertiveness: China's foreign policy is not in the hands of its diplomats.

Officially, China's highest-ranking foreign-policymaker is Dai Bingguo, who ranks only 50 in the whole political system. The real power is in the Politburo of the Communist Party -- and, to be precise, in its nine-member-strong standing committee. It is here that the directions to get tough on Japan over the South China Sea, or the United States over renminbi revaluation, are made. And Friday marks the start of the annual four-day Politburo meeting, which begins with a unusual cloud hanging over preceedings.

This Chinese "elite of elites" is somewhat distracted at the moment. In about two years' time, seven of the current nine will have reached retirement age and will need to step aside. Every five years, during the party congress, the next generation of leaders is elevated, and 2012 is going to be a big year: We will see a shift from the "fourth generation" of Chinese leaders under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao to a "fifth." A new era will start. And in theory, Hu and Wen will sink into quiet retirement, minding their own business and letting the younger guys (and perhaps this time one woman) get on with running the show.

Only this time there are a couple of problems. The first is that there is no powerful elder patron who can direct this whole process smoothly. Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of his day, anointed Hu many years before he finally got to the top. It ensured that his road was relatively clear. Deng's immense prestige and reputation meant anyone arguing with Hu had to reckon with the influence and legacy of Deng.

While Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin, still exercises influence, even in his mid-80s, he has nothing like the clout of a Deng. So the transition this time will be without a patriarch's guiding hand. That means that while politburos before have had high turnovers, the impact of a large number retiring this time could be far more destabilizing.

No one knows what kind of battles might be taking place now in the central government compound in Beijing where the key leaders live and work. The politburos under Hu and Wen have been watertight. Nothing much gets out about who supports whom, and who is in favor, who in danger. Rumors have swirled around Wen for some time about his lack of support in the party and his occasionally falling foul of Hu. He appeared in the southern city of Shenzhen in late August talking up political reform, leading to speculation that he was trying to create at least some legacy on the more liberal side of the party. But before anyone could get too excited, Wen produced the strongest condemnation of the Japanese when they detained the captain of a stray Chinese ship near disputed sea territory in September. Was he opportunistically compensating for being accused of being too soft earlier in the year? We simply don't know. Wen's recent interview with Fareed Zakaria -- censored by state media -- only adds to the uncertainty. Unlike with Western rulers, however, the habit of producing lengthy autobiographies after politicians leave office has yet to catch on in China, so we will probably never find out for sure what exactly has been going on.

FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS: EAST ASIA
 

Kerry Brown is a senior fellow in the Asia Program at London-based Chatham House.

FIRST ADVISOR

1:14 PM ET

October 15, 2010

Zero Analysis Analyst

The limitation of this opinion column is that Mr. Brown attempts to use the emotional manipulation of confessing he knows nothing to convince the reader he has some authority for magically transforming zany speculation into the god-given Truth. His vainglorious effort to appear wise fails, of course. There is no evidence there is any confusion or conflict whatsoever in the Chinese central government. Extrapolation from what we know of our own governments, we can reasonably conclude people in the Chinese government disagree with other over many subjects. We cannot assume that a lack of perfect agreement means they are tearing at each others' throats tooth and claw. Mr. Brown has no evidence to support his wild melodrama of 100 percent fiction. While the avoidance and prevention of looking like an ignorant fool merely requires keeping his mouth shut and waiting in mature patience to see what happens. Presumably, Chatham House is desperate for PR advertising to attract clients and income, and they decided to put out any paper, no matter how vacuous of content, just to get their name in the news again. Being told nothing at great length doesn't inspire me to offer them my money for more of the same.

 

CARDSHARP

7:34 AM ET

October 19, 2010

ditto

"Beijing lashing out at the West over human rights, the environment, and the valuation of its currency"?

a basic mistake in cause and effect.

 

MCDSHANBAOBAO

3:25 PM ET

October 15, 2010

You write like you criticize.

This is an echo of recieved wisdom, yes. I respect that fact that the author has no informed authority and demonstrates that in his analysis as well as stating it explicitly. Nonetheless, there are facts, not insights, that are important and are cogently articulated.

One serious error: Japan isn't putting its foot in the South China Sea. The EAST China Sea, rather. Who's your editor?

 

PUBLICUS

5:51 PM ET

October 15, 2010

100 years of volitility

The Jung Gwo (Chinese) have had volatility in their society and culture for the past 100 years - indeed, the Chinese have suffered disruptions and a self inflicted disorder for the past 200 years.

Your "Chinese central government" has had nothing but volatility and chaos since Mao established the CPC/PRC. There have been harsh internal struggles within the Communist Party of China from the beginning of the CPC/PRC. Mao, for instance, purged Deng Xiao Peng because Deng was an economic reformer who had ideas directly contrary to the ideological 'purity' of Mao.

Today there are daily roaring shouting matches in Beijing concerning the direction of t he CPC/PRC, meaning the same obvious divisions continue to exist within the CPC.

Mao organized the brutal "cultural revolution" to regain his own power as an incompetent head of state and to try to destroy the possibilities of economic (but the heavens forbid political ) reform.

The Tianaman Square demonstrations in 1989 went on for more than a month because of the natural internal divisions within the CPC. There were those in the CPC of the time who wanted reform, others who were Old Testament fascist hard liners that ultimately prevailed to unleash the thunderbolts of the People's Liberation Army to slaughter their own people who'd been demonstrating for democracy, to include a significant number of the Beijing population.

The same divisions continue to exist within the CPC. Indeed, the present university age population of the CPC/PRC, knowing this, want to believe that in 25 years the old order will erode away, that democracy and justice can take hold in China. I hope they are right, but they cannot say what the 1 400 000 000 Chinese would do with democracy if they ever were to have it. Ever.

Yes, the Jung Gwo are a peaceful people. However, their CPC rulers are not - their CPC rulers are violent mass murders of their own people and of the peoples they have subjugated in Asia, namely Tibet and the conquered Muslim Turkik speaking people of the far western province of XinJiang which borders on the 'stan' countries of cental Asia. Accordingly, imagine what the CPC would do to those of us globally who have and believe in democracy were the CPC/PRC to become the global hegemon it unrealistically intends to be.

Which raises the larger question of what the CPC/PRC stands for in the modern world. What, besides being the Chinese, do the CPC/PRC offer to the modern world? What do the Chinese offer to the modern and future world, besides a reactionary censoring fascist dictatorship?

What???