From Russia With Blood

C.J. Chivers talks with Foreign Policy about the Kalashnikov, the world's real weapon of mass destruction.

INTERVIEW BY CHARLES HOMANS | OCTOBER 15, 2010

Iraqi men march in a parade in Tikrit, Iraq, Saddam Hussein's hometown, on Feb. 8, 2003.

The Avtomat Kalashnikova, C.J. Chivers writes in The Gun, is "the world's most widely recognized weapon, one of the world's most recognizable objects." The AK-47 and its descendants have defined and exacerbated half a century of guerrilla conflict, terrorism, and crime; it is the most abundant firearm in the world, with as many as 100 million Kalashnikovs in circulation, 10 times more than any other rifle.

Chivers, a Marine Corps veteran and senior writer at the New York Times, has spent nearly a decade mapping the spread of the Kalashnikov and untangling its history, from the dusty government archives of the former Soviet Union to the battlefields of Afghanistan. The Gun, his history of the weapon, was published this week. He spoke via email with FP's Charles Homans about the AK-47's uncertain origins, how it has transformed modern warfare, and why the age of the Kalashnikov won't end anytime soon.

Foreign Policy: The Soviet Union's atomic bomb and the Kalashnikov both date from the same year, and you suggest that the United States made a critical error in obsessing over the former while ignoring the latter. But is there anything the United States could have done to limit the spread and influence of the AK-47?

C.J. Chivers: The United States is not responsible for the Kalashnikov's mass production or stockpiling, and during the Cold War it could have done nothing to stop these things from occurring. Later, while it certainly would have been helpful, in the security sense, if it had done more to contain the spread of weapons and ammunition that have rushed out of post-Cold War stockpiles, it might be useful to ask this question of China and Russia -- the two main Kalashnikov producers, who have shown little interest in undoing the effects of their exported rifles. That said, there are many ways to contain the ongoing proliferation, and rather than pursue them with any real determination, the United States has instead become the largest known purchaser of Kalashnikovs, which it has reissued in Iraq and Afghanistan with scant accountability. One thing about the AK-47 story is that almost no one looks good in it.

Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images  

Mikhail Kalashnikov with the assault rifle that bears his name on Nov. 23, 2002, in Izhevsk, Russia.

 

FP: The Gun expends much ink parsing the origins of the Kalashnikov and the biography of its designer, Mikhail Kalashnikov, sorting out myth from (often unattainable) fact. Why are the circumstances of the gun's creation so uniquely opaque? Why does it matter how much we know about them?

CC: Obviously I am interested in guns. But I am not interested in them only as weapons, or objects. Guns can tell us many things; they are lenses that are very useful for looking at other subjects and themes. In this case, tracing the origins of the Kalashnikov is not just a tour of the evolution of automatic arms. It's a journey into Stalin's (and then Khrushchev's) Soviet Union, with all of its national anxiety and the climate of fear and lies. This is a pretty grim ride. In the story of the Kalashnikov is a means to examine and understand how official falsehood and propaganda is organized, and how it works. The workings of this propaganda make the pursuit difficult. They also make it valuable.

Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images

A Russian boy holds his Kalashnikov in preparation for military training on March 5, 1999.

FP: How does one go about peeling away the mythology surrounding the Kalashnikov?

CC: It's a mix of textual and technical analysis, and of course interviewing. First is the gathering of materials, accumulating all of the public and private statements you can find from the people involved in the weapon's design. Much of this material is in Russian. It takes years to find what can be found, and to understand it. You bump into closed official archives in Russia, and try to track down sources who might have the material in their apartments in Moscow or in the former Leningrad, or in Kiev.

As you gather the materials, you set the statements against each other, and what you find is that Kalashnikov's own account shifts in the telling over the years, and that much of what he said was challenged by important peers who were there as the weapon took its shape. You also examine the weapon itself, closely, and set it against what is known about other weapons in the design pipeline at the time. In this way, you can see what features the Kalashnikov design team borrowed (some might say, lifted) from other weapons by other designers. And what you find is that the evidence strongly indicates that many of the ideas credited to Mikhail Kalashnikov do not appear to have been his own, or were outright claimed by others in his circle. Ultimately, the conclusion is inescapable: The automatic Kalashnikov, his namesake, resulted not from one man's epiphany, but from design convergence in a massive, state-directed pursuit, and that there is a sordid back story, including the fate of one man who was involved who was later swept away in the repression. This man's role was unremarked upon for decades. Further, Kalashnikov's own engineer, the man with whom he said he worked most closely, claimed that several of the main elements of the rifle -- the things that make it what it is -- were his ideas, and that Mikhail Kalashnikov opposed them and had to be convinced to allow these modifications to his penultimate prototype. All of this flies in the face of Soviet legend. It also helps you understand the Soviet Union more fully.

FP: At what point did the spread of the Kalashnikov become uncontainable?

CC: The key decisions were in the unchecked manufacture and stockpiling that occurred, beginning from the 1950s, in the Eastern Bloc. Once the rifles were made by the tens of millions, it was only a matter of time before their influence would be felt. 

Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images  

 

A 14-year-old Montagnard boy with a captured Communist Kalashnikov on the Vietnam-Cambodia border west of Pleiku, Vietnam, in August 1968.

FP: You write that the United States had the "most puzzling reaction" of any country to the Kalashnikov. Why was it that we alone failed to grasp the significance of the rifle, when everyone else did?

CC: There was a romance in the American military with the idea of the frontier marksman, and it manifested itself in the institutional idea of the far-shooting, eagle-eyed American grunt. So along comes the idea of a lower-powered rifle, with a shorter barrel, that fires automatically -- three traits that make it less accurate, especially at medium and long range. This was the AK-47. It was early in the Cold War. The two sides were making choices about how to arm themselves. The Pentagon took stock of the AK-47 and all but sneered. It did not even classify the AK-47 as a rifle. Traditionalists advocated a heavier rifle that fired a more powerful round. The M-14 was designed, developed, and fielded. When the two rifles met in Vietnam, the Pentagon realized its mistake.

Henri Huet/AP 

Looters with Kalashnikovs watch for authorities at the Isan Bakhriat archeological site in Iraq on May 21, 2003.

FP: The experience of American servicemen in Vietnam, saddled with the flawed M-16 and fighting in conditions that favored the Kalashnikov's capabilities, added much to the myth of the AK-47. How is it viewed by American soldiers today? Does the weapon maintain any mystique for them, with their now superior arms?

CC: There is a deep and grudging respect for the weapon's place. Yes, there are better weapons out there these days, particularly for fighting in arid climates where ranges of typical engagement stretch out. But most troops I have spent time with understand that their world is armed up with Kalashnikovs, and made much more dangerous because of it, and their lives are endangered by it.

Matt Moyer/Getty Images 

A Kalashnikov-armed guerrilla defends a remote rebel base in Afghanistan's Safed Koh Mountains on Feb. 10, 1988.

FP: The Kalashnikov was the defining weapon of the Cold War's small wars and proxy conflicts, but it also defines the upheavals of the post-Cold War era, from the 1989 execution of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu -- performed by a group of soldiers with Kalashnikovs -- to the current conflict in Afghanistan. How did the weapon's role in and influence on conflict change after the fall of the Soviet Union?

CC: It only increased, because as the brittle governments of the Eastern Bloc fell apart, many of them lost control, then custody, of their guns, and boundless supply flowed into conflict zones. The weapon already was enormously significant. Now it is more so.

Robert Nickelsberg/Liaison 

A chrome-plated folding-stock Kalashnikov with pearl hand grips and receiver printed with a photo of Saddam Hussein.

FP: How has the symbolism of the Kalashnikov evolved in the post-Soviet era? In the 1970s it was straightforward, denoting a generic leftist bravado -- but by the time Osama bin Laden was posing with the weapon in his video dispatches, you write, it had taken on much more complex meanings.

CC: As the rifles have moved about the world, they have been appropriated by all manner of combatants to have all manner of meanings. The rifle's evolving iconography is a fascinating subject because it shows how both governments and combatants view themselves. And it's even more interesting because it began with an ample amount of lies. The Kalashnikov, in the Kremlin's version of its meaning, is a tool for national defense and liberation. But its first uses were not for defense at all, but in smashing freedom movements in the Soviet satellites in Europe, and later in shooting unarmed civilians trying to flee the socialist world for the West. This part of its story has been redacted from the official account. So the entire Kalashnikov legend all began with a series of manipulated stories, and in the decades since, the rifle and its meanings have been recast repeatedly. This is a rich and rewarding line of reporting. In it is a pantheon of modern war. Saddam Hussein handed out rifles that were plated in gold; they were strongman party favors. Bin Laden has made a point of being photographed with the version of the rifle carried by Soviet helicopter crews in the 1980s, a clear case of the rifle, almost like a scalp, signifying martial cred. (In this case, he might be trying a little too hard, because there is no credible evidence I know of that he was ever involved in downing a Soviet helicopter.) We'll see more of this. To governments and combatants alike, symbols matter, and the Kalashnikov can be assigned an almost infinite array of meanings.

PAUL J. RICHARDS/AFP/Getty Images

A member of the Lord's Resistance Army in Ri-Kwamba, southern Sudan, on Nov. 12, 2006.

FP: The Gun includes a chilling account of the use of the Kalashnikov by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, where the gun's durability in a harsh environment has prolonged the guerrillas' activities and its ease of operation has enabled the deployment of child soldiers. How responsible is the weapon for the nature of the protracted, de-professionalized wars that have torn apart so much of east and central Africa over the past two decades? Are there conflicts that we likely wouldn't have seen but for the proliferation of Kalashnikovs?

CC: I like these questions, so let me riff on them. Let's be clear: Without Kalashnikovs, there would still be war, and plenty of it. It would be naive, even foolish to think otherwise. But let's also be clear about the Kalashnikov's role: It would also be naive, even foolish, to think that the costs and consequences of many wars would not be lessened if automatic Kalashnikovs were not so widely distributed, and so readily available.

Once or twice I have heard very accomplished Western soldiers say, "Hey, the AK is not very accurate, and it's not very well-used by many of the poorly trained people who fight conventional forces; therefore it's influence on war today is less than what it might seem." In this view, the improvised explosive device (aka, the IED) or the suicide bomber is the greater threat to many troops in the field, and military small arms are of less importance than they used to be. I reject this latter view, that the rise of one weapon in two wars signifies the decline of another. They are complements. What do I mean?

STUART PRICE/AFP/Getty Images 

 

Ugandan People's Defense Force soldiers patrol in rural northern Uganda on June 16, 2005, searching for LRA guerrillas.

CC (continued): I won't downplay the role of the improvised bomb, which in recent years has become the dominant cause of wounding to Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. But a broader view is essential to understanding war and how it is waged. We need to get past the lenses of the most robust and well-equipped forces in the world because (outside the Kalashnikov's early advantage against the early variants of the M-16 in Vietnam) the experiences of Western troops against Kalashnikovs is not where this weapon is at its best, or most influential, at least if measured by body counts. The fuller and more important measure of the automatic Kalashnikov is not how its users perform in head-to-head combat against the current generation of Westernized forces, who have body armor, armored transport, updated weapons with updated optics and night sights, extensive fire support, and medical treatment both immediately (within most patrols) and beyond (via medevac helicopter crews, forward hospitals, and then the infrastructure of the home nation). Of course a network of lightly trained, lightly resourced fighters with Kalashnikovs faces material and tactical disadvantages in many head-to-head gunfights of this sort, and so they have adapted other weapons to match the fight. Thus, the IED.

Let's do the fuller measures. Casualties are not the only yardstick. A weapon can have an enormous effect without wounding anyone at all because it limits the other side's movements or the choices made each day about where and how to go. It can reduce an enemy's mobility and increase the costs of his operations by encouraging him to wear or ride in armor. It can redirect the direction and ambitions of operations -- from campaigns to patrols, in many, many ways. And even this is not enough. The fullest measure of the Kalashnikov is its effects on the vulnerable -- on civilians, on weak governments, on lower-performing government forces, like, for example, the Afghan police or, as you allude to, the Uganda People's Defense Force. Entire areas of many countries are beyond their governments' influence because local anger is coupled with automatic Kalashnikovs, which engender lawlessness and provide a means for crime, rebellion, insurgency, and human rights abuses on a grand scale. The Lord's Resistance Army provided a telling example. It descended from an insurgent organization that had few Kalashnikovs and was short-lived -- its precursor was, in a word, routed. Then came the LRA. It acquired Kalashnikovs. Almost 25 years later, it's still in the field, and the territory it operated in is a social and economic ruin. That was a different war before Joseph Kony got his AKs. And there are many other examples.

Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

A diver retrieves a Kalashnikov from the bottom of the Suez Canal in Egypt in June 2001.

FP: Does the age of the Kalashnikov have a foreseeable end?

CC: Not that I can foresee. Vast numbers of the weapons were manufactured, and many slipped from state custody. The rifles in storage in old stockpiles remain in excellent condition and will provide fresh supply in the decades ahead. China still manufactures and exports them in unknown quantities. Venezuela is opening a new factory. And wherever they are -- locked up in armories or loose in the field -- they are too durable and long-lasting for us to talk about obsolescence. All of this, and efforts to address military assault-rifle proliferation are often lackluster and, viewed together, incoherent. This combination of factors all but ensures that we will see this rifle, and all of its characteristic uses, for the rest of our lives. Will they become obsolete? Not on any depreciation schedule that I have seen. I routinely find Kalashnikovs from the 1950s still circulating in Afghanistan. The rifles are more than a half-century old, and they are still in active use. What do these rifles tell us? They tell us that the Kalashnikov age is nowhere near over.

Jonathan S. Blair/National Geographic/Getty Images

Correction: An image of a Congolese child soldier originally featured in this slideshow included a rifle that was incorrectly labeled a Kalashnikov in the caption. It was actually a Vz. 58. We regret the error.

 

C.J. Chivers is a senior writer at the New York Times and blogs at www.cjchivers.com.

Charles Homans is an associate editor at
Foreign Policy.

TYRTAIOS

7:07 PM ET

October 15, 2010

Call a spade a rifle

Oh come on, as one former 0302 to another, the statement the U.S. didn't have a hand in the disbursement of the Ak-47, and couldn't have done anything about it is a bit of a stretch.

Very bluntly, the U.S. is no saint when it comes to the proliferation of the Kalashnikov line of small arms. Of course in order to maintain official deniability of any overt U.S. involvement in historic conflicts stretching from the Congo, to our own Southern Hemisphere in Latin America, and of late, the loss of thousands of AK assault rifles shipped into Iraq, we find the AK-47 quite handy.

 

CJC

9:49 PM ET

October 15, 2010

The statememt was about mass

The statememt was about mass production and stockpiling -- not about distribution. The United States was not involved in the mass production and stockpiling of the Eastern bloc's signature shoulder-fired arm. It has been active -- nay, very active -- in Kalashnikov distribution. It remains so to this day.

 

TYRTAIOS

10:38 PM ET

October 15, 2010

A shovel is still a spade

Thank you for the response CJC. I sensed that would be your reply, and was always aware of that valid point.

But my point was, and is, America benefited, and continues financially from the glut of Kalashnikovs and wonder why you're making your point - it is a zero sum game.

 

SAM FROM CALIFORNIA

9:49 PM ET

October 15, 2010

What about-

-the RPG? A companion article on that would have been interesting, and it is another result of practical, reliable, cheap Soviet manufacturing which has destabilized the world.

Anyways, the AK has been and will always be a highly practical weapon, simply because of its low production cost and reliability. I like the story of AKs from the 50s... If the Soviets could have figured how how to make the Lada even half as reliable as that, perhaps their government wouldn't have tumbled.

 

SAMJIGGENS

3:55 AM ET

October 16, 2010

Correction

I'd like to point out that the rifle slung over the Congolese child soldier's shoulder on page 4 is a Vz. 58, not a Kalashnikov.

 

CHARLES HOMANS

2:41 PM ET

October 16, 2010

Re: Correction

Thanks for the correction, Sam. C.J. Chivers writes:

"Sam, you're right, and your correction goes to one of enduring and likley indelible problems with many conversations about the Kalashnikov line. All sorts of people -- soldiers, anti-gun activists, journalists, and many of the combatants who carry the rifles -- call them AK-47s. And rarely are they actually AK47s. Usually they are derivitaves, a family of descendant firearms, licensed and unlicensed, Eastern bloc and otherwise, that were based on the AK-47's basic design. The most common of these are the AKM derivatives, one of which is shown in the yellow image that opens this Q&A and is embedded with the headline. The acronym AK-47 once defined a very specific rifle, which had a very specific period of production. Today the acronym is a short-hand, and an imprecise shorthand, for a large class of weapons. And then there is the vz. 58. The Czech vz. 58 is not a Kalashnikov at all, though at a distance it is often mistaken for one, if only because it has a Kalashnikov-like profile. It is much less common than the real item, but it routinely manages to show up in photographs from war zones, where it is labeled an AK-47. In this case, the photo agency that provided the image had the caption wrong. Foreign Policy has removed the photograph. Thank you for pointing this out. And this provides a chance to talk about another error related to the vz58. Through good intentions mixed with ignorance, thousands of vz. 58s were handed out by the U.S. military in Afghanistan a few years ago, which told the Afghans they were 'AK-47s.' They have since mostly been recalled. I'll have a sepearate post about this mix-up soon on The New York Times' At War blog. Thank you again. We are grateful for your close read."

 

BTAVERNIER

11:24 AM ET

October 18, 2010

From USA?

It would be hard to imagine an article in this magazine about landmines in Angola under a headline "From the USA with Blood".

 

CEOUNICOM

1:30 PM ET

October 18, 2010

Yawn...

Like Africans ever needed much help killing each other. Weapons are a symptom of violence, not a source.

That said, there are plenty of articles about the persistent nature of landmines, and Western culpability in their proliferation. Many current and former US soldiers volunteer to go to foreign countries and engage in de-mining operations every year. Its not like there's some big conspiracy to play down the issue.

 

BTAVERNIER

6:47 PM ET

October 22, 2010

Africans "killing each other"

The reference to "africans killing each other" is rather typical of the narrow-minded conception of Africans and African history. Africans have not been "killing each other" more than any other groups of people in other parts of the world...

This narrow minded view frames the issue outside the history of the world, as if Africans live in a different world. By framing the subject in this way, you conveniently ignore the long and destructive history of the European world's violence inflicted on the world.

Conceptions of savagery led to the slaughter of millions of indigenous Americans at the hands of European settlers; the slaughter of half the population of the Congo (by the European King of Belgium)... Brutal dictators like Pinochet were put in place by the country with the self-image of exceptionalism and superiority (after their intelligence people were complicit in the death of an elected leader, Allende); the same thing happened with Mobutu (following the assassination of Lumumba); Mussadegh in Iran (who was replaced by the Shah)....

It seems terribly simple to point to 'others' killing each other and ignore your own complicity in unspeakable violence against people around the world - death squads in Latin America, drug experiments in Guatamala, support for the apartheid regime in South Africa, support for Africa's terrorist, Jonas Savimbi for two decades....

So, yeah, keep writing and publishing articles and ignoring your own complicity in crime and injustice; creating "failed states" indexes based on YOUR notions of what states should be when states like the DRC were undermined by Washington at birth

YOU may ignore it; as that other great thinker of your society said: The ideas of the West have been dominant not by the strength of their ideas, but because of the violent ways in which they were spread and installed. People in outside wealthy countries have worked that out a long time ago - westerners have not.

That is not a statement by some left-winger, but buy the 'respected" scholar Samuel Huntington...

 

BTAVERNIER

6:49 PM ET

October 22, 2010

Spelling and Grammar

Yeah, i made a couple of typographical or grammatical errors. Focus on that, forget the substance of what I said.

 

CEOUNICOM

8:03 AM ET

October 31, 2010

"africans are no different than any other region..."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate

""Intentional homicide rates per 100,000 population by region and subregion"

Southern Africa 37.3
Central America 29.3
South America 25.9
West and Central Africa 21.6
East Africa 20.8

(largest single area in the world overall......)
#1 Africa 20

 

CEOUNICOM

12:58 PM ET

October 18, 2010

Is it really fair...

...to call the M14, "flawed"?

I understand the context; and yes, at the time it was the wrong weapon for the job. But design wise, being nothing but an extension of the Garand M1, it has a heritage of excellence. Yes, it has no business being fired on full auto; and in that sense I guess it is flawed, and that the M1 itself was the actual superior weapon (according to Patton: ""the greatest single battle implement ever devised by man") But just because it wasn't the weapon needed for the wars of the second half of the 20th century doesn't take away from its engineering quality and elegance. One might as well call the m16/m4 'flawed' because of its known limitations (the DI system), but we will judge it as a 'success' simply because its been in service so long. It is notable that even though the m14 was the shortest-lived service rifle in US history, its something like the second or third-longest weapon to be in continuous service in the military (given that its still used by a number of designated marksmen & the SEALS) next to maybe the 1911 or M2 browning.

You know what, forget it. I'm totally just nitpicking. I just happen to think the m14 is sexy. :) Don't pick on her!

Isn't the ultimate achievement of the AK simply that its freaking *cheap* and simple? The irony being that the emblematic tool of socialist revolutions was actually a triumph of industrial design and mass production that would have made Henry Ford proud. That said, i personally find it unbelievably ugly. And I've also never understood why so few designers put the charging handle on the *left* side instead of the right, given that most of the population is right-handed (it demands taking your hand off the grip, or doing off-sided manipulation). Its an ergonomic brain-fart. (then again, the m16 is even more stupid in that respect, and I've never understood why no one ever complained about having to rack your rifle right into your own face) Apparently only H&K seem to think that ergos matter. Those crafty Germans... they gave the world the Sturmgewehr, and all we collectively did was make it cheaper and uglier.

 

MALICEIT

4:47 PM ET

October 18, 2010

the:

reason that M14 had such a short life span is american need a better weapon in response to AK47's great success in Korean war. And since most of american weapon retaliation of Soviet so-called greatness being a factor of a self-clusterfuck that was going around since McCarthy, this archived absolutely nothing. War in Vietnam showed how so call "success" of M16 made roughly 1400 killed and 16000 wounded during the first years of M16 use in Vietnam simply because a grain of sand is enough to make it jam. Besides who cares if my weapon had charging handle on the wrong side ? When you take enemy fire, the last thing you think of is what side its on.

 

CEOUNICOM

10:07 PM ET

October 18, 2010

re:

First off, the AK wasn't used AT ALL in the Korean war:

http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/PrincipalWeapons.htm

It was in vietnam that US forces first encountered the weapon. And the idea that it was a vastly superior weapon in that conflict is a myth. Yes, it required less maintenance, but it wasn't what inspired the switch from the m14 to m16; it was the need for a change of caliber from 7.62 to 5.56 NATO.

The location of a weapon's charging handle, contrary to your dismissal, is crucial to its fighting ergos; in the m16 the funky location is mitigated by the last-shot bolt hold-open, which means you don't need to take the gun off target during a rapid reload. However for the AK or other designs that have no hold-open feature, you need to recharge the weapon with every new clip, which requires taking the gun off target and your primary hand off the grip. This isn't ideal.

I'd bother rebutting any other comments you make here if they actually made sense in English.

 

CEOUNICOM

1:40 PM ET

October 18, 2010

Also...

... Is there some specific effort to find Obama look-alikes and show them pumping AKs in the air like... you, know... a Kenyan terrorist-sympathizer or something? Or is it complete serendipity?

I think the caption to the first photo could begin, "While attending a democratic party fundraiser..."

 

ANDOR_1

3:42 PM ET

October 18, 2010

Boring....

"""The automatic Kalashnikov, his namesake, resulted not from one man's epiphany, but from design convergence in a massive, state-directed pursuit""""

And the Ford first car, his namesake, also resulted from the efforts of thousands of people, and also wasn't the result of any "epiphany".

Only in the US it is not called "stolen" ideas. It us called "improvement", progress, new design....

 

RAPHAELD

10:58 PM ET

October 18, 2010

Comment on AK-47 article

First, english is my second language and therefore I'm not so good in it.
Second: how can a former marine can be neutral and objective judging the AK as an enemy weapon. You have forgotten AK was in hands of Viet-Nam NLF, Viet Cong for you; decolonization of ex-portoguese territories in Africa and also with cuban troops also in Africa. It has not been a weapon only in the hands of "bandidos".

 

BOB_MACGREGOR

7:28 AM ET

October 19, 2010

Soviet Engineering

Mr. Chivers, this is fascinating material and I'm glad you've written this book. For a long time now I've been wishing someone would write a book about Udmurtia, which along with being a Finn-Ugric speaking semi-autonomous republic, also had the most heavily defense-oriented industry among all the oblasts, krais, and republics of the RSFSR. Votkinsk has an ICBM building plant and Glazov has the main Russian uranium processing plant in addition to Izhmash and other organizations in Izhevsk. What I want to ask you, is how did the design of the AK-47 take shape? Was it a totally Soviet story, with Kalashnikov himself and his subordinates responding to demands by the Red Army for a new type of battlefield weapon that would suit the massive warfare and barely-trained soldiers of the WWII Eastern Front? Or was there a real understanding that these weapons might be used in other types of combat, and would be well-suited to those types of combat (e.g. not jamming in a jungle). And even if that wasn't the case for the original design, is there any sense that the design improvements incorporated feedback from Soviet third world client states? Or was it purely a Soviet-driven story.

 

ENLISTED

3:49 AM ET

October 20, 2010

What makes an AK an AK?

My question is not as sophisticated as the one above. But on the chance that you're taking questions.

I've only fired one version of an AK, I don't remember the nomenclature, but it was described by the OPFOR in the familiarization class as a carbine version of an AK-47. It had the handguard fixed directly to the barrel, as in what I take to be the older versions (distinct from from the one in the late Soviet photo with the creator or "creator" with the offset, ventilated handguard). The OPFOR used oven mits to fire them, since as we quickly learned, the handguards heated up past handling very quickly on auto. Then you could only aim by holding on to the locked magazine, which was too close to the pistol grip, with the recoil, to give much accuracy. In the photo essay, I see ones with the same handguards and an extra pistol grip on the barrel. So many variations. Guessing that there's something to do with the design of the innards and/ or the manufacturing process that makes them all AKs. I understand the bare basic mechanics of a gas-operated assault rifle but not what makes them all specifically AKs.

Sorry about my ignorance.

 

SHIRLEE RAUDENBUSH

6:43 PM ET

November 13, 2010

From Russia With Blood

C. J. Chivers talks with Foreign Policy about the Kalashnikov, the world's real weapon of mass destruction. Mr. Chivers, this is fascinating material and I'm glad you've written this book. For a long time now I've been wishing someone would write a book about Udmurtia, which along with being a Finn-Ugric speaking semi-autonomous republic, also had the most heavily defense-oriented industry among all the oblasts, krais, and republics of the RSFSR. "C. J. Chivers: The United States is not responsible for the Kalashnikov's mass production or stockpiling, and during the Cold War it could have done nothing to stop these things from occurring appleton wi florist delivery. Later, while it certainly would have been helpful, in the security sense, if it had done more to contain the spread of weapons and ammunition that have rushed out of post-Cold War stockpiles, it might be useful to ask this question of China and Russia -- the two main Kalashnikov producers, who have shown little interest in undoing the effects of their exported rifles. That said, there are many ways to contain the ongoing proliferation, and rather than pursue them with any real determination, the United States has instead become the largest known purchaser of Kalashnikovs, which it has reissued in Iraq and Afghanistan with scant accountability. One thing about the AK-47 story is that almost no one looks good in it. " The United States was not involved in the mass production and stockpiling of the Eastern bloc's signature shoulder-fired arm. It has been active -- nay, very active -- in Kalashnikov distribution. It remains so to this day.