Sudan's War Inside

As pundits warn of a north-south Sudan scuffle, they might miss the real brewing conflict: within Southern Sudan.

BY MAGGIE FICK | OCTOBER 21, 2010

Already however, a number of signs suggest that the government's bold attempt at political and military inclusivity won't last long. Many of the now reconciled enemies of the Southern government happen to have significant military forces under their command, leaving a huge margin for troublemaking should alliances falter. And it's not hard to lure many of these leaders away for a price: Since April, there have been three post-election insurrections of note.

Take Tanginye's case, for example. Despite spending most of his life as a bush fighter, Tanginye holds powerful cards in the Southern Sudanese political arena -- and he knows it. When I met him in one of Southern Sudan's provinces, Unity state, he was relaxing riverside near the regional governor's mansion. He boasted of his force strength, emphasizing that his tens of thousands of men are under the control of no army, and loyal to him alone. "I own these guys, and they will do what I tell them to do," said Tanginye. Stories are swirling around Bentiu, capital of Unity state, that Tanginye will leave town with suitcases of cash and swaths of land to enrich himself and his people -- simply for claiming that his men will fight for the south if it comes to that. After the referendum, Tanginye may well find a higher bidder for his loyalty and that of his militia. And there are many men in south Sudan in the same position.

There are other reasons to think that an independent Southern Sudan will struggle to achieve sustainable peace as well. Tribal loyalty bodes against long-term reconciliation, and its role in politics should not be underestimated. If the southern government is not carefully put together after the referendum, including representatives of all Southern Sudan's more than 40 tribes, it risks the wrath of an armed insurgency in one remote corner or another. The marginal populations that wouldn't be represented have in the past found other ways to make their voice heard -- taking up arms in militias like Tanginye's.

Indeed, tribal discontent is already rearing its ugly head. The past year has seen an uptick in armed cattle raiding and deadly intercommunal violence, perhaps in anticipation of how unequally the benefits of peace may be shared among ethnic groups. The southern army's attempts at disarming the civilian population in the run-up to and aftermath of the April elections illustrated how tribal tensions can be exacerbated by the composition of the army itself; various minority groups suspect that they are targeted for disarmament because of their tribe's relation with the majority groups within the army.

Every possible destabilizing factor here is also magnified ten-fold simply by the copious quantities of small arms swirling around. In Unity state, a tank sits ominously outside the Unity state governor's mansion; the governor himself is guarded by boyish looking soldiers who man anti-aircraft assault weapons mounted on pickup trucks. Every sign indicates that the military apparatus may be gearing up for an even bigger, internal fight.

To outside observers of Sudan, it is tempting to believe that an autonomous south would mean an end to the country's long civil strife. But the war on the horizon might not be the one that everyone is expecting.

Photo Courtesy of Pete Muller

 

Maggie Fick is a freelance journalist based in Juba, Sudan, reporting for the Associated Press and others.

ARTFUL AID WORKER

11:59 AM ET

October 22, 2010

Thanks! Very Provocative!

Not much substantial analysis besides 'she's gonna blow' is available, and this was clearly argued.

Guns+greed+internal dissension add up to conflict in the same way as posturing+greed+militant proxies could lead to war between the North and South.

One worry is the spillover effect to CAR and Uganda, the potential of the LRA being used as a proxy, cross-border pursuits, and how Sudan's neighbours respond.

Unfrtunately, outside of AFRICOM, there is not a lot of quality contingency going on. Northern Uganda is business as usual, and CAR remains overlooked in terms of on-the-ground capacity to respond to humanitarian crises.

As for D.R. Congo, it's asking a lot of MONUSCO to deal with this on top of everything else they have to contend with in that beleaguered state.

Does anyone know what UNMIS is doing in preparation of pre/post election violence and conflict in Southern Sudan?

 

ABLITZ

1:45 PM ET

October 22, 2010

UNMIS is prepared to be under

UNMIS is prepared to be under prepared for post-referendum Sudan. I feel like so many scholars and journalists are crying out for someone to do something substantial for an almost guaranteed crisis but no dice.

 

JOHNHUNT

12:23 PM ET

October 22, 2010

Thanks 4 Shining the Spotlight

We don't need another decades-long civil war there. It seems to me that there may need to be some external military intervention if it gets particularly bad. But the article didn't make mention of this nor recommend that such preparation be made.

 

ARTFUL AID WORKER

1:29 AM ET

October 23, 2010

The Games We Play - What Games?

Being prepared to be under-prepared is fine. At least one has considered possible scenarios and theoretically tested them against one's capacity.

Like what though? Give me some examples of scenarios it has gamed.

For instance:

Under-prepared to protect the civilian population in Abyei in the event of Northern troops and militias occupying Abyei and SPLA mount a seige (or the other way around).

Under-prepared to protect civilian populations closer to the Ugandan border than hear of or directly experience attacks causing population outflows?

Under-prepared to politically respond to UPDF moving across the border in pursuit of Khartoum proxies who have trespassed (or believed to have trespassed) into Uganda.

 

JOES_FRON

12:30 AM ET

November 19, 2010

The Games We Play

Northern Uganda is business tatil as usual, and CAR remains klip izle overlooked in terms of on-the-ground capacity to respond to humanitarian crises. But the article gastromid didn't make mention of this nor recommend that such preparation moliva be made.