This Week at War: The Biden Plan Returns

The United States reluctantly accepts coercion over counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

BY ROBERT HADDICK | OCTOBER 22, 2010

Running out of time, Petraeus implements Biden's counterterrorism plan

Bob Woodward's latest book, Obama's Wars, discusses how, during the debate within U.S. President Barack Obama's inner circle over the best military strategy for Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus was the main proponent of a classic "protect the people" counterinsurgency strategy. During the debates, Petraeus railed against Vice President Joe Biden's proposal for a narrower "kinetic" counterterrorism approach that would focus on killing al Qaeda and Taliban leaders with bombs, missiles, and special-operations raids. Obama eventually gave Petraeus's plan the nod. Attempting to implement the soft touch recommended by counterinsurgency theory, former commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal severely limited the use of airstrikes and artillery and ordered U.S. ground units to disengage from firefights rather than risk firing into occupied buildings.

But that was then. Under pressure to show measureable results, Petraeus now seems to be warming up to Biden's approach more than he is likely to admit. According to the New York Times, the past three months have witnessed a sharp acceleration of airstrikes and commando raids on Taliban leadership targets. From June through September, U.S. pilots dropped 2,100 bombs and missiles on Taliban targets, a 50 percent increase from a year ago. Officers attribute the increased rate of attacks on better target intelligence, provided by a greater number of drone surveillance aircraft. Between early July and early October, special-operations forces killed 300 midlevel Taliban commanders and 800 foot soldiers, and captured another 2,000. According to Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, a recent internal study requested by Petraeus showed that 90 percent of the campaign's operational success has come from just 5 percent of the forces, led by his command's special-operations raiding teams.

With time running out until the December strategy review and July's scheduled drawdown, Petraeus has cast away McChrystal's soft touch. Furthermore, the counterinsurgency mantra of "clear-hold-build-transfer" no longer seems relevant given the time pressure to deliver credible progress. Petraeus's strategy now appears to be pure coercion, directed at mid- and higher-level Taliban leaders. Perhaps Petraeus has removed the Counterinsurgency Field Manual from his nightstand, and replaced it with Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence, the Cold War-era primer on the utility of military coercion.

Petraeus's tactical shift may be getting results. According to the New York Times, the general is in sending aircraft and clearing the roads to shuttle high-level Taliban leaders who are now seeking an audience with Afghan government representatives. The fear of a Hellfire missile, a laser-guided bomb, or the nighttime arrival of commandos seems the most logical explanation for the growing willingness of some Taliban commanders to talk. The metrics of counterinsurgency success -- growing acceptance by the population of the legitimate government, improved policing, falling corruption, etc. -- have not arrived and could not account for the changed calculations of these Taliban leaders.

The Afghan government and the Taliban are obviously a long way from a truce. The negotiating authority of the Taliban envoys is in question. And, according to the New York Times, the Taliban emissaries must remain anonymous, lest they be killed by the Pakistani intelligence service, which apparently has yet to sanction the idea of a settlement. In spite of these frailties, Petraeus seems eager to arrange these talks -- they seem to be the best way of showing resultsbefore the December policy review.

Obama is no doubt equally eager for progress toward a truce, if only to get another chance at resetting his Afghanistan policy. If he gets that chance, it won't be due to counterinsurgency theory but rather to tried-and-true coercion, enabled by a surprisingly small number of drone handlers, intelligence operators, and special-operations raiders. Could that make Joe Biden Obama's best military advisor?

MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS:
 

Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal.

MARTY MARTEL

8:41 PM ET

October 23, 2010

Afghanistan will become Petareus's Vietnam

As General McChrystal reported in his August, 2009 assessment to the President:
1. Most insurgent fighters in Afghanistan are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan.
2. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year.
3. Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups (QST, HQN and HiG) are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's lSI. Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support.

All American officers in Afghanistan know that they can not prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line neutralized. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line.

But Gates, Mullen & Company has split the Taliban into the Afghan and Pakistani parts. The US military is going after the Pakistani Taliban, while it encourages the Pakistani intelligence to continue to shelter the entire top Afghan Taliban leadership in Baluchistan province. Mullah Muhammad Omar and other members of the Taliban's inner shura (council) have been ensconced for years in the Quetta area. Yet, US drones have targeted militants in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but not the Afghan Taliban leadership operating with impunity from Baluchistan. US ground-commando raids also have spared the Taliban's command-and-control network in Baluchistan.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has sought to justify Pakistan’s terrorist connections, alluding to a “deficit of trust” between Washington, DC and Islamabad. Mr Gates also said there was “some justification” for Pakistan's concerns about past American policies. Gen David Patraeus, rushed in with an apologia for his Pakistani friends, by claiming that while Faisal was inspired by militants in Pakistan, he did not necessarily have contacts with the militants. Both Adm Mike Mullen and Gen Patraeus fancy themselves to be “soldier statesmen” a la Gen Dwight Eisenhower. Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura.

So General Kayani is going to assure that Afghanistan becomes Petraeus’s Vietnam.

 

BILL KELLER

7:47 AM ET

October 24, 2010

Prudent level of defense sustainment....

we have to give the Brits credit for prudent use of assets and recognizing where to hold capabilities such as ship building and operations and where to rely upon others to bear the costs of easily obtainable capabilities such as aircraft. It is a bit of smarts and collaboration for national security but it realizes that irresponsible fiduciary management can easily place a strategic and suicidal IED with the crown's coffers. The 'Do More Without More' leadership at the Pentagon seems to lack the intestinal fortitude to cease building one very big IED with our national security finances.

Almost two decades ago these Lilliputians were growing in the petri-dish of senate staffs and 'think' tanks, reading "The Year of the Rat" and proclaiming the Chinese apocalypse upon us. Now they are funding armadas worldwide on land, sea and air in follies applauded in the Forbidden City. The taste of American cheese with its velvet feeling must be very satisfying and comforting to those who have more fear of local proclamations that go by name such as Charter 08.

 

RADGASH

9:47 AM ET

October 24, 2010

It's the occupation stupid!

We here in the USA would be fighting just the same if a foreign military was occupying our nation conducting air-strikes and kicking in doors. It sickens me that we ever set foot on their soil.

 

JOES_FRON

10:08 AM ET

November 19, 2010

Something smells here

The US military is going tatil after the Pakistani Taliban, sinema while it encourages the Pakistani intelligence to continue to shelter the entire top Afghan gazeteler Taliban leadership in Baluchistan province. Mullah Muhammad Omar and other members of the Taliban's inner shura (council) have been ensconced sigara birakma for years in the Quetta area

 

REM686

12:53 PM ET

November 21, 2010

This Week at War: The Biden Plan Returns

The United States reluctantly accepts coercion over counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. As General McChrystal reported in his August, 2009 assessment to the President: 1. Most insurgent fighters in Afghanistan are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan. 2. "But that was then. Under pressure to show measureable results, Petraeus now seems to be warming up to Biden's approach more than he is likely to admit. According to the New York Times, the past three months have witnessed a sharp acceleration of airstrikes and commando raids on Taliban leadership targets. From June through September, U. S click the link. pilots dropped 2,100 bombs and missiles on Taliban targets, a 50 percent increase from a year ago. Officers attribute the increased rate of attacks on better target intelligence, provided by a greater number of drone surveillance aircraft. Between early July and early October, special-operations forces killed 300 midlevel Taliban commanders and 800 foot soldiers, and captured another 2,000. According to Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, a recent internal study requested by Petraeus showed that 90 percent of the campaign's operational success has come from just 5 percent of the forces, led by his command's special-operations raiding teams. " Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Talibans Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura. So General Kayani is going to assure that Afghanistan becomes Petraeuss Vietnam.

 

REM686

12:53 PM ET

November 21, 2010

This Week at War: The Biden Plan Returns

The United States reluctantly accepts coercion over counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. As General McChrystal reported in his August, 2009 assessment to the President: 1. Most insurgent fighters in Afghanistan are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan. 2. "But that was then. Under pressure to show measureable results, Petraeus now seems to be warming up to Biden's approach more than he is likely to admit. According to the New York Times, the past three months have witnessed a sharp acceleration of airstrikes and commando raids on Taliban leadership targets. From June through September, U. S click the link. pilots dropped 2,100 bombs and missiles on Taliban targets, a 50 percent increase from a year ago. Officers attribute the increased rate of attacks on better target intelligence, provided by a greater number of drone surveillance aircraft. Between early July and early October, special-operations forces killed 300 midlevel Taliban commanders and 800 foot soldiers, and captured another 2,000. According to Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, a recent internal study requested by Petraeus showed that 90 percent of the campaign's operational success has come from just 5 percent of the forces, led by his command's special-operations raiding teams. " Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Talibans Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura. So General Kayani is going to assure that Afghanistan becomes Petraeuss Vietnam.