Bergen also takes issue with the claim that the Taliban wouldn't be as foolish as to let al Qaeda tag along if and when they re-occupy much of southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban are not "rational actors," he says. "Housing al Qaeda was not a rational act. And there's no reason to believe they would behave any differently from the way they did before." Nor, says Bergen, is it correct to say that the Taliban have no goals beyond overthrowing the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some sub-groups do; others don't.
How can one predict whether or not Taliban leaders will do what Westerners would deem the rational thing? Patrick Cronin, a national security specialist with the Center for a New American Security and a signatory of "A New Way Forward," is candid enough to say, "We don't know." The Taliban might well put out a welcome mat for al Qaeda-style groups. The Haqqanis, who have carried out many of the suicide attacks against NATO forces and have worked closely with al Qaeda, are "the nub of the problem," Cronin says, because a Haqqani presence in eastern Afghanistan would offer a new platform for international jihadists. But Cronin notes that Pakistani security forces, which have long sponsored the Haqqanis, do not want to see an al Qaeda connection and have been trying to "rein them in." The Haqqanis may have to be included in any final settlement -- Pakistan will insist on it -- but NATO forces will continue pounding the frontier areas.
But "can the effort succeed?" and "how bad would failure be?" are not quite the same question. On the first, much evidence has piled up; and most, though not all, of it points to "No." Counterinsurgency strategy doesn't work with a corrupt and illegitimate government, and an insurgency that can take shelter beyond the Pakistani border. But experience to date tells us almost nothing about the second question. Paul Pillar, another veteran CIA officer and signatory of "A New Way Forward," argues that the Haqqani-al Qaeda link "is not immutable." That may be; but there's no more evidence on that subject than on the rationality, or irrationality, of the Taliban. The Council on Foreign Relations' Leslie Gelb has consistently argued that a troop reduction in Afghanistan, like the withdrawal from Vietnam, would provoke apocalyptic fears but prove to be an anti-climax. I find that notion appealing, though not necessarily persuasive.
But all costs are relative. And against the uncertain benefits of maintaining a very large military presence in Afghanistan over the next three to four years are the very large costs of staying in such large numbers. The $100 billion a year or so in resources may be the least of it. Whether or not Pape is right that foreign military presence itself is the cause of terrorism, it is surely a provocation in the eyes of millions of Muslims, some tiny fraction of whom will be moved to attack the West. And whether or not Sageman is right that al Qaeda-centric terrorism has given way to leaderless jihad, the focus on Afghanistan absorbs assets needed for criminal justice and surveillance efforts in all the other places where terrorism now germinates. The war is a terrible drain on Washington's attention, and on U.S. soft power and prestige. "It's hard to be taken seriously in Asia when we are still bogged down in Afghanistan," as Cronin says.
There are very few true wars of necessity. The Civil War was one; World War II was another. When Mullah Omar refused to give up Osama bin Laden, a war in Afghanistan became necessary. But then the war changed character, and the nature of the adversary changed as well. A war against Islamic terrorism, in some form, remains necessary. But the war in Afghanistan does not.
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