India's Strategic Future

Why India needs to move from "strategic autonomy" to strategic cooperation with the United States.

BY C. RAJA MOHAN | NOVEMBER 4, 2010

Unlike in Washington, where governments are noisy in articulating their worldviews, for the permanent bureaucracy that runs New Delhi's foreign policy, silence is golden. But Delhi's reluctance to articulate a grand strategy does not necessarily mean it does not have one. Since India embraced globalization at the turn of the 1990s, many of its traditional strategic objectives have evolved, and the pace of that evolution has gathered momentum as India's economic growth has accelerated in recent years.

Yet the United States remains unclear about its potential ally's goals and objectives. Despite significant advances in Indo-U.S. relations during George W. Bush's presidency and bipartisan agreement in Washington to support India's rise, Barack Obama's administration has found it hard to make big strategic advances. U.S. officials dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to find India -- and particularly its reluctance to offer concessions on Kashmir that might presumably encourage Pakistan to cooperate more thoroughly in Afghanistan -- part of the problem. American negotiators on climate change and trade find the notorious prickliness of the old non aligned India alive and well. And the Pentagon is frustrated in its efforts to build a partnership with a New Delhi that resists cooperation on U.S. terms. But American strategists should take heart: If Washington can be patient, endure an extended courtship, and above all take a longer-term view of the relationship with Delhi, it will find much to like about India's foreign policy.

The problem for India's top strategists is not that they don't seek a grand bargain with the United States. It is about negotiating equitable terms. It is also about bringing along a political elite and bureaucracy that are adapting too slowly to the new imperatives of a stronger partnership with Washington. But make no mistake: Engagement with the United States has been the Indian establishment's highest foreign-policy priority over the last decade and a half.

India's grand strategy has four broad objectives. In all four areas, strategic cooperation with the United States is critical.

India's first objective is to pacify the northwestern part of the subcontinent, or the AfPak region, as it is known in Washington. All of India's great empire-states  throughout the last 2,500 years, from the Mauryans to the British Raj, have had trouble controlling these turbulent lands across the Indus River that frame the subcontinent's western frontier.

Indeed, ever since Alexander the Great and his army first arrived on the banks of the Indus, most foreign forces and alien ideologies have come to what is now India through the northwestern route. In the past, India managed to absorb the invaders and modify their ideologies. All it needed was sufficient time. But weakened by the subcontinent's partition in 1947 and faced with U.S. and Chinese support for Pakistan during the Cold War, India has had little time and space to manage the conflict with its troublesome sibling to the northwest.

PRAKASH SINGH/AFP/Getty Images

 

C. Raja Mohan is the strategic affairs editor of the Indian Express in New Delhi and adjunct professor of South Asian studies at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

NORBOOSE

10:20 PM ET

November 4, 2010

Very much in agreement

The importance of the US and India having a closely allied, long-term strategic future might be the only real issue where I can endorse one point of view wholeheartedly. It justs makes so much damn sense. Yes, relations with Pakistan will suffer, but if we look out beyond the next five years, India will only become more important, and Pakistan, more irrelevant.

 

NORBOOSE

10:30 PM ET

November 4, 2010

Problem with cooperation in Af Pak

Like I said before, I like the prospects of US-Indian relations, but as a very realistic person, I feel obliged to point out one fundamental problem. If the US and India start to build stability in AfPak, because it is in the best interest of US and India, China is going to notice. Because it is the nature of these things, a dozen MSS agents with ten million dollars in suitcases, in three months, can undo a billion dollars and several years worth of stability building efforts. China really likes the fact that India's ability to reach its potential is hamstrung by its unstable neighbors. We have seen how hard it is to build stability in places like central Africa, where there is NOT some big power player actively working against stability-building efforts. When there is one, its basically impossible. Now, it is conceivable, that China could somehow be disssuaded from this path of action, as it is far from a core immediate interest of theirs, but not for free.

 

PADDYP

12:33 PM ET

November 5, 2010

Agree But

Yes, India will become more important, as will China. Pakistan will be less important though hardly irrelevant. And the USA will be less important, a fact well understood in India but apparently not by American strategists and negotiators.

 

NORBOOSE

1:07 PM ET

November 5, 2010

You misundertand the nature of American decline

Obviously, the US postion following the old War, as sole superpower, was not only unsustainable, but undesirable in general. Clearly, the US is undergoing relative decline as other countries grow in influence. Many people seem to think this relative decline is leading to American irrelevance. However, it seems much more logical to me to see it as an approach to equilibrium of power with countries of similar "weight," like China and Russia, and potentially India and Brazil one day, should those last two modernize and stabilize sufficiently to take full advantage of their weight potential.

 

NORBOOSE

1:09 PM ET

November 5, 2010

Cold War

not sure where that C went

 

PADDYP

1:59 PM ET

November 5, 2010

Agree

I agree entirely. My remarks were in the context of the article's reference to frustration with 'efforts to build a partnership with New Delhi that resists cooperation on US terms.' India wants a more equal partnership and has time on her side.

 

SREEKANTH

3:10 PM ET

November 5, 2010

>>>In the past, India's

>>>In the past, India's internal identity as a liberal democracy was in tension with its external image as the leader of the global south against the West. A rising India ... is bound to acquire a new identity

I find this candor refreshing. Effectively Raja Mohan is saying India is not poor any more, and so should acquire a better set of friends :-)

 

FILIPA RAMOS

8:27 PM ET

November 5, 2010

Just signed up to FP :)

Just wanted to share , that I really enjoyed reading above comments on the " Indian Strategic Future " . I am an Angolan citizen and I really hope to see and read in a near future , a very relevant and knowledgeble article on my country development . An article different from all the articles where I can only see the word "Corruption" rulling it out :(

Very good indeed:)

 

PUBLICUS

11:49 PM ET

November 7, 2010

The problem is incompetence

The problem for India's top strategists is that they are incompetent, inert.

India remains devoid of an effective strategy or means to control the northwest AfPak region so wants the United States to bear that burden.

India is oblivious to the obvious presence of the PRC in Burma and Sri Lanka where along the northern rim of the Indian Ocean Beijing is busily constructing naval bases and facilities.

India's so called third strategic objective, to increase its weight in global bodies is not a serious claim as India presently cannot carry its already bloated weight.

The fourth objective of becoming a credible power is, well, laughable except for India's nuclear warheads. Where is India's navy for instance in the littorals of the Indian Ocean and southwest Pacific? If the Indian Navy were a serious force, it instead of the EU could be the central command to check the Somali pirates, who have begun operating further away from Africa and most recently closer to India than to Africa.

New Delhi continuously and lethargically dithers with each of the strategic goals presented above. I don't doubt the accuracy of the article, however, what I do see is an apologetic article that fails to challenge the slack foreign policy bureaucracy whose minds are as soggy as the country's climate and which hasn't the inspiration or competence to implement any of its designs.

 

RAMTODATRY

6:29 AM ET

November 17, 2010

US vs India vs Pakistan

I am not an Israeliphobe (assume that usage is correct).

Where US has bent over backwards to accommodate all of Israel's activities, it has not given half as much attention to the sub-continent, until recently.

The US has over the last 50+ years supported Pakistan with weapons, etc to balance the "threat" of non-aligned India, and later to counter Russia in Afghanistan. The US continues to do so today, playing both sides at the same time.

If it is trying to convince India that Pakistan is not a threat, then why is it a threat to the US 12,500 miles away? Is it not a greater threat to India than to the US?

As an American, of Indian origin, I do not believe nor trust the US b***s***. It has always been, and will always be about the not so almighty dollar...

Give Pakistan billions in arms aid, while trying to sell billions in nuclear and other obsolete technology to India.

It is not about about "bringing along a political elite and bureaucracy that are adapting too slowly to the new imperatives of a stronger partnership with Washington" - it is common sense, when the person across the table does not respect you, nor your judgment.