Russia's Not-So-Odd Couple

Politicians and pundits won't stop telling us that Medvedev and Putin are at odds. Keep dreaming.

BY CHRISTIAN CARYL | NOVEMBER 24, 2010

Joe Biden has got it all figured out. In a round-table discussion last week with a handful of reporters and columnists, the U.S. vice president suggested that the Obama administration's nuclear arms reduction treaty, New START, and its broader aim of "resetting" relations with Russia could be a means of strengthening Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the expense of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. "The centerpiece of where Medvedev is, is this reset," Biden said. "And [START] is the crown jewel inside that reset because it wasn't Putin pushing this -- it was Medvedev."

Well, good luck with that. Two big problems with this approach present themselves. First, if the past 20 years has shown us anything, it's that issuing Washington brownie points to a Russian politician is a great way of ensuring that person's ultimate marginalization and irrelevance. If you're Medvedev, getting yourself publicly identified as the man pushing a pro-Western agenda is going to be a huge hindrance, not a help. Does Biden think that Russians don't read the papers?

Second, Biden's remarks assume that Medvedev and Putin are participants in a power struggle, each maneuvering at the expense of the other. I can see why the vice president might think that Russia's leaders are engaged in full-fledged rivalry; so many people seem to be taking that as a given these days. But I just don't think it's true.

The notion of antagonism within Russia's leadership tandem has become a staple of the media coverage of late. "Russian politics is in the midst of a tug-of-war between Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in the long lead-up to the 2012 presidential election," wrote Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun recently. "Medvedev may edge out Putin as Russia's top leader," ran the headline in Newsweek. That story hyped the idea, without citing much in the way of specifics, that "the Russian elite has lined up behind the new president, Dmitry Medvedev, rather than the old one, Vladimir Putin." I should note, though, that even some Russian media have been getting into the act. "Aides Noting 'Growth of Confrontation' Between Medvedev and Putin," was the title of one story earlier this month in the weekly Argumenty Nedeli.

The claims in these stories build on a handful of recent Kremlinological plot twists. The most notable is the recent fall from grace of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who was targeted by Medvedev-friendly news media before being removed from office on Sept. 28. The removal or appointment of regional leaders is the prerogative of the Russian president, so it's understandable why the move was seen by many analysts as a demonstration of Medvedev's power over a figure long regarded as virtually unassailable within his own fiefdom. Russia may be the world's biggest country, but economic and political power are still disproportionately concentrated in its capital, so controlling Moscow is undoubtedly a requirement if you want to win a power struggle. Putin, by contrast, evidently didn't see Luzhkov as much of a challenge and accordingly didn't go to the trouble to clip his wings.

For believers in the theory of a full-blown rivalry within the ruling duumvirate, this was merely the culmination of a series of similar incidents. A few days before sacking Luzhkov, Medvedev killed the sale of the S-300 anti-aircraft system to Iran, underlining his insistence that Russia should go along with U.N. sanctions imposed on Tehran. That now-dead deal is said to have enjoyed the backing of some of Putin's most powerful friends in the Russian military-industrial complex. As Biden's remarks suggest, Medvedev's performance at this weekend's NATO summit, where he agreed to consider cooperating with the transatlantic alliance over missile defense, is bound to inspire comparisons with Putin's stance on the issue. One need only recall Putin's contentious performance at the previous NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.

VLADIMIR RODIONOV/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS: RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE
 

Christian Caryl is Washington chief editor for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a contributing editor to Foreign Policy, and a member of the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

COOKS

9:38 AM ET

November 25, 2010

they are two big brains

I like their politics. Cool idea must look like this.webmaster

 

TSANDR

1:33 PM ET

November 25, 2010

Get fun with

Their mind-numbing "both-are-the-boss" style of governance has been made especially for those wanting to collate desperately whatever they say or mean by saying...

 

VICTOR KOGAN-YASNY

4:31 PM ET

November 25, 2010

a correct article

I rarely see a correct intuitive analysis of what is going in Russia and how its leadership is built. This article is of such rare cases. Thanks to Christian Caryl and people which helped him in orientation in Russia's affairs

 

GAFFNEYH

11:35 AM ET

November 26, 2010

Russian Leadership

Christian Caryl is, in sum, right in his analysis. But some of his details perpetuate some of the myths about the leadership situation that even the Russian commentators tend to perpetuate. I speak because we at CNA did a thorough study of Russian leadership about four years ago, complete with biographies and analyses of how the Russians handle particular issues, all with the help of friends in Moscow who shall remain unnamed. The old joke in Moscow is that there are two factions in Russian leadership: the Putin group and the Medvedev group; except that no one knows to which group Medvedev belongs. The fact is that the core is the St. Petersburg city government group of the 1990s under Sobchak (the father of them all), plus others that became attached to them during Putin's years (e.g., Shuvalov and Sobyanin, both from Siberia). The third most powerful person in Moscow is not Sechin, but Kudrin -- Russia is on a budget and its macroeconomics are sound. The role of "silovki" is greatly exaggerated -- of the 60 top officials, maybe 20 are ex-siloviki, and half of those are where siloviki are supposed to be, in the security agencies. Incidentally, a good Moscow source told me that Putin no longer goes to Security Council meetings because he doesn't like being Number Two there; he does not meet with the security agency leaders collectively; maybe only one-on one. Sechin is indeed powerful -- representing the energy and big old industries (steel, nickel, chemicals) -- as opposed to the other grouping concerned with economy, development, social welfare, regional matters, etc. Sechin as KGB is still dubious: all we see in the record is that he took his philology degree and went off as an interpreter -- clearly GRU -- in Angola and Mozambique. Otherwise his 20's learning experience was in St. Petersburg city government. Sergei Ivanov is a decent guy, but a bad manager -- nothing happened in his six years as MOD, and all stories are that he is not close to other siloviki. He has been kicked upstairs, left with a staff of four. Those identified as very close to Medvedev from student days (e.g., Antonov, Chuichenko, Yurgens) are few and not in powerful positions (unless head of the Control Department in the Kremlin by Chuichenko is powerful). In short, Medvedev is part of this narrow elite at the top, close to Putin, and Caryl's end conclusion is about right -- all may stay the same. The Russian commentators now compare this to Brezhnevian stagnation. No question that Putin is in charge. His equivalent in the U.S. now is Roger Ailes -- think about that...