President Barack Obama's surprise trip to Afghanistan on Dec. 3 is just the latest sign that his administration's latest review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is in full swing. "Today, we can be proud that there are fewer areas under Taliban control and more Afghans have the chance to build a more hopeful future," he told an assembled crowd at Bagram Air Force Base. "You will succeed in your mission."
COMMENTS (5)
More...
Back in Washington, officials are trying to determine what success looks like. They are assembling a comprehensive "report card" of U.S. efforts, with inputs from all the departments and agencies that have a hand in the region. The White House wants to know which of its policies have demonstrated success, and which ones are failing.
Many assessments will probably prove inconclusive. The effect of the U.S. troop surge on the military balance of power will be particularly tough to measure, especially in those regions of Afghanistan where new forces have only been at work for six months or less. This will also be true for a wide variety of other newly expanded programs, for which resources will need to be applied over a longer time frame in order to show concrete signs of progress. Kabul, after all, can't be rebuilt in a day.
Amid this sea of ambiguity, at least one clear judgment is possible: Washington's political strategy in Afghanistan deserves a failing grade.
The U.S. political strategy is comprised of different elements, many of which attempt to alleviate Afghanistan's poor "governance capacity" -- that is, its inability to provide basic services to its people. This is indisputably true. The Afghan government has proved itself incapable, for instance, of establishing local courts and legal institutions, to the point that many Afghans approach the Taliban to adjudicate their civil disputes. Afghanistan's poor health care, education, and transportation infrastructure all hinder economic opportunity and development. These are serious problems, but they are common to many other poor, developing countries around the world. And many of those countries are not plagued by raging insurgencies.
As analyst Steve Coll pointed out this summer, those conducting the December review should focus on the fundamental -- and truly political -- question of whether a majority of the Afghan people and their leaders are working toward the same goals as their international allies. Today they are not. In the heady days after the Taliban were toppled, the Kabul government was widely accepted as a force for national and international unity. But over nine long years of war and mistakes on all sides, that unity has broken.
Many influential Afghans who are natural partners in the fight against international terrorism feel alienated from their government and are deeply frustrated with the United States for propping it up. For some, last year's fraudulent presidential election was the final straw. Others, especially minority groups and women, fear the outcome of "reconciliation" talks between an exclusive, unrepresentative group of President Hamid Karzai's cronies and Taliban insurgents. Still other powerful figures have been disappointed by recent parliamentary elections -- another exercise tainted by massive, politically motivated fraud and whose results were greeted by protests from disenfranchised Afghans.
In short, there are good reasons to fear that Afghanistan is falling apart at the seams, and things have only gotten worse over recent months.
SUBJECTS:
(5)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE