Pakistan's fears of India's ambitions in Afghanistan, "justified or not," Patterson wrote, meant that it would not tolerate any vacuum in Kabul that could be filled by a pro-Indian regime. "General Kayani," she wrote, referring to Pakistan's army chief and effective ruler, "has been utterly frank about Pakistan's position on this. In such a scenario, the Pakistan establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan." Patterson cautioned that "discussion of deadlines, downsizing of the American military presence or even a denial of the additional troops reportedly to be requested by Gen. McChrystal" could trigger this response.
Patterson also signed a cable from January of that year, when Biden, then vice president-elect, and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) came to Islamabad for a heart-to-heart with Kayani. Patterson recounted Kayani's reassurances of support that U.S. counterterrorism efforts; he just needed more money to take on the insurgents. In answer to a blunt question from Biden, Kayani and Pakistani intelligence chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha promised to take on the Pakistani Taliban first, and then the Afghan branch. "[They insisted that] nobody was protecting the bad guys Graham said that he would support development assistance to Pakistan, but needed to know that the aid would produce a change in Pakistani behavior. Kayani replied that Pakistan and the U.S. had a convergence of interests."
This was an important meeting, for it may have helped persuade Biden that the United States could make more headway in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. The cable makes no judgment about Kayani's sincerity, perhaps because diplomats are disinclined to report that the local strongman has pulled the wool over the eyes of two visiting senior statesmen. But at least by September, Patterson knew that Kayani had been telling his visitors what they came to hear. "There is," she wrote in the later cable, "no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India." Patterson suggested that the United States seek to lower tensions between India and Pakistan and use its civilian aid to "extend the writ of the Pakistani state into the FATA" -- the frontier area where the extremists seek sanctuary -- "in such a way that the Taliban can no longer offer effective protection to Al Qaeda from Pakistan's own security and law enforcement agencies in these areas."
Of course, saying that the United States must help Pakistan create legitimate governance in the frontier region and must help Afghanistan do so all over the country is useful advice only if it's possible. And in fact later that fall, Patterson's counterpart in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry would write a memo of his own arguing that such a strategy almost certainly wouldn't work. He appears to have been absolutely right. Nor have U.S. aid efforts made much headway in FATA so far, though Patterson was careful to warn in the September cable that doing so would "require a multi-year, multi-agency effort." The embassy in Pakistan didn't, and perhaps couldn't, supply the White House with a better answer; rather, the cables may have forced policymakers to think twice about the appealingly modest alternative Biden and others were proposing.
You can imagine Obama reading the Patterson cable, smacking his forehead and saying, "So I can't go small, like Joe wants, but I'm not convinced I can win by going big. What do I do?" In the end, Obama tried to square the circle by limiting the goal of the war in Afghanistan to "disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist allies" rather than crushing the Taliban; accepting that the central threat was not Afghanistan but Pakistan; but nevertheless ordering in 30,000 more troops and the ambitious civilian effort required to bring "stable civilian government to Afghanistan." Maybe he heard Patterson's message.
The WikiLeaks documents in general show that U.S. diplomats are quite adroit at analyzing problems like this, ones that their government turns out to be unable to resolve. This shouldn't come as shocking news, but I suppose it would to Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, who must have thought that the documents would expose American imbecility, or hegemony, or both. He has, at any rate, probably done a good deal less damage than he had hoped.

SUBJECTS:















(11)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE