Spain on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown

European leaders need to stop whinging and start solving their debt crisis for real.

BY EDWARD HUGH | DECEMBER 3, 2010

Europe's debt crisis continues to spread -- Greece and Ireland have already had to seek shelter from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, while bond spreads in Portugal and Spain are giving strong indication they might meet the same fate in the not-too-distant future. And as the crisis develops, far from sending a much-needed signal of confidence and self-assurance, the rhetorical register we're seeing from Europe's leaders is becoming increasingly nerve-racked and even at times apocalyptic. In a typically troubling example, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy warned recently that the eurozone, and even the European Union itself, were in the process of fighting for their lives, telling the astonished audience at a Brussels think-tank conference, "We're in a survival crisis."

Only a few days later, another top EU official, European Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia, stunned market observers with a statement that was widely interpreted as suggesting there might be something behind the rumors that Spain's banking and government debt statistics were not as reliable as they should be. "There are no doubts that there is doubt [about Spain]," he said in an interview with a Spanish radio station, doubts that are connected with the possibility that Spain could "have something more than what it has already put on the table."

Then, Olli Rehn, the European Union's commissioner for economic and monetary affairs, tactlessly chose a day of extreme market tension to tell the world that in his considered opinion, the Spanish government was in danger of not complying with its 2011 deficit target of 6 percent. The result was predictable, and the next day yields on both Spanish and Italian bonds hit euro-era highs. The situation was brought under control only thanks to substantial intervention on the part of the European Central Bank (ECB), as well as bank President Jean-Claude Trichet's promise of a major change in policy at the next meeting. As American economist Barry Eichengreen recently put it: "You can say one thing for the European Commission, the ECB and the German government: they never miss an opportunity to make things worse."

Far from serving as a call to arms, comments like these, especially at such a sensitive moment in the latest round of the crisis, merely leave the people who make them looking ridiculous and trivialize the institutions they represent. The European Union itself is not in any kind of survival crisis. Indeed, the risk that the union will actually break up is so small as to be virtually nonexistent -- and even though doubts remain about the long-term survival of the euro in its present form, this is not the immediate problem. The only meaningful way to ensure that the common currency survives in the long run is to find ways to adequately resolve Europe's present problems. Wandering from the script, as Van Rompuy is wont to do, simply doesn't help.

The problem Europe faces, as seen by the markets, is that it has half-emerged from one economic crisis only to be engulfed by another: the challenge of maintaining under reformed pension and health-care systems in the face of the most rapid population aging in human history, with very sharp increases in the elderly dependency ratio looming over the next 10 years. Add to this challenge the doubts about who is actually going to be responsible for whom: Will Irish citizens pay through taxes the losses incurred by Irish banks in the property bubble, or will the German government recapitalize the German banks that were irresponsible enough to lend the Irish the money to have the bubble in the first place? And at the heart of this sovereign-debt crisis is another tricky question: Whose sovereign goes with whose debt?

We are now into the third wave of the present crisis. The first tremors were effectively noticed around the turn of the year, when Abu Dhabi announced it was not going to take responsibility for all the excesses of its poorer but more reckless neighbor, Dubai. This news turned all eyes toward Greece and the issue of who was going to foot the bill for all that under-the-table deficit spending that had been going on since the euro was introduced.

DOMINIQUE FAGET/AFP/Getty Images

 

Edward Hugh is an independent macroeconomist based in Barcelona, Spain.

ZORRO

9:58 AM ET

December 4, 2010

Default

Are the south European countries going to successfully reform their economies? No.
Are the Germans going to be willing to continue to pay other countries debts? No.
Are thus a lot of countries going to default on their debts? Probably Yes.
The only other option is to start printing money, and it is very doubtful whether northern Europe will accept that as a payment method either.
So work out a structured way of closing some banks and defaulting on at least some sovereign debt and start applying it as soon as possible.
With some luck the crisis will have time to blow over before it is time for the US sovereign debt crisis.

 

ASCHOPS

3:13 PM ET

December 4, 2010

Hum?

Since Eurozone countries don't have their own Central Bank, I don't think they can print money on their own.
And should Germany just let them go, then in the near future it is Germany who's going to suffer the consequences. German economy dependends highly on other countries' - more precisely, other Eurozone countries' - ability to buy its high value added products. If a large number of Eurozone countries are left in the mud of recession, Germany will soon have to follow suit.

 

CHANGES

3:55 PM ET

December 4, 2010

actually i think german

actually i think german products will be buyed anyway, no mather what they may cost.....

 

ASCHOPS

7:38 PM ET

December 4, 2010

Not quite.

Countries in recession can't import much.

 

DOM WYNN

10:35 AM ET

December 6, 2010

no easy way out

As has been noted, printing money is only an option if they were able to use seignorage which they aren't since the money supply is controlled by the ECB.

Likewise default is not really an option currently (more below) - it would essentially involve leaving the Euro and that is a whole world of hurt:
http://www.economist.com/node/17629757
Eurozone countries cannot just default. Which is why we are seeing a lot of twisting in the wind around the bail outs.

As to the source of the pressure, there are a number of different issues sloshing around. The biggest is bank exposure. As you say, the simplest route would be to start closing down these walking dead banks, but the outcome for the banking sectors of Germany, France and the UK which has provided most of the liquidity for what is essentially unrealised debt would be horrific. It would kill the recovery stone dead in Europe and potentially into depression.

It is this prospect that is exercising Brussels, Frankfurt and Paris (as London has QE to fall back on): rock=end of existing Eurozone; hardplace=southern Europe/periphery depression.
Given the political judgements my money would be depression with a long term economic realignment resulting in de facto economic union with Germany, and an acceptance that Europe is run from Berlin.
There is a whole load of nuance in the situation which is missing from the article's analysis that explains the response to the crisis in Europe. It is essentially the coming of a crossroads which many had hoped to delay to a point where economically the zone was in alignment, but is the ironic culmination of the creation of a fully unified Europe. The problem is that it is driven not by consensus, but events and the cost is going to be devastating for the periphery.

 

DOM WYNN

11:02 AM ET

December 6, 2010

addendum

Just to clarify re

"the banking sectors of Germany, France and the UK which has provided most of the liquidity for what is essentially unrealised debt would be horrific. It would kill the recovery stone dead in Europe and potentially into depression"

The issue here is that the banks in the above countries have been offering lines of credit until relatively recently to smaller regional banks. While the impact on Germany, UK and France would be nasty, opening up another round of support for banks, and probably driving some under (the likes of HBOS in UK or HRE in Germany), possibly even leading to the default of the UK, the prospect for the smaller economies would be potentially to lead those economies insolvent with no meaningful banking system left.

Personally I think this is the real risk given the alternative is an end to the Euro.

 

DRUNK ORACLE

11:42 AM ET

December 8, 2010

FIscal pressure

I think that people might be slightly under-estimating the will of the people to support the fiscal hardship. As especially if Spain has to nationalise private sector bank debt (the cajas). I think that that will be hard to take. I appreciate that reneging on bank sector liabilities will wipe out the eurozone & Uk bank system but that is exactly the trump card that the periphery has at its disposal. That would be good for nobody but as it stands, the periphery is getting scr*wed. Morally and financially, I dont see why periphery taxpayer should take on all of the bank liabilities like in Ireland. BTW, the budget passed yesterday in Ireland but more and more opinion leaders are advocating a renegotiation of debt and terms.