5 Ways to Win the War in Afghanistan

Here's how Obama can reverse the dangerous deterioration of conditions in America's longest war.

BY ANDREW EXUM | DECEMBER 15, 2010

As President Barack Obama delivers an assessment of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, and an update on his own year-old strategy for winning the war, the strategic outlook in the country remains bleak. Although the United States and its allies have scored important tactical gains over the past 12 months -- decimating insurgent networks and securing once-violent districts in southern Afghanistan -- they have no clear plan to either defeat insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan or address the corruption and predatory behavior of Afghanistan's political class, which threatens to undermine U.S. and allied military successes.

I fought in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2004 and returned to serve on Gen. Stanley McChrystal's initial assessment team in 2009. Over the past two weeks, I have been traveling around Afghanistan interviewing U.S., NATO and Afghan commanders, Afghan police and politicians, NGO workers and journalists, and local Afghans.

While the daily tactical battles in Afghanistan might seem distant, and the strategic challenges daunting, policymakers in Washington are not helpless. In fact, they can support the efforts of Gen. David Petraeus and his troops in Afghanistan in five key ways.

1. Cut Funding for the War

This may seem a bit counterintuitive, to say the least. But right now, the massive amount of money flowing into Kabul is fueling the conflict. In a bizarre way, both the Taliban and the Afghan government currently have an interest in perpetuating this conflict: Both parties are making millions of dollars from the aid and development money saturating the country. These funds are distorting incentives and presenting ample opportunities for kickbacks, bribes, and other forms of corruption. It is little wonder Transparency International rates Afghanistan the world's third most corrupt nation.

The United States and its allies should only spend the money in Afghanistan they can properly manage and oversee. They should also focus on developing ways to spend resources more wisely in Afghanistan. One way to do so -- and here any congressional aides reading this should grab a notebook and pen -- would be to allow aid and development funds not spent in one fiscal year to roll over to the next. Well-constructed aid programs, such as Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program, have trusts established that allow funds not spend in one year to be spent later. But within the U.S. government, that's not the case: Money not spent is lost from year to year.

Military officers, for example, are familiar with the concept of the "SPENDEX," where all ammunition not used in the course of the year is fired -- sometimes wildly -- at the end of a fiscal year, so ammunition allotted for the next year is not cut. The same principle applies to aid -- but instead of wasting bullets, the organizations waste dollars. Rather than face the prospect of reduced development funds in the future, development and military officers are under pressure to spend every penny they are given. But doing so simply feeds the Afghanistan's distorted economy, which only benefits the insurgency and corrupt Afghan officials. We must first fix the perverse incentives in our own system in order to fix those in Afghanistan.

MASSOUD HOSSAINI/AFP/Getty Images

 

Andrew Exum is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He recently co-authored a policy paper with Lt. Gen. (Ret.) David Barno for the Center for a New American Security on the transition of power in Afghanistan following the U.S. drawdown of forces.

MYSTIKIEL

12:23 AM ET

December 16, 2010

As long as Afganistan is nothing more than a heroin plantation

then whitey ain't going to win this war. You can't run an economy on handwoven baskets and growing saffron. As long as Afghanistan needs to rely on poppy farming then it will need to rely on militias.

Seriously, do you think that appointing another special envoy is going to make a bit of difference, let alone "win the war"?

The only thing that might win the war is getting a country like China to do in Afghanistan what they have recently done in Africa. Chinese DFI in Africa has done far more for that continent than any piddling water pump or school room from a Western NGO.

But then again China is actually capable of getting things done. The US is increasingly looking like a spent bullet.

 

CEOUNICOM

3:39 AM ET

December 17, 2010

re:

I think you pretty much nail it.

Plus, I'm still kinda confused why leaving OBL alive still constitutes "winning".

 

MALICEIT

1:32 AM ET

December 16, 2010

RE:

1)NO,
2)NO,
3)Maybe,
4)Maybe,
5)NO.

 

CARL

2:31 AM ET

December 16, 2010

Mr. Exum: Very impressive and

Mr. Exum:

Very impressive and original, especially points 1, 2 and 4, at least this civilian thinks so. My own hobby horse is cutting Pakistan out of the supply route picture so maybe that might go along with point 1. As a civilian, point 2 didn't occur to me. Point 4 is just a flat out "eureka" idea. Good job.

 

MARTY MARTEL

6:34 AM ET

December 16, 2010

Andrew Exum needs to discard misconceptions

Pakistan does NOT see its support to violent extremist groups endangering its own security as Andrew Exum claims. On the contrary Pakistan even created these extremist groups precisely to use as foreign policy tools.

Andrew Exum has to know that nobody forced Pakistani government to facilitate relocation of Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996. Pakistan’s democratic government chose to do so of its own free will.

Andrew Exum has to know that Pakistani Army and ISI created what ex-CIA official Bruce Reidel called 'this jihadist Frankenstein monster' on their own with full financing provided by Pakistan’s democratic governments during 1990s.

Andrew Exum has to know that Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton’s national security advisor told 9/11 Commission in March, 2004 that ’Pakistani Army was the midwife of Taliban’. UN report on Bhutto killing published in April, 2010 confirmed this fact when it stated that "The PAKISTANI MILITARY ORGANIZED AND SUPPORTED THE TALIBAN TO TAKE CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN IN 1996“.

Declassified DIA Washington D.C., "IIR (intelligence Information Report) Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan," dated November 7, 1996 states how "Pakistan's ISI is heavily involved in Afghanistan," and also details different roles various ISI officers play in Afghanistan. Stating that Pakistan uses sizable numbers of its Pashtun-based Frontier Corps in Taliban-run operations in Afghanistan, the document clarifies that, "these Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary combat“.

Declassified U.S. Department of State, Cable "Pakistan Support for Taliban" from Islamabad dated Sept. 26, 2000 states that "while Pakistani support for the Taliban has been long-standing, the magnitude of recent support is unprecedented." In response Washington orders the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to immediately confront Pakistani officials on the issue and to advise Islamabad that the U.S. has "seen reports that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance and military advisors. [The Department] also understand[s] that large numbers of Pakistani nationals have recently moved into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, apparently with the tacit acquiescence of the Pakistani government." Additional reports indicate that direct Pakistani involvement in Taliban military operations has increased.

Pakistan created these terrorist outfits and so is in NO danger from these outfits. Sooner Andrew Exum discards such misconceptions, the better.

 

DUNCAN-O

1:28 AM ET

December 18, 2010

Misconceptions

The facts you are citing go back six years or more, and even that most recent one was quoting past behavior. The idea of actual military confrontation in NW Pakistan between the army and Taliban elements would have been unthinkable even in 2004. Clearly, things have changed.

YOU claim that these terrorist outfits are NO danger to Pakistan. Perhaps their thousands of civilian victims (including national figures like Benazir Bhutto) have helped many Pakistanis to discard misconceptions of their own.

 

JJACKSON

9:23 AM ET

December 16, 2010

What's a win?

Is being able to withdraw troops without an immediate and obvious return of Taliban control the new win? A win for who, the US or Afghanistan? If we leave the Afghans with a corrupt leadership and systemic corruption perpetuated by an all powerful military, we created and funded, are the people over whose land we have been fighting this ideological war any better of before we invaded?

Suggestions 1 & 4 might help reduce some of the worst excesses but we have sidelined the traditional Shura based consensus politics with a Western import. This new governance model has created parallel, and competing, power structures with out the traditional checks on corruption. Add cash inflows on a vast scale into a desperately poor country and you now have exactly what you would expect under these circumstances.

2 & 3 help implement the current plan, militarily and diplomatically respectively, but to what end if the plan is flawed?

5 includes the only statement that really matters "normal Afghans are just trying to survive". They have three enemies the occupying forces, the Taliban and the central government. The first two are stopping them earning a living and the third is trying to extort what they do make.

In all the ideas are not bad in - from a purely US stand point - in they may extend the war with less US troop losses and cost to the tax payer but by extend misery for the 'normal Afghans'. They will not win the war either for those Afghans or in a way the US domestic audience would consider a win, for this what we are really talking about. The leaked 'Pentagon Papers' on the Vietnam war included this

"
In another example, a memo from the Defense Department under the Johnson Administration listed the reasons for American persistence [in Vietnam]:

* 70% - To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat.
* 20% - To keep [South Vietnam] (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
* 10% - To permit the people [of South Vietnam] to enjoy a better, freer way of life.
* ALSO - To emerge from the crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.
* NOT - To 'help a friend'[3][9]
"

What would this metric look like today?

Zia may have been bullied into becoming Bush's ally in the GWOT but polling data makes it clear that as far as Pakistani's are concerned the US has surpassed India as their greatest existential threat. The US and India are the enemy, China is their friend (as was Afghanistan under the Taliban). A regime in Kabul that was happy to accept that "we should be prepared to leave behind 25,000 to 35,000 special operations forces and trainers beyond 2014" is not one Pakistan or China would be happy to accept. At present the Taliban are doing quite nicely without too much support but if the occupying force started to look like imposing a solution they did not like a little extra support could easily redress the balance.

The object of this war is no-longer to reduce the risk of terror attacks on US soil - if that is its aim it is counter productive - it is about saving face but the price being paid by 'normal Afghans' is far too high.

 

COURTNEYME109

11:47 AM ET

December 16, 2010

This is a win

Surge Expert Col Nagle at CNAS lays it it in language that everyone here can easily understand.

Great Satan should endeavor to create "...an Afghanistan that can stand on its own, that ultimately is going to be able to secure its own territory, not provide a safe haven for terrorists, and not drag down the security of the entire region..."

 

SUNNY SENSIBLE

1:29 AM ET

December 17, 2010

Balanced Approach

Everyone is trying to shape the environment according to their own national interests, which though understandable, will not help. Then there is yawning trust deficit between the stake holders. Honest negotiations and allaying the fears of regional and western countries must be addressed in a way that evryone is more or less satisfied, but above all the Afghans must be satisfied.
Miltary operations must go in tandem with political and economic activities at a pace that progress can be seen on ground on monthly basis to restore confidence. Time is actually runnig out.
Besides, unchecked flow of money and weapons has to be controlled at all costs, without starving the common Afghans. Narco trade is yet another huge problem which is fuelling this war. Not enough effort is being directed towards it.
Resolution of Afghan imbroglio is in everyones interest. Please all countries should understand this and honestly work towards it.

 

RAZAUSMAN

8:19 AM ET

December 17, 2010

and do it yesterday

great article.

 

LEON DEINOS

10:08 AM ET

December 17, 2010

4 ways to stay

Items 2,3,4, and 5 are the recipe for how to STAY in the war in Afghanistan. Only item 1 starts toward an end of the mess we have made in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the last 32 years.

Mikhail Gorbachev gave his generals 2 years to wrap it up. Ours will have to do with more than four, as the President promises us 4 more years in Afghanistan. I do not remember anyone making such specific, protracted promises during the Vietnam disaster. Has nothing been learned by Exum, et al., or, more importantly, by the ones who give them the orders?

 

JANYE

11:13 AM ET

December 17, 2010

How to win.

I suggest the way to win is to declare victory and leave Afghanistan.

Since there is no agreement on what "victory" would be, who would contradict our declaration?

 

PHILIP HENIKA

12:29 PM ET

December 17, 2010

How Does "Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer" Equate With Win?

Any assessment of US foreign policy in Afghanistan must begin with the clear defintion of precedents the latter of which defines how the US practices foreign policy in Afghanistan but in the future as well; as an US adaptation to globalization perhaps. An unclassified, unWikileaked White House document re: an assessment of the Obama Adminstration efforts in Afghanistan was posted by FAS' Steven Aftergood. The document declares "clear-hold-build-transfer" as the template, the flow chart, if you will, of the the collaborative American/NATO/Afghan effort. "Clear-hold" are obviously references to the removal of the Taliban from Afghan communities and to the prevention of the Taliban from their inevitable attempt to return. Exum, in his article, elaborates on improved measures re: military "wins" and peacekeeping, however, that is where his article both starts and ends. Frankly, the discussion of "build-transfer" is almost invariably left out of the these discussions. Build, in my interpretation, refers to peacebuilding initiative which is an initiative that begins with listening to what Afghan communities say they need. Exum's article suggests "survival" needs which in my estimation might begin with fresh water, food that is safe to eat and clean air. Then we have shelter, transportation and security all of which are necessary vehicles for hope and opportunity. And, of course, it can be hypothesized that with hope and opportunity might come a commitment to community developement with a concomittant reduction in Taliban recruitment. This effort might address the global rise in the sheer number of terrorist and terrorist wannabes. Finally, we have the "transfer" of authority to the Afghans re: the "stabilization" of Afghanistan which is actually the new buzzword even in military circles. The assessment of "clear-hold-build-transfer" requires an objective look at results re: Afghan communities. It is not unexpected to find many examples where "clear-hold-build-transfer" has been cutoff at one of its hyphens via corruption. Although, I know of one case where the concept of self-help was introduced. A new school in Kunar was built with US aid, however, when it came to ordering school supplies the US directed the school's attention to the Karsai government. This is an application of transfer of both authority and responsibility. My goodness - what is next - human rights?

 

ORMONDOTVOS

3:59 PM ET

December 17, 2010

$.02

We lost the war when we started it. The rest is history.

The war on drugs keeps the heroin flowing. The money from it keeps the warlords in power. The Taliban grows from poverty and theocracy.

We have no interests there.

Pakistan was an abortion from the beginning.

Religion poisons everything.

 

MARSBAR

3:33 AM ET

December 26, 2010

Think Outside the Square

I doubt it was ever a winnable war to begin with.

Just as I think there is more interest there than what is seen.

From my perspective I doubt very much whether these
wars are ever about religion yet it has become a popular excuse
as it keeps peoples minds away from the real agenda which is power
and greed.
In my humble opinion it's peoples ego's more so than anything that is the poison, not religion.
The internet shows us that as a human race that we all get along as we all want the same thing which is Peace for everyone on this planet.. dont we?

Happy 2011 ?

 

NICHOLAS WIBBERLEY

4:37 PM ET

December 17, 2010

On target

Devastation / Chaos / Corruption / Crisis / Crisis Management. The US would appear to be just over halfway towards its goal.

 

HELIOUS6423

6:11 PM ET

December 17, 2010

Let's try.

We all know when we will win the war: when we understand that powerpoint presentation. I heard that McChrystal pointed that out and he was probably right.

I am too far from any decisions, yet I came to understand that McChrystal's strategy went beyond chasing the enemy and also depended on understanding social forces. Government institutions, industry, etc. - or lack therefore.

I instinctively liked the story behind McChrystal's strategy. I was born in a country, whose people thought they lived in a "banana republic." Institutions barely worked or had broken down. It felt bad that people in authority routinely lied to the population. For me, Afghanistan is not as much in a war, but it is in a military operation in the background of nation-building exercise. I take success to be the quote earlier: "...an Afghanistan that can stand on its own, that ultimately is going to be able to secure its own territory, not provide a safe haven for terrorists, and not drag down the security of the entire region..."

There are a series of arguments that are made in the article. I understand some of them, but I do not agree with some of the salient points. There has to be demand for stability. It occurs when people have something to protect and means to protect it. A lot of other regions in the world used to be unstable and their experience shows it is possible to transition to stability. (If that works, then maybe even a place like Baltimore can hope to lower its crime rate.)

Here is the response to the 5 points in the article:

1. Restructuring of international aid systems is an important base. It runs against bureaucratic and academic dogma, though. Also, your point is not universally true.

2. Probably correct. But I doubt it builds the Afghan forces properly. I think it sends rather the odd message.

3. No idea.

4. Well, I am not sold yet that the goal can be achieved that way. It can be used to exert pressure, but show me how it works to build institutions?

5. Yes. Go long. She said size matters. But - how do you do it really? I say, let most army units move out, get UN-backed force for stability. Allow for special forces, obviously.

I think much more important for long-term commitment are economical and industrial developments. Keep the highways open, import agricultural technology develop mineral mines. These factors worked to overcome Middle Ages and bring independence to multiple counties, bring Irish sovereignty, etc. A road and a mine can bring a lot more knowledge than any other option.

It is certainly important to discuss the options, keep talking with people. I think that if Afghani develop some manufacturing industry and institutions grow to take responsibility, the situation will improve. Keep working.

 

HELIOUS6423

6:24 PM ET

December 17, 2010

and a technological lever can also be

Let's not forget that the country used to functional 30-years back. It is not unthinkable that its institutions can re-develop themselves. Its people just need to learn lessons from its history.

How can current corruption be tackled? Education works for the long-term. I know of only one organization that has been able to tackle corruption in the short-term: WikiLeaks. I know FP authors do not hold a high view of it, but I wanted to pose the question:

Would an open-leaks organization - say openleaks - suffice to challenge the current status of corruption? Can it be used to take away any initiative from the Taleban and build better-functioning organizations?

My answer is that it certainly can and will do.

 

SAIF UR REHMAN

6:24 AM ET

December 18, 2010

5 Ways to lose the War in Afghanistan

Here are the 5 reasonswhen wars are lost.

1. Invading a soverign country and illegal occupation.

2. Denying power to the majority of a country and imposing a minority on them.

3. Allien to the culture, history and regional dynamics of a country.

4. Do not respect the aspiration of the local people and impose your own values.

5. Supporting an illigitimate and corrupt regime in a country.

One thing more.........
did US lost a single battle in vietnam?
no.
It only lost the war.
Mr Obama's review says the same!.

 

BEINGTHERE

8:25 PM ET

December 18, 2010

Optimism about war is fodder for comedians

Mr. Exum, some good, earnest thoughts, but there's little that can be said or written to persuade Americans we're engaged in a war that could ever be good.

Not even all military families support the war itself but simply want to keep a good face for sons, daughters and spouses. The celebrity of commanders is fading quickly. Anti-heroes (Assange, for instance) are rising. In 2012, the war will once again garner heavy attention,with thousands more American lives lost or broken, costs astounding and "progress" being redefined - again. Don't look for David Petraeus on any magazine covers with the "our hero" appellation. Don't look for Obama to earn a second term.

 

DISIGNY

10:05 AM ET

December 27, 2010

Mr. E. neglected to give the

Mr. E. neglected to give the foggiest idea of what we would "win", (outside of war profiteering); this is a basic concept of clear writing.

 

STEERPIKE

5:12 PM ET

December 28, 2010

Do the Taliban need 5 new ways to win their war?

All the Taliban need do is keep doing what they are doing.

Lay low when things get hot. Strike back when the pressure is over. And keep on doing it for the next decade or two if necessary.

Nine years of war and we are still waiting for the magic formula which will give victory?