Without any doubt it is a huge challenge to dismantle the exceedingly powerful
drug cartels in Mexico, but you also have to recognize that it would have been far less complicated to stop this tendency at the beginning of its advent and not now when it has reached a dangerous climax.
Why just Mexico became such a victim of these criminal forces?
A stable state founded on the rule of law doens't give such criminals even a chance to develop.
Therefore it is Calderon's duty to restore this code of law and particularly a profound law enforcement in order to undermine this horrible criminal energy.
Otherwise, this country will remain overshadowed and darken by this for a long time.

As a culture goes, so goes its society. While most people in Mexico certainly find all this drug-related violence abhorrent, enough people don't. That suggests that the problem is not fundamentally political but cultural. There is a basic failure in the Mexican institutions that are supposed to transmit the right values from one generation to the next.

Thus I find that there is a problem with most big-picture policy analyses: culture is in most cases off the radar screen. I think a magazine like FP should try to find others who are not public policy experts but who have a mature perspective that can address important dimensions of the Mexican problem that policy specialists are likely to miss or be unfamiliar with.

The monies generated by the Cartels are substantially recycled into the Mexican economy as is the investment in extra hiring of personnel for drug suppression.

Both are considerable so there is no incentive to back off on either drug exports or diversion of money into general Mexican infrastructure.

Let's also add the poor pay structure of police, penal workers, and the judiciary, which leave them open to corruption and subversion.

A poor country generates its income any which way it can after all is said and done.

Finally, let's add a slightly counter-intuitive observation.

The larger part of Mexican society pays zero taxes--in effect, they have no skin in the game.

When all must pay something for civil society's features, perhaps they will demand a better edition of those features, not the least of which is personal security.

Hey, when the vast proportion of crimes are unreported, and those which are, are unsolved, why should anyone give a damn?

The mordita, the endemic and induced corruption, the never-ending demand for drugs from the US user population, the fundamental lack of civic concern, along with a legitimately wary approach to government--the PRI, the long running party after all which "owned" the government for rake offs--all of this militates against a Calderon victory.

Calderon's cajones would be better braced *against* the military solution and focused more tightly against those who benefit from the system as it exists.

I forgot; it is time to bring the Cartels into the tent, and kick the DC gringos out.

America also shares a long border with Canada and yet our neighbors to the north are not plagued by narco-terrorists like Mexico. While it is true that a lot of the drugs from Mexico are consumed in America and a lot of the gangs guns come from America, it would be logistically, just as simple to export tons of drugs from Canada into America, if, Canada was a very corrupt and near lawless country, but, it isn't and, sadly, Mexico is.

Mr. Casas-Zamora does an admirable job of considering the failures of Calderon's drug war, and provides some valuable recommendations for institutional reform. Mexican institutions lack more than just resources in combating the cartels; they lack effectiveness at a fundamental level, illustrated by the country's strikingly high impunity rate. Mexico cannot hope to tackle crime through military means alone, if there are no functioning systems in place to bring criminals to trial and hold them responsible for their actions.

However, despite Calderon's emphasized military successes against the drug cartels, he has also made a sustained effort towards reforming institutions and rooting out endemic corruption. Perhaps it is because he is finding the task of institutional reform more problematic and difficult that he hasn't made this more of an issue. Perhaps it is simply because it is harder to establish rigorous metrics for success, and victories are less visible and iconic than the capture of renowned drug lords.

Mistrust in institutions such as the police is ingrained from years of corruption alongside individual impunity from prosecution. Regaining public trust in these institutions will be a long and difficult process. The government's limited resources will allow corruption to continue to flourish, barring a dramatic new investment in the country's police, military, and judiciary. This scenario is unlikely. With continued corruption at the local level, it will be hard to convince people that these institutions are acting to protect them.

Backing down from military confrontation with the cartels is also not an entirely advisable scenario. The current war has exposed the extent of the trafficker's resources and destructive potential. Letting them regroup and rearm in the absence of a government crackdown would only make them more potent adversaries the next time a crackdown is attempted. Further, in the absence of strong institutions, the individuals responsible for the current violence will likely not be held accountable if not captured by the military. The Mexican government cannot now afford to 'go easy' on the traffickers.

A sustained, violent confrontation with drug traffickers will of course breed opposition, as what qualifies as a 'victory' is less than clear. Some may point to the Colombian government's ability to assert control over the country and reduce violence nationwide. However, Colombia's murder rate is still well above Mexico's, and the country remains the principal producer of cocaine worldwide. Drug trafficking is alive and well in Colombia.

Mexico needs to clarify what it hopes to achieve through the drug war. Perhaps most importantly, it should strive to achieve what Mr. Casas-Zamora argues is necessary in fighting this war: strong, effective institutions which are able to serve the Mexican population. A low impunity rate, a more well-trained and effective police force, and increased trust in law enforcement. This would be both the best way to take on drug trafficking, but also the most real, valuable result.

Mr. Casas-Zamora does an admirable job of considering the failures of Calderon's drug war, and provides some valuable recommendations for institutional reform. Mexican institutions lack more than just resources in combating the cartels; they lack effectiveness at a fundamental level, illustrated by the country's strikingly high impunity rate. Mexico cannot hope to tackle crime through military means alone, if there are no functioning systems in place to bring criminals to trial and hold them responsible for their actions.

However, despite Calderon's emphasized military successes against the drug cartels, he has also made a sustained effort towards reforming institutions and rooting out endemic corruption. Perhaps it is because he is finding the task of institutional reform more problematic and difficult that he hasn't made this more of an issue. Perhaps it is simply because it is harder to establish rigorous metrics for success, and victories are less visible and iconic than the capture of renowned drug lords.

Mistrust in institutions such as the police is ingrained from years of corruption alongside individual impunity from prosecution. Regaining public trust in these institutions will be a long and difficult process. The government's limited resources will allow corruption to continue to flourish, barring a dramatic new investment in the country's police, military, and judiciary. This scenario is unlikely. With continued corruption at the local level, it will be hard to convince people that these institutions are acting to protect them.

Backing down from military confrontation with the cartels is also not an entirely advisable scenario. The current war has exposed the extent of the trafficker's resources and destructive potential. Letting them regroup and rearm in the absence of a government crackdown would only make them more potent adversaries the next time a crackdown is attempted. Further, in the absence of strong institutions, the individuals responsible for the current violence will likely not be held accountable if not captured by the military. The Mexican government cannot now afford to 'go easy' on the traffickers.

A sustained, violent confrontation with drug traffickers will of course breed opposition, as what qualifies as a 'victory' is less than clear. Some may point to the Colombian government's ability to assert control over the country and reduce violence nationwide. However, Colombia's murder rate is still well above Mexico's, and the country remains the principal producer of cocaine worldwide. Drug trafficking is alive and well in Colombia.

Mexico needs to clarify what it hopes to achieve through the drug war. Perhaps most importantly, it should strive to achieve what Mr. Casas-Zamora argues is necessary in fighting this war: strong, effective institutions which are able to serve the Mexican population. A low impunity rate, a more well-trained and effective police force, and increased trust in law enforcement. This would be both the best way to take on drug trafficking, but also the most real, valuable result.

How does a country do what the author is recommending?

And as someone else has noted, the demand for drugs is in the United States and the source of many guns is in the United States. Instead of seeing this true threat to our vital interests, we are off busy blowing up Afghanistan and eager to expand into Pakistan and Iran.

Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.

I can`t dissaprove with an all out war against the drug cartels, even if the the costs are high. These costs are a short term side-effect, and the fact that they are short term is crucial. This type of offensive transcends current generations; however, its long term viability, unfortunately, lies outside it`s boarders. The drug trade is rampant only because of American demand. The US plays a crucial role in Mexico`s problems. This then demands the question: is the US willing to help Mexico? With this said, the drug and violence problem goes beyond what it is at the surface and spins off into the world of geopolitics and American assertiveness in Latin America.