The Euro Is Dead

But, if Europe's leaders play their cards right, it can rise again.

BY CHARLES CALOMIRIS | JANUARY 6, 2011

Europe is living in denial. Even after the economic crisis exposed the eurozone's troubled future, its leaders are struggling to sustain the status quo. At this point, several European countries will likely be forced to abandon the euro within the next year or two.  

European leaders tell us that this is impossible. There is no legal mechanism, they say, for exiting the euro. But the collapse of the euro is simple arithmetic: Once a country's debt-to-GDP ratio gets high enough, it becomes impossible for it to generate enough future taxes to repay its existing debt and interest costs. This week, Portugal became the latest country to threaten the integrity of the eurozone when it saw the yield on its Treasury bills soar, based on investors' fears that it would be unable to pay its debt.

The only way out of this conundrum is for countries with insurmountable debt burdens to default on their euro-denominated debts and exit the eurozone so that they can finance their continuing fiscal deficits by printing their own currency. Here's a hint for Europe's politicians: If the math says one thing and the law says something different, it will be the law that ends up changing.

The countries currently teetering on the precipice include "peripheral" countries -- such as Greece, Ireland, and Portugal -- as well as large countries, such as Spain, Italy, and France. It is extremely unlikely that all of these countries will still be members of the eurozone by the time revelers gather to ring in New Year's 2013. The most likely scenario is that the next two years will witness the departure of more than one peripheral country and at least one of the large countries.

Greece is at the top of that list. The country will soon have a sovereign debt-to GDP ratio of more than 150 percent and an economy that contracted approximately 4 percent in the past year. It has long suffered from the worst corruption and largest shadow economy in Europe, while also possessing some of the lowest labor participation rates, most generous pension systems, and highest consumption rates among its European peers. It is true that the Greeks have made heroic efforts in the past six months to cut spending and raise taxes, but it won't be enough to reverse the explosive costs of covering its debts. And yet, the story goes, Greece will somehow repay what it owes.

Following closely on Greece's heels is Ireland. During the so-called "Irish miracle," the country experienced a housing boom that saw twice the appreciation as did the United States. When this bubble popped, Ireland's banking system suffered a massive loss. The government's bank bailouts have added more than 20 percent of GDP to its budget deficit in the past year and will add a similar additional amount to its deficits in the near future.

The Irish case also shows the perils of EU intervention. Ireland was forced by its self-serving European partners to guarantee massive bank debts -- in order to forestall debilitating losses to German, Belgian, Danish, and British banks, among others -- as a condition for receiving emergency EU assistance. This Irish policy mistake has raised its debt to stratospheric levels, which the government will be hard-pressed to bring down. Thus, in effect, some of the largest EU countries proved their willingness to throw Ireland under the bus to postpone dealing with their own financial institutions' problems.

Now Spain is being pushed by those same European partners into making the same deadly mistake as Ireland. Spain's housing boom was similar to that of Ireland and was similarly financed by large external borrowings. The good news in Spain, however, is that most of the country's largest financial institutions appear to be solvent. If Spain shuts down its insolvent savings banks and allows closed banks to default on their external bond debts held by other EU countries' banks, Spanish sovereign solvency can be preserved.

A number of other European countries face similarly daunting fiscal challenges. Italy, for example, is running a debt-to-GDP ratio in excess of 125 percent. Although serious and immediate fiscal spending cuts could give Italy a reasonable chance of repaying its debts, the country seems so politically broken that it is unlikely to make the deep spending cuts that would permit it to stay in the euro. Its meager cuts this past year are an indication of how difficult it is for Italy's political system to confront its challenges.

Sean Gallup/Getty Images

 

Charles W. Calomiris is Henry Kaufman professor of financial institutions at Columbia University and a senior scholar at the Columbia Business School's Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business.

BASBEN

3:00 PM ET

January 7, 2011

More self-serving anti-euro drivel

Having closely followed the (dis)information campaign against the euro in anglosaxon media for more than a year now, I have alternated between amazement at the sudden bout of 'concern' for a currency they left largely unattended for a decade, anger at their indifference to the consequences of their fearmongering for the populations of the affected countries, and joy at the backfiring of their mendacious efforts.

So an article that just restates all the cliches about the eurozone's alleged 'unsustainability', while adding some dire predictions even the maddest economists shrink from making, should leave me thoroughly uninterested. It does, but since it also neatly sums up and even exaggerates so many of the fallacies anglosaxon commentators have come up with in their desperate attempts to disparage an economic rival's currency, I feel this may be a good place to deconstruct this nonsense.

First, there is no economic crisis exposing the eurozone's 'troubled future', as the writer proclaims. There has been first and foremost a financial crisis, exposing the myriad forms of deception, plunder and theft practised by American financial institutions. If anything, this has shown Europeans the dangers of depending on an 'ally' that systematically abuses its exorbitant privilege to print the world's reserve and transaction currency in order to extort free lunches from the rest of the world, more particularly, its foreign creditors and trading partners.

Second, the collapse of the euro is not simple arithmetic (though if it were, I would still shrink from trusting this author's conclusions). While a high debt-to-GDP ratio will hamper economic growth in most countries (as per Reinhart and Rogoff's research), there is no rule that states a certain ratio 'inevitably' leads to default and/or currency collapse.

The reference to 'math' by the author is therefore disingenuous at best, and I dare him to show me the equations that lead to this conclusion. Of course, this would have to include an explanation why the developed country with by far the hightest debt/GDP ratio - Japan - is so far in no danger of defaulting or collapse. But such an explanation would have to refer to the fact that the main holders of these debts are the frugal Japanese themselves. And because the same holds for many of the large European countries like Italy and France now 'teetering on the precipice', this would require an intellectual honesty this author has done nothing to expect.

Third, Greece has made a mess of its finances by deceiving its eurozone partners with close help and cooperation of American financial institutions that then did everything to profit from the subsequent fallout, including mobilizing the - always cooperative - anglosaxon financial media. Ireland bailed out its banks, but not at the bidding of its eurozone partners.

Fourth, to say Europe need rules to limit government spending - ludicrous as this is in itself, coming from an American - is to display a thorough ignorance of EMU. For there actually have been such rules in place since the Maastricht Treaty - 3% deficit, 60% debt/GDP. The problem has been enforcement, as well as keeping out predatory American institutions helping countries to bend these rules with complex financial chicaneries (and then shorting the hell out of them when the story breaks).

Fifth, 'austerity' imposed on overindebted countries with a large public sector does not necessarily translate into lower economic growth. In fact, given their bloated bureaucracies and social security systems, austerity will likely contribute to increased efficiency and private sector initiative, rather than eat into economic growth as it would in economies with a smaller public sector, like the US's or the UK's.

Sixth, the anti-euro campaign to which this author so incompetently contributes has actually already backfired. The desired effect of crowding in investment in Treasuries has not materialized. For one thing, rising yields of peripherals have corresponded to lower yields of core countries, increasing spreads but diminishing the crowding out effects of 'safe haven' flows to dollar and pound.

Furthermore the artificially weakened euro has unleashed the export might of the European core on the rest of the world, resulting in high growth that is as yet only partially reflected in a stronger currency. Meanwhile, the Chinese are slowly offloading US Treasuries (which is why long yields are rising despite QE2) to ensure a soft landing, converting some of their dollars into euro denominated debt, thus strengthening the common currency.

So the campaign against the euro has already failed. And if it weren't such a disgusting sight to see American academics, economists and pundits twist and turn the truth (not to mention 'math) in order to provide for the 'inevitable' collapse of their rival's currency, I would encourage them to keep it up by all means.

 

ANBUDMOR

7:39 AM ET

January 8, 2011

German Model

All the suggestions for the countries of the Med would seem to be the exact opposite of what other successful northern European Euro countries are doing. There are plenty of employment protection laws in both Germany and Holland. The author seems to be using the failings of the Euro and of various countries to change policies than aren't necessarily the cause of their woes.

Having said that, I do think it would behoove Ireland to get out of the Euro now and to abandon its bank guarantees. The author is correct in saying that Ireland's commitments as a condition for a bailout seems partly to have been to help out German and English banks at the expense of Irish tax payers, most of whom weren't engaged in property speculation or banking. Not being in the Euro seems to have worked well for Iceland.

As the Germans and the English clearly don't have the best interest of the Irish at heart, (nor would I expect them to) I don't see why the Irish should engage in such self-immolation; especially as the Euro will live or die without them.

 

MAYA

5:38 AM ET

January 9, 2011

Compare the euro to the dollar

In monetary matters Spain or Ireland are to Europe what California or Hawaii are to the US.
It is not a matter of debt-to-GDP ratio getting to high and leaving the eurozone to avoid paying existing debt and interest costs.
The euro is here to stay, alongside the dollar. Europe has the capacity and the means to overcome financial bottlenecks and to rescue their "federal states", because that's what they already are, in monetary matters.
Compare the euro to the dollar - and ask why the dollar - and the American economy - is surviving? Then you have the answer.

 

ANTONIO ANDRE

4:44 AM ET

January 10, 2011

Portugal and the Euro

Dear Sir.
You mention Portugal a lot in your article and you may well be right. You do not write a word, though, to sustain your assertions concerning this country, which makes me wonder where does it fit your story.

 

ALISON C

12:50 PM ET

January 22, 2011

The UK didn't even get a chance.

So we in the Uk still had to change money when visiting our neighbours in Europe.

It has been impossible to set up a Euro bank account in Britain which of course would be very helpful for both business travellers and those going taking holidays in Europe.

However reading the article it could be argued that we are better off without it.