Getting Real on Japan

Bob Gates now appears to understand that the U.S.-Japan alliance is much bigger than one base in Okinawa. But both sides still have a long way to go.

BY DANIEL SNEIDER | JANUARY 14, 2011

Two learning curves intersected in Tokyo this week when U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates came to town, part of a Northeast Asian swing that started in Beijing and will finish in Seoul.

One curve is under way in Japan, where the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is learning the difference between campaigning and governing. Ending a half-century of nearly uninterrupted conservative rule, the DPJ came to power in September 2009 vowing to forge a more "equal" relationship with its patron ally and put more emphasis on Japan's ties with Asian neighbors, particularly China and South Korea.

The DPJ also pledged to reduce the burden of hosting U.S. bases placed on the people of Okinawa, where the bases occupy nearly a fifth of the island. The new government hoped to revisit the unimplemented 1996 agreement to move the helicopters and planes stationed at Futenma Marine air base, dangerously crowded in among apartment buildings and schools on the southern part of the island, to a new base built in its less densely populated northern half.

Since taking power, the DPJ has struggled to reconcile its electoral pledges with the reality of a serially provocative North Korea and an increasingly aggressive China. Yukio Hatoyama's inability to manage the base issue with the United States became emblematic of his weak leadership, costing him the premiership after only nine months and contributing to the party's loss of the upper house of parliament last summer.

Americans somewhat smugly congratulate Tokyo for its belated realism. Less acknowledged is Washington's own learning curve about both the realities of politics in Japan and the enduring value of the alliance. The early days of the DPJ administration were marked by barely disguised U.S. disdain for its political ineptitude and domestic troubles, and even, among some U.S. officials, expectations that a strategic condominium with China could eventually supplant the Cold War alliance with Japan.

Gates's successful role as alliance manager this week stands in stark contrast to his visit more than a year ago, in October 2009. Back then, he came to bluntly tell the Japanese to drop any talk of reopening the Okinawa base issue. "This may not be the perfect alternative for anyone," Gates said, "but it is the best alternative for everyone, and it is time to move on." He dismissed any other options as "politically untenable and operationally unworkable."

As for the alliance, Gates forcefully reminded his Japanese hosts that Americans were there to protect their country -- allowing the Japanese to spend very little on their own self-defense over the past half-century. At the same time, Obama administration officials talked openly about Japan's diminishing importance, hinting at China's potential as a new strategic partner. A senior State Department official told the Washington Post that the U.S. had "grown comfortable" with the idea of Japan as a constant in U.S. relations with the region. It no longer fills that role, he said, adding ominously that "the hardest thing right now is not China -- it's Japan."

The March 2010 sinking of a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, shook that illusory view of the region. China's decision to back Pyongyang and its vocal opposition to U.S. naval deployments in the Yellow Sea surprised some in Washington. Meanwhile the DPJ government in Tokyo lined up strongly behind Seoul, as it did later after North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island last November. The new administration of Prime Minister Naoto Kan, Hatoyama's successor, got its own shock when Beijing purposely escalated tensions over the arrest of a Chinese fishing-boat captain following a collision near Japanese-controlled islands in the disputed oil and gas rich waters of the East China Sea.

By last fall, talk of a "strategic partnership" with China had been replaced by a new emphasis on bolstering traditional Cold War-era cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States. In October, ahead of the president's visit to Japan, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell admitted that the "learning process is not confined just to Tokyo."

Campbell told reporters in Tokyo that the difficulties of the past year served as "a reminder to the United States [of] how badly we need a good relationship with Japan" to deal with the challenges in Asia. "It is critical for this generation of American policymakers to in no way take Japan for granted," he said, in an obvious swipe at more Sino-centric colleagues back in Washington.

KAZUHIRO NOGI/AFP/Getty Images

 

Daniel Sneider is associate director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University and a former foreign correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor.

MARTY MARTEL

7:06 AM ET

January 15, 2011

Japan needs to defend its own territorial claims

Since US is NOT going to take sides between disputing nations about the maritime boundaries as declared by Defense Secretary Gates last October, US will obviously preach the disputing nations to settle their claims peacefully as it did to Japan and China recently over the capture of a Chinese captain for hitting Japanese boats in disputed area.

There in lies the rub.

What if two disputing nations can NOT settle their differences about the maritime boundaries peacefully like Japan and China can not? Why didn’t US support Japan’s claim to those islands but instead pressured Japan to release Chinese boat captain to reduce tensions? Poor Kan government got a lot of flak domestically for bowing down to Chinese bullying under US pressure.

US is also beholden to China as Japan has to know. Afterall US realizes that China has US by the tail even if Japan does not realize that. US businesses are hooked to huge profits that cheap Chinese products generate for them and US government is hooked to huge investments that China makes in US treasuries.

Japan is economic giant but military midget. China is going to find other ways to screw Japan. China’s short term aim is to ’Finlandize’ Japan.

Japan can not and should not expect others to fight its own battles. Unless Japan becomes a military giant at par with China by developing its own nuclear weapon arsenal, Japan will always be at the mercy of US-China relations.

 

XTIANGODLOKI

2:44 PM ET

January 17, 2011

Japan is still feeling from WWII

Japan tried the whole regional hegemony thing before WWII but the war changed all that. Being the only country who have actually been nuked by another, Japanese for the most part are against nukes. I don't think Japan will go for nukes even if N.Korea gets one.

There are plenty of right wingers in Japan who are trying to relive the whole regional hegemony dream. If you go to some large Japanese cities you will find them in these black buses with loudspeakers denouncing foreigners and liberals. But that the chances of Japan rising like it did even back in the 80s extremely unlikely. Economically, for industries where China is not the competition Japan's export economy is slowly being overtaken by Korea. As for the military, the Japanese population for the most part are still anti-war and anti nuke.

On top of this, Japanese population is aging fast, and its pathetic young people apparently have lost their interest in having sex (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/8257400/Third-of-young-Japanese-men-not-interested-in-sex.html). Without significant changes in immigration policies Japan will remain in a decline in multiple areas. Japan in other words will likely to need an external protector for the long term.

Many Western nations fear Japan switch from siding with US to siding with China, but I think that is unlikely. Chinese still harbor major resentments against the Japanese, so China's popularity in Japan will be limited.

 

YOSHIMICHI MORIYAMA

9:48 AM ET

January 16, 2011

The Democratic Party of Japan

"Ending a half-century of nearly uninterrupted conservative rule" virtually means that DPJ was in opposition for that same long period since its bulk comes from opposition parties during that period.

"Equal relationship with its patron ally" meant to a majority of DPJ members a closer distance with China and a farther distance from the United States.

"Yukio Hatoyama's inability to manage the base issue" was because he did not much appreciate "the enduring value of the alliance."

A very large group, perhaps the largest, of DPJ were members or affiliates of defunct Japan Socialist Party. They were generally hard on the United States, seeing it more as an imperialistic, war-liking country than as a fighter for freedom. They were soft on China, seeing it as a country long victimized by Japanese and Western imperialism but struggling to its feet rather than an ethno-centric and authoritarian country.

That these people were in opposition for such a long time means that they were protected, day-dreaming, from facing the reality of international environments and real China.

Hatoyam as Prime Minister went to Beijing to talk about East Asian Community when China was becoming increasingly self-assertive. Kan, the present Prime Minister, said about the Chinese fishing vessel which went into a Japanese Coastal Guard ship that he did not know he was the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

Most of these people are amateurs. "This generation of American policy-makers" can "in no way take Japan for granted."

As for the "disputed isles," I posted two comments to Nicholas Kristof/Look Out for the Diaoyu Islands/NYTimes.com(#317~319 on page thirteen) and two to www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/ Can China Afford to Confront the World?-Part One. I hope some of you will read them if interested.
Unnan City, Japan