A Middle-Class Revolution

Ben Ali's Tunisia showed all the signs of being a stable and relatively prosperous country. Until it imploded.

BY ERIC GOLDSTEIN | JANUARY 18, 2011

In my numerous trips to Tunisia for Human Rights Watch since the mid-1990s, I grew weary of Tunisian dissidents telling me that at any moment the people would rise up in revolt against their autocratic president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.

Keep dreaming, I thought.

This country was not ripe for revolution. Anyone who traveled throughout the region could see that Tunisians enjoy a relatively high standard of living and quality of life. The country's per capita income is almost double that of Morocco and Egypt. It's higher than Algeria's, even though Algeria has oil and its smaller neighbor to the east has almost none. Tunisia scores high in poverty reduction, literacy, education, population control, and women's status. It built a middle-class society by hard work rather than by pumping oil from the ground; Tunisians export clothing, olive oil, and produce, and welcome hundreds of thousands of European tourists each year.

Although Ben Ali's Tunisia was a police state, his tacit bargain with the people -- "shut up and consume" -- seemed to hold, making the country appear to be a tranquil haven between strife-torn Algeria and Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya. However, a tragic protest by a street vendor caused long-simmering -- though not immediately visible -- grievances to spill over and unmask Tunisia's reputation for stability as illusory.

For the rare activist who rejected Ben Ali's bargain during his reign, this was not authoritarianism-lite: The president jailed thousands of political prisoners during his 23-year rule, the vast majority alleged Islamists serving multiyear sentences even though they were not accused of planning or perpetrating acts of violence. There was also the occasional leftist, journalist, or human rights activist or lawyer jailed for defamation or disseminating "false information," or on trumped-up criminal charges. Plainclothes police routinely tortured suspects under interrogation and broke up even the most anemic street protest, roughing up critics and openly tailing foreign journalists and human rights workers.

Still, those who experienced the repression were a minority of the 10 million Tunisians. The silent majority included most of the intelligentsia, who, since the early 1990s, had increasingly checked out of political life. Some supported the government because they feared the Islamists, who had grown strong before Ben Ali crushed them early in his rule. Others saw no point in joining a hamstrung opposition when the price was relentless harassment from cops in leather jackets and dark sunglasses, dismissal from government jobs, and restrictions on travel.

Ordinary Tunisians kept their heads down and attended to their work. And there seemed to be plenty of job opportunities: Compared with neighboring countries, there were fewer men lingering all day long in cafes, and fewer hittistes -- Algerian slang for the omnipresent youths who spend their days on sidewalks "holding up the walls." Tunisian women were highly visible in public spaces and well-represented in the professional class.

The government always had its critics, but by the mid-1990s Ben Ali's crushing of dissent had reduced them to a hard-core handful of "refuseniks." These lawyers, writers, and activists were hailed in Paris and Brussels for their courage -- but were virtually unknown at home because repression had atomized their movements and the media refused to cover them.

It was these refuseniks who insisted that ordinary Tunisians were fed up and ready to revolt. The Tunisian economic miracle was an illusion, they claimed. Ordinary Tunisians seethed over regional inequity, their eroding standard of living, the shakedowns and mistreatment at the hands of police and local officials, and the stories of colossal corruption and wealth among the president's in-laws and cronies.

Early in the 2000s, the small circle of political opponents widened modestly. A larger circle of Tunisians formed around the hard-core refuseniks; though not firebrands, they nonetheless wanted to be counted among those who said no to repression. These included intellectuals who realized that the president's problem was not only with Islamists, but with anyone who criticized his rule. A cautious journalism professor who had declined to meet me in 1999, explaining that such a meeting would bring police interrogation, began receiving me openly and attending the little gatherings organized by the beleaguered human rights community.

FRED DUFOUR/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS: DEMOCRACY, NORTH AFRICA
 

Eric Goldstein is deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch.

DR. JONES JR.

11:09 PM ET

January 18, 2011

Well put:

"Autocracy looks stable until the day it is not."

Perhaps we should also CC our friends in the People's Republic of China on this point. There is no one path to reform which an autocracy can recognize and thus deny access to. There is only the unexpected flash-point, in which a repressed (often self-repressed) society suddenly recognizes itself and decides to act.

Autocracies do, however, have the ability to instigate reform themselves. It is a sad statement on the nature of power and the human desire to obtain and retain it, that so few do. Eventually that decision is taken from such governments, although there is and can be no established schedule for doing so.

The reverse of this is that there is also no one policy that liberal democracies can take to accomplish either reform or revolution. We implement one policy, then another, and we declare each one useless after a few years have passed. If Tunisia teaches us any lesson, it is that when the people of a country are ready to ask for what is theirs, they will act to obtain it. There is no one strategy that outsiders can plan or one role they can play, because they (we) are not the key ingredient.

 

MALICEIT

12:21 AM ET

January 19, 2011

RE:

The usual 'more freedom' rhetoric. Would be better if it was a democracy with Ismalist in power? Or if the country had oil it would be couped by US long time ago with another autocrat in power.

 

GRANT

6:13 AM ET

January 19, 2011

There isn't anything about

There isn't anything about Islam that makes it incompatible with democracy, the problem is that the Muslim states that do have democracy are either stumbling to it from one military after the next* or are in fact ruled by authoritarian leaders stupid enough to back a man actively subverting both democracy and the aforementioned leader**.

*See Turkey and Pakistan
** See Iran

 

GRANT

6:09 AM ET

January 19, 2011

Sadly I see this as far too

Sadly I see this as far too optimistic. We've seen plenty of protests and demonstrations in the past twenty years with no change and this article does nothing to address what are perhaps the two most vital questions. The first, what were the elites who could have been expected to back Ben Ali doing? The second, what were the security forces who had no problem crushing dissent before doing?

 

CHOPPY1

1:01 PM ET

January 19, 2011

The US makes this mistake again and again

How many times have we been surprised when a dictators falls? We completely believe that democracy is the only stable form of government, but we somehow always convince ourselves to support dictators as a concession to "political reality." But dictators spend their time trying to look like they have a firm grip on power--we unconsciously accept this propaganda. We make the same mistake with China. The CCP tries to appear to have a firn grip on power, but we should be careful that our China policy is not welded to the CCP so that when they inevitably fall, US interests get dragged down too.

 

GINKGOBILOBA

5:11 PM ET

January 19, 2011

Caution: Western perspective

What I find most interesting about Western (especially Anglo-American) commentary on democratic transition is that so much of it is focused on the middle class. From the Western viewpoint, the middle class equals the whole society, no matter how tiny it may be. If the middle class is happy, the society as a whole is happy. If the middle class doesn't support the government, the society doesn't support the government. Whatever opinions the vocal minority of the middle class espouses is taken as the unerring representation of what everyone else in that society believes.

As a corollary, every time such a middle class "revolution" occurs in a non-Western country, the Western media attempts to paint it as an uprising by the entire society. During the Iranian election protests, for example, it is safe to say that most of those who joined the protests were middle-class; Ahmadinejad has a broad base of support among poor, rural Iranians, and most of them probably couldn't be bothered to join the protests. Yet Western reporting on the event consistently portrayed it as an groundswell of anger by all of the Iranian people. If this is true, then why weren't there 70 million people joining the protests?

This perspective is what makes the "middle class revolution" the defining characteristic of the American-supported policy of the "color revolution". It is understandable that the Anglo-American culture, originating from a "nation of shopkeepers" and so capitalistic in orientation, would sympathize more with the middle class than with the poor. However, we mustn't forget that in most non-Western countries, the middle class represents only a small segment of society, and their preferences in many areas conflict with those of the poor majority. If the West truly supports democracy, should we not listen to the opinion of the majority, rather than those who can shout loudest?

Finally, a short digression on everyone's favorite topic at the moment: China's middle class may be growing, but given its large demographic base, this middle class is even less significant than those of most other nations. If, as many Westerners believe, democratization could only stem from the middle class, then we shouldn't be too optimistic about China's chances for democratization.

 

KHADIJA

5:58 AM ET

January 20, 2011

unemployment in Tunisia is the highest in the Arab world

As a comment to these words « And there seemed to be plenty of job opportunities: Compared with neighboring countries, there were fewer men lingering all day long in cafes, and fewer hittistes -- Algerian slang for the omnipresent youths who spend their days on sidewalks "holding up the walls." International statistics show that unemployment reached 14.3% in 2010 the highest in the Arab world followed by 13% in Algeria and 12 % in Jordan so I think that you are taking into consideration only coastal areas of Tunisia forgetting about millions living in interior Tunisia .