At a meeting between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators on June 21, 2008, Ahmed Qurei, a former Palestinian prime minister, raised a familiar concern: "When will you freeze settlement activity? This will kill us." Israel's continuing refusal to stop settlement construction was making the Palestinian Authority look fatally weak in the eyes of Palestinian and Arab public opinion and thus empowering the radicals of Hamas. "You want to help Hamas on our account?" he asked.
Tzipi Livni, Israel's foreign minister, noted that Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, would soon be speaking to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. "You can raise it," she said.
"They will freeze it?"
"No, but you can raise it."
I mined this exchange from the so-called "Palestine Papers," a trove of 1,600 documents -- a kind of Arabic WikiLeaks -- given to Al Jazeera and published earlier this month. The documents have been used to discredit Palestinian negotiators, whom Al Jazeera has described in blazing headlines as lackeys begging for scraps from the imperious Israelis. Some on the left in the United States have made the same point.
I don't read the leaks that way. To me, Qurei and his colleagues come across as thoroughly rational, if world-weary, negotiators playing a weak hand as well as they can. I can see why frustrated Arabs, fed for years on triumphal delusions, might not see it that way; but if the American people read these documents they might finally be cured of their single-minded support for the official Israeli narrative and their hostility to Palestinian aspirations.
The exchange over the settlements was especially telling. U.S. President Barack Obama pressed Israel harder than any of his predecessors to freeze settlement construction as an indispensable good-faith gesture to the Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed only to a temporary and partial freeze, and peace talks collapsed last year when Israel refused to extend the halt. Post-facto conventional wisdom holds that the White House should never have made the freeze a precondition, because the Palestinians themselves did not view it as a sine qua non. And yet, in the Palestine Papers, Qurei and his colleagues constantly harp on the public-relations catastrophe they will suffer should settlement construction continue. Livni, who seems to understand their situation perfectly well, never disagrees.
The 2008 talks were held in the wake of the Annapolis conference of late 2007, at which Olmert and Abbas had accepted a two-state solution. From the evidence of the Palestine Papers, the talks were conducted in a professional manner, with only the occasional temper tantrum or ideological diatribe. The Palestinians made painful concessions, first insisting that Israel could not annex any of the large settlement blocs in and around Jerusalem, and then conceding on several of them (thus today's charges of betrayal). In extensive one-on-one meetings in mid-2008 -- of which the papers released so far provide no hint -- diplomats produced a document stipulating areas of agreement and leaving a great many brackets for the unresolved issues. In his new memoir and in a recent interview, Olmert has said that he and Abbas had reached agreement on virtually all major subjects and came agonizingly close to signing a deal in September 2008. Whether or not that's so, it's plain that both sides were trying very hard to bridge the gaps between them.
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