And so Tunisia and Egypt are not "liberalizing," but rather, at least if all goes well -- a giant if, of course -- will pass directly from dictatorship to democracy at some point in the coming months. This is incredibly thrilling, and also dangerous. States that hold elections before they've had the chance to evolve away from ancient autocratic habits tend to become what Fareed Zakaria called "illiberal democracies" -- the opposite, more or less, of the liberal autocracy. Africa is full of states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo that have the formal trappings and official nomenclature of democracy, but none of the accountability or even genuine representativeness. "People power" brought democracy to the Philippines without significantly changing the corruption and fecklessness of the autocratic Ferdinand Marcos.

It's a dangerous moment, but also a golden opportunity. The vast American machinery of democracy promotion in the Arab world had absolutely nothing to do with the events of the last month or so -- because it was predicated on a "liberalization" model that even advocates recognized wasn't going anywhere. But if there is to be an effective transition to democracy, the civil society organizations and nascent political parties that American and European funds have been nurturing will serve as the means by which mass enthusiasm can be channeled into participation and citizens can monitor and help shape the actions of their government.

The golden opportunity is to help Egypt, Tunisia, and perhaps others to hold free and fair elections, and over the long term to develop the institutions that broaden and sustain democracy. I asked Kenneth Wollack, head of the National Democratic Institute, what this would entail in practice. "First," he said, "the requests have to come from local actors; you have to be standing behind them." That said, he noted that experience in Eastern Europe and elsewhere showed that in the run-up to transitional elections, organizations like his own can make a difference by advising officials on the reform of laws governing the function of political parties, electoral commissions, and the media; by working with civil society organizations engaged in election monitoring; and by helping political parties organize and develop platforms.

But democracy promotion institutions can only do just so much; the most difficult and dangerous issues require sustained diplomatic engagement. Washington must make it clear that Mubarak's apparent decision to use security forces to wreak mayhem on protesters will destroy relations between the two countries. If Mubarak steps down, the White House must push for an inclusive transitional government and must seek to limit the power of the Army in any new government, so that Egypt does not become, like Pakistan, a military state with a feeble civilian government. These are, of course, Egyptian questions, but Egyptians will inevitably look to Washington to see where it stands. "We have to lead on democracy and human rights," as Wollack says.

Will that happen? For all its rhetorical commitment to a democratic Arab world, Barack Obama's administration cannot help but feel apprehensive about the consequences for U.S. national security. Some policy experts, such as Leslie Gelb, have warned of the calamity of a government dominated by the broadly popular Muslim Brotherhood, which, like a great many Egyptians, rejects the state of Israel and supports the radicals of Hamas. With this in mind, Stephen Hadley, national security advisor to former President George W. Bush, has suggested that the United States try to delay elections in Egypt so that "civil society and non-Islamist political parties can emerge."

This is a temptation that must be resisted. First, it wouldn't do any good: If people want elections, they won't be dissuaded by being told they're not "ready" for them (even when they're not). Second, it would reinforce the view that the United States only believes in democracy when the outcome is to its own liking. Third, it's probably unnecessary because the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt seems to be shying away from power rather than actively seeking it, while Islamists in Tunisia are both less popular and more moderate. And finally, the most effective way for the United States to shape outcomes in an increasingly democratic Arab world is to be seen as a champion of popular aspirations. What American policymakers did over the last half-dozen years to promote democracy in the Middle East mattered much less than they thought; what they do now will matter a great deal.

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