Small Wars

This Week at War: The Pakistan Scenario

How the United States could end up paying even more for an anti-American Egypt.

In its dealings with the United States, will the new Egypt take after Pakistan?

This week's battle between pro- and anti-Mubarak supporters for control of Cairo's Tahrir Square only deepened the mystery over where Egypt's latest revolution is headed. Mubarak has promised to step down after presidential elections in September, though it remains to be seen if he'll have to make an exit much sooner than that. What will follow, no one can say. The U.S. government has long granted a generous foreign assistance package to Egypt in order to maintain Mubarak's support for critical interests in the region. Regardless of what form the new, post-Mubarak government takes, the financial price the United States will have to pay to keep Egypt on its side will almost certainly go up.

Whether the next government is authoritarian or representative, the street protests of the past two weeks will force it to do more than Mubarak ever did to reflect popular will. The Mubarak government was as pro-American as U.S. policymakers could reasonably hope for; its successor will almost certainly be less so. Its level of dependence on the United States will start out the same, but its level of antagonism will very likely go up. At the same time the new Egyptian government will also have important leverage over the United States. Since 9/11, Pakistan's leaders have shown how leverage and antagonism can be combined into a money machine financed by the U.S. treasury. Obama and his officials should expect the new Egyptian government, whatever form it takes, to quickly apply the same formula.

According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the populations of both Pakistan and Egypt have rock bottom opinions of the U.S. government. With popular will now out on the streets, political leaders in post-Mubarak Egypt will profit from burnishing their anti-American credentials. A less cooperative bilateral relationship with the United States will likely result. As is currently the case with Pakistan, U.S. officials will soon have to deal with counterparts in Cairo who will face a limited ability to cooperate with U.S. objectives due to popular resistance.

In spite of this antagonism, U.S. officials will still have to seek Egyptian government cooperation on critical U.S. interests in the region. These include Egypt's continued support for U.S. military activities in the region, its peace treaty with Israel, its active support of counterterrorism, and its continued adherence to a policy of nuclear non-proliferation.

These policies would seem largely to be in Egypt's interest as well. However, that does not mean that Egypt will agree to deliver on these U.S. interests for free. Pakistan has shown how to combine leverage over the United States and popular anti-American sentiment into a method of extracting ever more foreign assistance from the U.S. government. U.S. policymakers may grumble that the Pakistanis have delivered little on al Qaeda in many years or that it harbors the Afghan Taliban or that it is rapidly expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal. Given the leverage Pakistan has over the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, it seems that the less Pakistan cooperates, the more foreign assistance it receives from the Washington; according to the State Department, U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan has gone from $727 million in 2007 to a request of $3.05 billion in 2011. Similarly, Yemen has used its tepid support for U.S. counter-terrorism goals to vault its annual U.S. foreign assistance from $19.4 million in 2008 to a request of $106.6 million this year.

The post-Mubarak government could very well follow Pakistan's lead in combining Egypt's inherent anti-Americanism and the U.S. government's critical interests in the region to form a powerful lever to pry more cash out of the U.S. treasury. Although some may view such payments to "frenemies" as unsavory, most U.S. policymakers likely view them as a bargain when compared to the alternatives. Mubarak's pro-American approach yielded $1.56 billion in assistance this year. With a little bad behavior, the next Egyptian government should be able to do much better than that.

Should the Pentagon flaunt its cyberpower?

During an interview he gave just prior to retiring as the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force General Kevin Chilton asserted that if the Pentagon wants to use deterrence to defend its interests in cyberspace, at some point it will need to put on an intimidating display of just how much turmoil it can inflict online. "[I]f we're going to use cybercapabilities to deter, that's going to beg for some demonstration of that capability," Chilton said. "There's no plans for anything that would demonstrate a [cyberattack] capability at this time. But I think, if we're going to think about deterrence, which we do at Stratcom, these are the kinds of challenges for the future for us."

Chilton is no doubt using Cold War nuclear deterrence as a model for dissuading potential cyber adversaries. Images of massive mushroom clouds over the Nevada desert or Bikini Atoll were presumably enough to convince Soviet decision-makers to think long and hard about making potentially provocative moves. But how would the U.S. government actually go about making a similar display of cyberpower? And is Cold War deterrence even the appropriate model of conflict in cyberspace?

The most difficult problem regarding cyberdeterrence is attribution, knowing who the attacker is, where to find him, and what assets he values that are vulnerable to retaliation. Chilton asserted that attribution "is more difficult in this domain but it's not impossible," and that Stratcom is getting better at it. A policy of deterrence through the threat of retaliation won't be credible until Stratcom reliably solves the attribution problem -- attackers won't fear Stratcom cyberretaliation as long as they know that Stratcom can't find them. And until Stratcom finally does solve the problem, a demonstration of offensive cybercapability would be diplomatically damaging and would unnecessarily reveal capabilities that best remain inside an adversary's imagination.

While the Pentagon's computer engineers work on those problems, the government's attorneys have some cyberwork of their own to complete. Writing in the New York Times, Richard Falkenrath, a former deputy commissioner for counterterrorism for the New York Police Department and deputy homeland security adviser to President George W. Bush, says that it is unclear what legal authority a U.S. president has to conduct offensive cyberoperations. Under his commander-in-chief powers, a president presumably has the authority to employ cyberweapons in support of a military campaign against foreign adversaries. But in the cyber world, the U.S. government's offensive cyberoperations may run through or target assets or persons inside the United States. Just as it is highly questionable whether a president has legal authority to order Predator drone strikes inside the United States, according to Falkenrath a president's authority to employ cyberweapons at or through U.S. cyber infrastructure is currently ambiguous and should be resolved with a statute from Congress.

Is Cold War deterrence even the appropriate model of conflict in cyberspace? Rather than looking to the nuclear standoff against the Soviet Union for lessons, a better model might be the Pentagon's more recent experience chasing down anonymous insurgents who hide within the non-combatant civilian population. If cyberadversaries are insurgents who hide among the world's computer servers, as the counterinsurgent, the Pentagon would need to persuade those servers (and their owners) to be on its side of the conflict. Just like counterinsurgency in the physical world, winning that struggle in cyberspace will take diplomacy and a whole-of-government approach.


Small Wars

This Week at War: Lessons from Cyberwar I

How Russia pioneered the use of cyberattacks as a military tactic.

What does cyberwar look like? In 2008, Georgia found out.

In most ways, the brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was a throwback to the mid-20th century. A border dispute, inflamed by propaganda and whipped-up ethnic tension, resulted in a murky case of who-shot-first, an armored blitzkrieg, airstrikes, a plea for peace by the defeated, signatures on a piece of paper, and the winner's annexation of some territory. So far, so 1939. But one aspect of this little war was very much in the 21st century, namely Russia's integration of offensive cyber operations into its overall political-military strategy. The August war was a preview of how military forces will use cyber operations in the future and what commanders and policymakers need to prepare for.

In a new piece for Small Wars Journal, David Hollis, a senior policy analyst with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and a reserve Army officer at U.S. Cyber Command, describes how the Russian government integrated cyber operations into its campaign plan against Georgia. Hollis notes that though the Russian offensive cyber operations in the Georgia war were obvious, they were masked through third parties and by routing the attacks through a wide variety of server connections, all standard practices of cyber operations. As a result, Georgian and other investigators cannot conclusively prove that the Russian government conducted these cyberattacks. Indeed, the Kremlin denies using cyberwarfare in the conflict, a somewhat odd thing to be embarrassed about while Russia's tanks roamed around the Georgian countryside and its aircraft bombed Georgian targets.

According to Hollis, Russian offensive cyber operations began several weeks before the outbreak of the more familiar kinetic operations. Russian cyberintelligence units conducted reconnaissance on important sites and infiltrated Georgian military and government networks in search of data useful for the upcoming campaign. During this period, the Russian government also began organizing the work of Russian cybermilitias, irregular hackers outside the government that would support the campaign and also provide cover for some of the government's operations. During this period the government and cybermilitias conducted rehearsals of attacks against Georgian targets.

When the kinetic battle broke out on Aug. 7, Russian government and irregular forces conducted distributed denial-of-service attacks on Georgian government and military sites. These attacks disrupted the transmission of information between military units and between offices in the Georgian government. Russian cyberforces attacked civilian sites near the action of kinetic operations with the goal of creating panic in the civilian population. Russian forces also attacked Georgian hacker forums in order to pre-empt a retaliatory response against Russian targets. Finally, the Russians demonstrated their ability to disrupt Georgian society with kinetic and cyber operations, yet refrained from attacking Georgia's most important asset, the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and associated infrastructure. By holding this target in reserve, the Russians gave Georgian policymakers an incentive to quickly end the war.

Faced by overwhelming Russian air power, armored attacks on several fronts, and an amphibious assault on its Black Sea coastline, Georgia had little capability of kinetic resistance. Its best hope lay with strategic communications, with transmitting to the world a sympathetic message of rough treatment at the hands of Russian military aggression. According to Hollis, Russia effectively used cyber operations to disrupt the Georgian government's ability to assemble and transmit such a plea. Meanwhile, Russia's own information operations filled in a narrative favorable to its side of the case, removing Georgia's last hope for strategic advantage.

Hollis points out that the effectiveness of cyber operations, especially denial-of-service attacks, can be fleeting; in the recent duels between cyberattackers and defenders of WikiLeaks, both sides mostly fired blanks. But in August 2008, Russian planners tightly integrated cyber operations with their kinetic, diplomatic, and strategic communication operations and achieved cyber disruptions at the moments they needed those disruptions to occur. The Georgia episode provides a good case study for cyberwarriors preparing for the next such conflict.

Stuart Levey, Treasury's sanctions supremo, didn't get results. What now?

On Jan. 24, the Wall Street Journal reported that Stuart Levey, U.S. Treasry undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, will leave his post in one month. David Cohen, Levey's deputy with long experience in the Treasury Department, will very likely succeed Levey. For nearly seven years, Levey has labored to isolate the North Korean and Iranian governments from the international financial system. Levey used diplomacy, moral suasion, and his deep connections with the global banking system and in the process revolutionized the employment of financial sanctions as a tool of statecraft. Unfortunately, he will leave office having failed to achieve his goals, namely to obtain leverage sufficient to change the behavior of the North Korean and Iranian governments. His bosses will now have to decide what to try next.

Last week's negotiation in Istanbul between Iran and the P5+1 group ended in quick failure, revealing that many years of increasingly restrictive sanctions against Iran have failed to produce effective negotiating leverage. And in spite of being the most commercially and financially isolated country in the world, it took North Korea only a year and half to build a large uranium enrichment facility, equipped with 2,000 centrifuges and advanced control systems.

Levey's disappointing results do not mean that sanctions should not have been tried or that the U.S. government and its partners should not continue to tighten them. Western policymakers surely hope that sanctions will eventually produce effective negotiating leverage without inflicting deep pain on civilian populations. It is worth questioning whether such fine-tuning -- effective leverage without civilian pain -- is realistic. The civilian population in North Korea suffers more than any (something for which Kim Jong Il is responsible), without the achievement of much negotiating leverage. And if things became really uncomfortable for a targeted regime, it could play the "victim card" to fight back against sanctions, as Saddam Hussein did with increasing success before 2003.

If sanctions aren't working, what then? Policymakers will inevitably look to their military and paramilitary assets to produce negotiating leverage. Military and intelligence staffs will be asked to prepare options involving the use of covert action, unconventional warfare, or the recruitment of proxy combatants. Political leaders generally first chose sanctions in order to avoid the privations of war. Next will be the hope that "small wars" will preclude a large one. In Iran, some entity has employed covert action -- the Stuxnet computer worm and the assassination of two nuclear scientists -- in an attempt to slow down Iran's nuclear program. How many other realistic "small war" options exist against Iran and North Korea remains a mystery.

When civilian masters have concluded that sanctions aren't working, they will put pressure on their military planners to come up with some practical "small war" options. If the Treasury's leverage isn't enough, the Pentagon's planners will likely be asked to produce more. These planners need to be careful that their plans produce more leverage instead of more trouble.