Neocons and the Revolution

How the Arab revolt is rocking the neoconservative world.

Jeane Kirkpatrick was angry.

In August 1997, I visited the retired diplomat at her spacious corner office at the American Enterprise Institute. "I guess they thought it was worth publishing," she spluttered. What had got her so steamed was my allusion to a recent philippic Robert Kagan had published in Commentary called "Democracies and Double Standards."

In his article, Kagan repudiated Kirkpatrick's famous 1979 essay "Dictatorships & Double Standards" in the same journal, which denounced U.S. President Jimmy Carter and caught the eye of his successor Ronald Reagan, who appointed her ambassador to the United Nations. As Kirkpatrick saw it, Carter had hustled the Shah of Iran and the leader of Nicaragua, both of them pro-American autocrats, out of office. The results were disastrous. Friendly authoritarians were gone; true totalitarians were taking over in both places. While authoritarian regimes of the right could mellow over time into democracies, totalitarians ones of the left would not. Anyway, it required "decades, if not centuries," she observed, for "people to acquire the necessary disciplines and habits" to create a viable democracy.

Kagan was having none of it. He trumpeted a new neoconservative doctrine: Away with the cold, amoral realism of the Kirkpatrick school and in with a boisterous championing of what amounted to liberal interventionism, promoting democracy, the very "essence," as he put it, of American nationhood. Kagan bemoaned the fact, as he saw it, that both the right, out of despair at what it viewed as the cultural degeneration of America during the Clinton era, and the left, out of reflexive hostility to military intervention, had come to embrace the Kirkpatrick doctrine. He praised Bill Clinton's readiness to send the Marines to Haiti and condemned a "mood of despair" that had overcome many foreign-policy experts. In Kagan's view, America had to push Middle Eastern regimes to become more democratic, not settle for a cozy embrace with ruling elites. "We could and should be holding authoritarian regimes in the Middle East to higher standards of democracy, and encouraging democratic voices within those societies," he announced, "even if it means risking some instability in some places."

Sound familiar? The debate between the two "Ks," Kagan and Kirkpatrick, has once again flared up as the Middle East experiences a wave of uprisings. Already Egypt and Tunisia have seen their authoritarian leaders toppled. Who is next? Colonel Qaddafi? The king of Jordan? The House of Saud? And will their successors steer an anti-American and anti-Israel course?

For Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer, a neoconservative thinker who leans toward realism, the answer is not so clear. Krauthammer has landed in the same camp as many in Israel, who fear instability in the region more than they welcome change. He noted in a Feb. 4 column, "Yes, the Egyptian revolution is broad-based. But so were the French and the Russian and the Iranian revolutions. Indeed in Iran, the revolution only succeeded -- the shah was long opposed by the mullahs -- when the merchants, the housewives, the students and the secularists joined to bring him down. And who ended up in control? The most disciplined, ruthless and ideologically committed -- the radical Islamists. This is why our paramount moral and strategic interest in Egypt is real democracy in which power does not devolve to those who believe in one man, one vote, one time." For good measure, he announced that having former International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei in power would be a "disaster." (How would he know?) Meanwhile, neocon patron and former Vice President Dick Cheney declared that Hosni Mubarak was "a good man."

For fellow neocon travelers William Kristol, Elliott Abrams, and Paul Wolfowitz, by contrast, the Middle East tumult is cause for bliss and a new dawn, nothing less than the vindication of the Reagan (and George W. Bush) doctrines of spreading freedom whenever and wherever possible. Writing in the Weekly Standard in a Feb. 14 editorial titled "Stand for Freedom," Kristol thus denounced the conservative doomsayers who see an inevitable rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. The ouster of Mubarak is not a replay of Iran in 1979, Kristol concluded: "The Egyptian people want to exercise their capacity for self-government. American conservatives, heirs to our own bold and far-sighted revolutionaries, should help them." In the Washington Post, Kristol decried Obama for his "passivity." And in the Wall Street Journal, whose editorial page has advocated bombing Libyan airfields, Wolfowitz declared, "The U.S. should come down on the side of the Libyan people -- and of our principles and values. The longer the current bloodshed continues, the worse the aftermath will be."

So is the neocon house about to crack up? Will the split between the movement's realist and idealist wings sunder its unity over what's best for Israel and America?

Probably not. Krauthammer is representative of an older neocon school that has largely been overridden by the democratizers. Indeed, the overwhelming sentiment among neocons has been that the events in Egypt are a good thing. Perhaps the most powerful case has been made by Abrams in the Washington Post, who tried to claim credit for George W. Bush. He drubbed President Barack Obama for being too slow to support the protesters. Far from being an exception to the democratic wave sweeping around the globe, Arabs are ready to embrace it, according to Abrams: "It turns out, as those demonstrators are telling us, that supporting freedom is the best policy of all."

But is it, at least where Israel is concerned? Already Hamas leaders are anticipating that they can develop new ties in Egypt that will strengthen their hand. Mahmoud Zahar told the Los Angeles Times, "Israel is the big loser in recent events ... This is a new era. They should fear." Pressure may mount in Jordan as well to pursue a less-friendly policy toward Israel.

Freedom and human rights were terms that the earlier generation of neocons viewed with considerable skepticism. Neocon godfather Irving Kristol, in a lengthy article in the National Interest in 1987 (which is reprinted in a new collection of his essays called The Neoconservative Persuasion), dismissed the very idea of human rights, arguing that the term simply disguised a hidden agenda of trying to establish a "moral equivalence" between America and the Soviet Union. Irving Kristol, Kirkpatrick, and others looked askance at the idea of trying to create democracies abroad. They wanted to maintain close relations with stable -- or seemingly stable -- leaders abroad who were friendly to America, whether in Central America or the Philippines.

But Reagan crossed the divide when he assented to withdrawing American support from Ferdinand Marcos in March 1986. People power was on the march in Manila. Wolfowitz played a valuable part, as James Mann's excellent Rise of the Vulcans shows, in helping to prod the administration to detach itself from Marcos. Similarly, Abrams correctly pushed the administration to force Chile's dreadful Augusto Pinochet to a popular plebiscite. The fall of the Soviet empire a few years later seemed only to confirm the righteousness of America's missionary impulse. Ever since, that impulse has been on the rise among a younger generation of conservatives who view America's foreign policy as a prolonged crusade.

Kirkpatrick herself recognized that her view of the Soviet Union had been too static, but she moved toward espousing American self-restraint after the end of the Cold War, arguing that America could now become a "normal" country. The neocons are simply reviving an old debate about America's purpose. The balance between national interests and idealism has always been a vexed one. But statements such as Abrams's provide a reminder of how far neoconservatism has moved away from its realist origins and toward unabashed democracy promotion. Were Jeane Kirkpatrick alive to hear them, she might once more be aghast.

Alex Wong/Getty Images


Too Little, Not Yet Too Late

Western governments say they have limited options to stop Qaddafi's barbarous war on his own people. And that's true -- but they haven't even picked the low-hanging fruit yet.

Much of official Washington has greeted the evidence of an ongoing massacre in Libya with a helpless shrug. "We don't have personal relations at a high level," lamented David Mack, a former U.S. diplomat in North Africa, in a Washington Post article titled "U.S. struggles with little leverage to restrain Libyan government."

Numerous articles in recent days, clearly influenced by what U.S. officials are telling reporters on background, have stressed this theme: The United States doesn't have deep ties with the Libyan military, as it did with the Egyptian and Bahraini militaries; it does not provide large amounts of aid to the Qaddafi regime; U.S. diplomats don't have friends in the Libyan government to whom they can make reasoned arguments about the need to change their ways. Therefore, even as Libyan leader Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi deploys warplanes, helicopters, and troops to crush the growing challenge to his rule, it is assumed that there is nothing the United States can do about the catastrophe under way.

But wait a moment. The United States doesn't have any military or diplomatic ties with Iran either, but we don't hear U.S. diplomats whining about how they are unable to press Tehran to give up its nuclear program. Nor did they plead limited influence when the world was pressing Libya, through sanctions and other tools, to compensate the victims of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, which was carried out by a Libyan intelligence officer. When an issue is important to Washington, U.S. officials figure out what leverage they have and use it as assertively and creatively as they can. They don't make excuses.

The U.S. military's connections to Egypt and Bahrain have unquestionably proved useful at key moments in the dramas that have unfolded there in recent weeks, allowing Pentagon officials to urge counterparts they knew well to show restraint. But those connections -- and the Pentagon's fear of losing them -- also held the United States back from pressuring those countries for reforms in years past. To say that deep military-military engagement is essential to having influence -- and an unvarnished good from the standpoint of promoting human rights -- is preposterous. Such ties can be helpful at key moments, but they can also reinforce the perception that the United States supports the status quo. In Egypt and Bahrain, they created popular mistrust of the United States that will take years to overcome.

The absence of close military and diplomatic relations can also free the United States to take more decisive steps to support democratic change and restrain repressive regimes such as Libya. Indeed, the international community has exercised such leverage effectively with Libya to pursue other goals in the past. Gaddafi was so eager for Western investment to develop his oil fields that he abandoned his nuclear program in 2003, ended his support for terrorist groups, agreed to a settlement on the Pan Am bombing, and in 2007 freed a group of Bulgarian nurses spuriously charged with spreading HIV among Libyan hospital patients. In each case, the West used the stick of sanctions and isolation and the carrot of closer economic and diplomatic ties to influence Libyan behavior.

There are numerous steps the United States and its allies can take today to affect the immediate calculations of the Qaddafi regime. Europe buys 85 percent of Libya's oil, after all. And the West largely controls the international financial system through which the Libyan leadership moves its money -- and could block transactions with one word from the Treasury Department or other finance ministries. And there's more: Western governments could say today that they will seek international investigations and prosecutions of Libyan officials who murder their people. And they could offer to provide humanitarian assistance to parts of Libya that have fallen to the opposition.

Qaddafi may rail endlessly about foreign meddling, but the reaction of Western governments clearly matters to his regime. Why else would it have gone to such lengths to hide what it is doing by shutting down the Internet and communications with the outside world?

We should be under no illusion that Qaddafi himself will give in to international pressure at this point. As his brutal tactics show, he is fighting for his life. But Libya's fate is not in Qaddafi's hands; it is in the hands of those who must decide, today and tomorrow, whether to follow his orders. Every psychological blow to Qaddafi's government -- whether it is a Libyan official who defects to the opposition or a forceful repudiation of his government by the international community -- gives them another reason to refuse to commit further outrages on their leader's behalf, for which they may be held accountable when the crisis is over.

"Our leverage is limited" is a phrase diplomats use to absolve themselves from responsibility. It is both true -- after all, U.S. influence is never unlimited -- and utterly irrelevant. The only question the United States and other countries should be asking now is how to use the leverage they have to bring the calamity unfolding in Libya to an end.