Echoes of the Soviet Surge

The West's war in Afghanistan increasingly resembles the Soviet Union's.

BY NIELS ANNEN | MARCH 2, 2011

The war in Afghanistan is not going well. A young president wants to pull out, but is boxed in by his generals. In Kabul, a corrupt, nominally democratic leader is losing his grip on power. A surge of ground troops has begun. The year is 1985.

It was 25 years ago that the Soviet Union experienced the bloodiest year of its occupation of Afghanistan, as the West is today. It was also the moment that Soviet forces there grew to a record 118,000 men -- a number ominously close to the 97,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan today. The strategy then was, as it is now, to produce a "surge" that could establish the conditions for withdrawal. Afghanistan's early spring of 1985 offers a striking parallel with its current season of discontent, and as the U.S. government pushes ahead with its strategy, it would be wise to study how the Soviets failed in fighting and ending their war.

In 1985, Moscow's mission was less an imperial adventure than an attempt to preserve some measure of dignity before exiting Afghanistan for good. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev swept into office in March 1985 as an agent for change, a politician who claimed he could get the Soviet Union back on track after the serious missteps of his predecessors. Minimizing his country's involvement in Afghanistan topped his to-do list. Gorbachev had become increasingly impatient with the counterinsurgency against the stubborn U.S.- and Pakistan-backed mujahideen, which was costing the nearly bankrupt Soviet Union an estimated $2 billion to $3 billion a year. He was prepared to finally and decisively change course.

In front of the 27th congress of the Soviet Union's Communist Party in February 1986, Gorbachev owned up to the dire nature of the struggle, referring to Afghanistan as "our bleeding wound." The delegates authorized him to seek a political solution for the conflict and eventually to end the Soviet presence in the country. But rather than chart an immediate withdrawal, Gorbachev conceived an effort to bolster the pro-Soviet Afghan government by military means.

First, the Soviet leader had to prepare the political ground in Afghanistan. Gorbachev started by breaking the news of an imminent Soviet withdrawal to his Afghan allies. In his initial encounter with Afghan President Babrak Karmal, Gorbachev made clear his determination to end the war: Karmal would have to defend his own country, Gorbachev told him in no uncertain terms, by the summer of 1986.

According to recently disclosed Russian documents, Gorbachev said that Karmal was shocked by this news. "[He] was dumbfounded, in no way expected such a turn, was sure that we needed Afghanistan more than he did, and was clearly expecting that we will be there for a long time, if not forever," Gorbachev told a meeting of the Politburo in October 1985. Gorbachev decided that the Kremlin's faltering Afghan allies stood no chance after a Soviet withdrawal unless there was a new face in Kabul's presidential palace. "The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help," Gorbachev reportedly said of Kabul's largely ineffective and unpopular ruler. Finally, the Soviet leader put his money on Mohammad Najibullah, the energetic former head of the secret police. On Nov. 21, 1986, Afghanistan witnessed one of the country's rare peaceful transitions of power when Karmal "voluntarily" left Kabul for Moscow for medical treatment, paving the way for Najibullah's takeover.

Najibullah took Gorbachev's message to heart. In a bid to prepare his government to fend for itself, the president launched an all-encompassing national reconciliation policy in 1987. Every Afghan who accepted the principles of reconciliation would be welcome to return home. The insurgents were even offered seats in the government. Constitutional reforms were put on the table that recognized the pivotal role of Islam and established the country's nonaligned status in the Cold War. The Kabul government's concessions went so far as to relinquish control over the judicial system to the mullahs. The president clearly was determined to cut a deal.

Gorbachev was also now ready to start laying the groundwork for an orderly Soviet troop withdrawal. The Soviet Union began to invest heavily in the new regime and backed Najibullah's reconciliation strategy. At this program's core was a massive buildup of Afghan security forces. In effect, as it prepared for withdrawal, Moscow effectively produced a "surge" of military assistance intended to make the Afghan government more responsible for the battle against insurgents -- a strategy that closely resembles the West's current counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.

 SUBJECTS: AFGHANISTAN, SOUTH ASIA
 

Niels Annen is a nonresident fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He is a former member of the German Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee.

OTUS

7:23 AM ET

March 3, 2011

Te-te-te, small lies, long consequences

...118,000 men -- a number ominously close to the 97,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan today...

I cannot believe that Mr Annen unintentionally forgot to mention the allies and the non-governmental contractors.

So, the number of Western troops in Afghanistan is HIGHER (and by far) then the biggest number of the Soviet troops there.

And (as hinted in the article) the US Army is fighting in much more COMFORTABLE conditions: there is no superpower trying to shed as much blood as possible out of the US soldiers, Pakistan is a dubious ally not a merciless foe, etc. etc.

So, the US Army & its allies are actually doing much WORSE than the Soviet Army.

Another important lie in the article was about the reasons for the fall of the Nadjibullah's government: the real reason was that despite the agreement to the contrary, Pakistan (endorsed and assisted by the US) did NOT stop supplies to the Muslim opposition. So, when Eltsin effectively betrayed Nadzhibullah by ordering to stop vital supplies, the latter one kept as long as there was fuel (he did not even spare few drops for his plane to escape).

Nadjibullah was a brave man...

The third lie is about the Soviet social program in Afghanistan: it did start BEFORE the war and was never stopped. In fact, before the war the Soviets were regarded by the Afghans as “best friends” (well, given the amount of money the USSR pumped in there, that was not a surprise). This, of course, changed when the troops moved in but, as I mentioned, the war did not stop (although, obviously, dwarfed) the attempts of the Soviets to build up hospitals, factories and schools.

 

CARDENAS697

12:34 PM ET

March 3, 2011

With friends like that who needs enemies!

Comparing the Soviet troops to the US lead coalition is a bit awkward. The US forces may have had incidents where we have innocent people being killed because of proximity to combatants. The Soviets actually used nerve gas in Afghanistan and would kill innocent children while dropping bombs that looked like toys. I think you may want to revisit your statement.

I like your definition of friends.

 

SWANSONG66

3:18 PM ET

March 9, 2011

To CARDENAS697

Please site your reference as to what right-wing propaganda fantasy you were reading when you reference "bombs made to look like toys".

And how many Vietnamese (Iraqi? Afghan? Cambodia?) children have we killed by the way? Stop spreading the anti-Russian stance of the 80s.
Putin and his puppet are awful. Their government is awful. But to claim the Soviet goverment back then was that depraved, please site your source.

 

JONESGP1996

7:51 AM ET

March 3, 2011

The Taliban's patron

"[T]he Taliban today have no comparable international patron." What about Pakistan's ISI?

 

JKOLAK

9:27 AM ET

March 3, 2011

Anyone who could write an

Anyone who could write an article like this obviously does not read independent military analysts. The Taliban is a non-existent military force in its death throes. Military historians are already writing up Afghanistan as a US victory. Here's a good place to start in the Winning article series:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/articles/20110302.aspx

 

THE GLOBALIZER

11:49 AM ET

March 3, 2011

I think you misunderstand.

What you're saying is consistent with the opportunities the author presents.

I'm not sure whether the author is "for" or "against" the use of such a surge, but I think he'd readily concede that it has its merits, and that we're better situated than the USSR was in seeking a positive outcome.

At the end of the day, Afghanistan will only be "won" by Afghans. Finding Osama bin Laden, however? That's pretty much been a fail for the US. It's probably time for us to pull back and let him relax, get cozy, and get careless. Pakistan is becoming a real mess and I don't think it's helpful for us to linger and make it worse.

 

MARTY MARTEL

2:33 PM ET

March 3, 2011

Pakistan - common enemy in Soviet and US Afghan wars

Pakistan is the common denominator for the West’s war in Afghanistan increasingly resembling that of Soviet Union.

While US supported Pakistan-based Islamic Mujhahiddins with stinger missiles that led to the failure of Soviet Union’s Afghan mission, US itself is the main reason for its own failure in Afghanistan.

The roots of the ‘current Afghan tragedy’ are in Washington where Bush administration decided to allow Musharraf to spirit away by airlift hundreds, if not thousands, of Taliban operatives cornered by the advancing Northern Alliance in Kunduz in November, 2001. Pakistan relocated those Taliban cadres including Mullah Mohammed Omar in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan (now relocated to Karachi by Pakistani ISI to protect them from possible US drone attacks) and Haqqani network (HQN) in North Waziristan from where Mullah Omar’s QST and Haqqani’s HQN have been planning raids in Afghanistan ever since.

Duplicitous Pakistan has poor U. S. over the barrel. US can NOT use its aid leverage to force Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups who kill US/NATO troops in Afghanistan day in and day out because US needs Pakistan’s help in ferrying supplies to those very US/NATO troops.

Adm Mullen had following to say about America’s primary ally in its fight against terrorism, to the foreign news media on 1/13/2011: “I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again it, [Pakistan] is the epicenter of terrorism in the world right now. It is absolutely critical that the safe havens in Pakistan get shut down. We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without that. It’s not just Haqqani Network anymore, or Al Qaeda or TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), the Afghan Taliban, or LET (Lashkar-e-Tayyeba), it’s all of them working together.”

And previous US ambassador Anne Patterson to Pakistan, wrote in a secret review in 2009 that ‘Pakistan's Army and ISI are covertly sponsoring four militant groups - Haqqani‘s HQN, Mullah Omar‘s QST, Al Qaeda and LeT - and will not abandon them for any amount of US money, diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show.

However US has been deliberately ignoring Taliban’s Pakistani connections in fueling and sustaining Afghan insurgency as reported by Matt Waldman in ‘The sun in the sky‘ on 6/13/2010, corroborated by WikiLeaks leaks on 7/25/2010 and then further corroborated by Chris Alexander, Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan from 2005 until 2009 in his article on 7/30/2010 titled ‘The huge scale of Pakistan‘s complicity‘.

US Afghan mission was destined to fail because US deliberately ignored Pakistan’s terrorist connections.

 

YASIRSHEIKH

4:17 PM ET

March 3, 2011

stop spamming

Stop pasting same comment everywhere. Seems like you have nothing intelligent to say.

 

JAYDEE001

4:44 PM ET

March 3, 2011

The author, in his final

The author, in his final paragraph infers the possibility that the US experience in Afghanistan might turn out better than the Soviet Union's, if only the US could somehow manage to instill a spirit of good government, implment a true democratic process, and eradicate widespread corruption. Not asking for much is he?

We have been trying to change Afghanistan for over ten years now, and what do we have to show for all that? No one claims success or even modest progress towards the type of state we would like to see. The fact is that our military and political leaders don't have the courage to admit that we long ago failed in the primary mission (capture or kill Osama bin Laden and his aides - drive the Taliban criminals from power), and that even the most hopeful of them see no end in sight. The concept of cointer-insurgency is one that requires more patience and resources than we have or may be able to apply to the situation. The Taliban have been resurgent for several years, coming back from the brink after we drove them out in 2003. Corruption continues and we appear to be very uncomfortable with Karzai as "our man in Kabul". Pakistan treats the US as an ATM machine, while giving us little in return - they continue to shield OBL, Mullah Omar and the leadership of the very insurgency that we are fightin next door. We have become their b*#ch.

There is no commitment to ending this thing soon, and even the best scenarios envision another decade or more fighting an insurgency that is still based across the border in Pakistan. It is highly likely that we will finally leave Afghanistan having failed in just about every respect. We will leave as the Soviets did.

 

AARKY

10:59 PM ET

March 3, 2011

Surge in Afghanistan??

You have to understand that Petraeous was behind the surge in Iraq, which was a joke. Because of ethnic cleansing, most of the Sunnis had been forced to leave their homes and the Iraqis had turned against the Al-Qaida foreigners for their brutal tactics. Muqtada Al-Sadr had ordered all his troops to stand down because it had been infiltrated by too many fanatics who were robbing and killing for the fun of it.
So Petraeous convinced himself that it really did work in Iraq, so why not do the same in Afghanistan? One of the problems with that was the resurrection of the Phoenix program from Viet Nam, where they tried to kill or capture all Taliban commanders. The techniques used have killed too many innocent people, so forget the "Hearts and minds" approach. One poster also pointed out that we have as many private support personnel as troops in Afghanistan, so we have in effect many more people there than the Soviets had. Many of the similarities to the Soviets are downright scary. Bin Laden has probably been dead for a number of years. The only thing we hear are voice recordings and the Swiss say, That's not him". I trust the Swiss more than our government on this one. If Bin Laden were still alive, we would have seen at least one up to date video in the last four-five years.

 

RGALETI

6:59 PM ET

March 3, 2011

Trite comparison leads to a "no duh" conclusion.

While Annen's premise is trite and the comparison between the Soviet situation in 1985 and our situation today is fairly thin, his conclusion is a "no duh" statement. That building up the army and giving them modern weapons and capabilities will not a self-sufficient Afghan state make. Obviously State and other allied agencies and political/strategic efforts have to modernize the Afghan state politically, and ensure there is as honest a government as is realistic that is in touch with its people in all its provinces. A tall order, but one that Americans and ISAF partners are up to if given enough time and resources.

 

RICHAZ

11:03 AM ET

March 4, 2011

Very Familiar to this Vietnam Vet

I read with sad amusement about our various efforts to "win" in Afghanistan. I cannot recall one tactic or strategy that has been put forth by our military or civilian leaders which was not tried by us during the Vietnam War. Or tried by the French during the Indo-China War, or even in more recent history by the Russians, who knew all about our Vietnam efforts, but, obviously, didn't learn much.
It is all hubris to attempt to change Afghans or Vietnamese or any others.. People get the governments they deserve. If they do not want to fight for a "better" government, who the heck are we to choose for them? This Afghan War is a total waste. Unfortunately, only a real cynic like Henry Kissinger could end it now----sign anything, declare peace, and get the hell out.

 

DOMNULEDOCTOR

1:19 PM ET

March 4, 2011

Deja vu vs. wilful blindness by disconnected citizenry

Discouraged by FOREIGN POLICY's censorship I was not going to comment here anymore. But this wonderful article above needs praise for its wisdom. We should remember that France was a real democracy, yet its military was a sink hole of corruption and incompetence. That is what I fear most becoming the character of our commanders. We now have 2x the Four Stars as we did in Vietnam with only 1/2 the size of the force. Executive top-heaviness has always been the cancer killing corporate or bureaucratic success. Worst still, America having a volunteer military, allows many citizens to think "ain't my kid going to war," leaving the generals carte blanche. Just as you would want only the best pediatric care possible for your children, so would you want the best command for your patriotic sons&daughters that enlist. But the attitude I quote above allows far too many Americans to display an ominous disconnect syndrome, insisting that: "No one forced them to join, they volunteered because they like to kill; so let them do what they're getting paid to do as long as it isn't in my backyard."

This is not much different from that old Marine, Bing West, who said that Marines should be allowed to do what they do best: "KILL PEOPLE!" When asked, after he wrote a book on how we're losing Afghanistan, how the young grunts feel about the war, he insisted that they don't think about such things because, after all, all they joined up to do is kill and live rough. Look at French history and note how such attitudes doomed the French military and its young recruits.

Bob Woodward wrote the most well informed and thorough early histories of our post-9/11 wars when "ain't my kid going to war" permitted half the expeditionary force to fight inadequately trained and supplied as Reservists that had joined up on the promise that they would be called up only to defend the homeland against fire, flood, chaos and invasion in return for payment of their tuition; so they need serve only one weekend a month and one month a year in training. Suddenly, mom&dad soldiers—well past the maximum age accepted into the regular forces were finding themselves locked into endless servitude under Bush's "stop loss" policy, supplied and commanded as second class soldiers. To this complaint' SecDef Rumsfeld could only say that sometimes you don't get to go to war with the army you want (!!@#%^$##&&**!!!)!

So, generals from one star or more became star chasers to that fourth by promoting a kind of warfare they in no way understood. Facing "towel heads" armed with only Kalashnikovs and Korans, our mom&dad soldiers very quickly left behind orphans and widows on the home front as tribute to command incompetence and strategic drift at the top. As the generals did to French presidents before him, the generals are locking in our President in self-promoting mil-babble like the plagiarized text they produced on COIN warfare. Intellectual bankruptcy is matched only by chicanery through which the outcomes of their operations are hidden in Pentagon "secrecy" classification. But thanks to Wikileaks, none of us can pretend: "Wow! I just didn't know!" It is the task before us as Americans to know and to know well what is going on. One American, Bob Woodward, has done his duty. I am not saying that we should take his books as "this is it," but he is a starting point from which every one of us should begin to look at what these generals are doing with OUR children.

I often urged judging our generals by the same standards by which we judge our physicians. A loss rate such as that of the media darling, Gen. Petraeus, would certainly cause people to demand investigations were he a physician…and, commensurate liability for incompetence and cover-up. Whatever you find, be objective and perseverant in your search. We cannot abandon our children to history two decades hence when their fate will be abandoned to dusty library shelves, topic of PhD theses. Our generation was abandoned to the command incompetence of leadership in Vietnam. A fantastic book appeared exposing it: DERELICTION OF DUTY—AFTER the fact! We cannot allow repeat of the worst errors, at great cost to Iraqi, Afghan-- and maybe some day Iranian—lives, on top of the lives of all our heroic children that enlisted, as generals chase stars for their lapels. The Vietnam War was under constant scrutiny of MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE. Yet this war has fallen pray to blogging careerism instead of responsible debate. Americans are seeking reassurance so they can go back to their ME-ism, not the truth so they can properly exercise their responsibility as citizens in whose name all this is done. The fate of the French Army by 1962 should ring in our ears. It is OUR kids, the kids of ALL OF US, whom we allowed to go to war intel blind, language deaf and culture dumb against mere religious peasants. There's no global Jihad in Afghanistan, as there was CIA meddling, guided by the Pakistani ISI of mujahedins that the Soviets felt they had to respond to. We are stacking our command incompetence against the devout will of tribal Afghans so that we may impose on them what Petraeus himself calls a "criminal syndicate." Obama, here as in all issues, proved to be a moral weakling. He adjudicates by going through with the Salomonic threat of cutting the baby in half. Because, over and over again, cutting the baby in half is no solution, as half-babies are non-viable, Obama has suffered policy failure after policy failure. Yet, the brouhaha over McChrystal, the mythmaker, should make it clear that we have a duty to investigate if in fact Petraeus did really betray us
.

 

RICHAZ

7:58 PM ET

March 4, 2011

You Are So Right!

I posted just before you, and I left out many things which you have said better than I ever could say. You have encouraged me to speak my deep, and unpopular, thoughts.
We have an older group of below average soldiers, some even are former criminals, making more money than they ever dreamed of, humping around giant mountains and hills burdened by huge loads of crap, and being micro-managed by the most incompetent, poorly educated, super-religious Jesus nut, officer corps in our history. All totally unfit to fight a counter-insurgency. All the officers are lifers, terrified of one bad fitness report; they are overpaid and know they could not make the same money in this 2011 America, so they just mindlessly go along with their bosses, whether those superiors be a captain, major, LtCol, or above.
I'd rather we had no Army than have this Army. We would then keep out of trouble and also save one heck of a lot of money.

 

SEBASTIAN81

3:28 PM ET

March 4, 2011

democratic process questionable

"Finally, today's Afghan government possesses a crucial advantage that Najibullah's government lacked -- a nascent, if flawed, democratic process that can be used to bolster its support among the Afghan population"

I wonder if there is really a democratic process in our understanding. Although IEC chairman Fazal Ahmad Manawi called the November 2010 parliamentary elections a "major success" ony 1,2% of the 2500 candidates were representatives of a political party. There were also 7 million fewer voters than in the 2009 presidential elections. In the province of Ghazni despite of its Pashtun majority no single one was elected to parliament. In contrast Ghaznis Hazara minority succeded in winning all of the 11MPs.

There is a Afghan saying: a house will collapse sooner or later if its first stone is wrongly laid. Todays Afghan "democracy" is risking a collapse of the system and maybe there will be a "night of the long knives" some day.