Did Obama Make His Case?

FP's bloggers debate the president's Libya speech.

MARCH 29, 2011

Why Obama's Speech Doesn't Matter
By Stephen M. Walt

The president is tiptoeing through a mine-field of conflicting imperatives, seeking to justify a war that he has launched even though there are no vital strategic interests at stake. And make no mistake: it is a war. When your forces are flying hundreds of sorties, and firing missiles and dropping bombs on another country's armed forces, it is Orwellian to call it anything else.

It is a war being fought for humanitarian objectives -- and there's nothing inherently wrong with that -- but the president's somewhat tortured parsing of the reasons for his action betrays an awareness that he's on shaky ground. And notice that almost all of his justifications were anticipatory in nature: we went to war to prevent a potential bloodbath in Benghazi, to prevent evens in Libya from possibly affecting developments elsewhere in the Arab world, and to forestall some future tarnishing of America's reputation. When you are as strong and secure as the United States really is, everything becomes a "preventive" operation. (Too bad we don't think that way when it comes to financial matters). Ironically, if the United States faced real threats to its security, it wouldn't be wasting much time or effort on operations like this one.

Read the full post here.

Why Obama Had to Act in Libya
By Marc Lynch

"We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi -- a city nearly the size of Charlotte -- could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen."

This was the blunt, powerful heart of President Obama's speech last night explaining American intervention in Libya: Had the international community not acted when it did, thousands would have been slaughtered as the world watched. The effects of that decision would have been felt across the Middle East, where America would have been deemed to have abandoned the people struggling for freedom in the Arab world. And it would have quite simply been wrong. I have long been conflicted about the decision to intervene militarily, primarily because of the absence of a clearly defined end-game and the risk of escalation. I doubt that Obama's speech will convince many of his critics. But I now think that he made the right call.

My conversations with administration officials, including but not limited to the one recounted by the indefatigable Laura Rozen, convinced me that they believed that a failure to act when and how they did would have led to a horrific slaughter in Benghazi and then across Libya. There was no mad rush to war, and certainly no master plan to invade Libya to grab its oil. The administration resisted intervening militarily until they had no choice, preferring at first to use diplomatic means and economic sanctions to signal that Qaddafi's use of force would not help keep him in power. The military intervention came when those had failed, and when Qaddafi's forces were closing in on Benghazi and he was declaring his intention to exterminate them like rats.

Read the full post here.

Satisfactory, Not Satisfying
By Peter Feaver


President Obama gave his first, but hopefully not the last, major address on events in Libya (with a gesture or two to the broader Middle East). The text was solid, not soaring, which befitted the occasion. The delivery was fine, even passionate at points. The speech was serviceable in laying out Obama's rationale and why he is convinced he picked the absolute goldilocks position between various "false choice" (his words) extremes that he rejected.

Asking myself the questions I posed, I come away with mixed answers:

1. The president talked plainly and persuasively about the inputs and why he ordered them. But he avoided talking about outcomes. He said the administration has "fulfilled the pledge" it made to the American people. And he reiterated the point "So for those who doubted our capacity to carry out this operation, I want to be clear: the United States of America has done what we said we would do." (Note to research assistants: who in the world doubted the U.S. capacity? I heard many doubts about will, but I can't imagine there is anyone who has even the faintest familiarity with American military power who doubted our capacity to do what we have done, namely establish air supremacy over Libya and conduct precision strikes against vehicles.) But these are all the inputs. He is right to note that we deserve credit for delivering on the inputs, but strategy is about accomplishing outcomes. No one expects the outcomes to be achieved already, but I did expect more discussion about what outcomes the military must achieve for him to declare mission accomplished.

2. Alas, the president only talked about optimistic scenarios. The obligatory gestures about a "difficult task" -- "Libya will remain dangerous..."; "Forty years of tyranny has left Libya fractured and without strong civil institutions" -- barely scratched the surface of what could go wrong here. I did not expect the president to run down the "dirty dozen" list of bad things that might happen. That is the work of strategic planning shops. But I did expect more steeling of the American public for possible adverse developments. And I did expect more discussion of why not intervene in other cases that looked, on the surface, like they might match the Libyan case on the atrocity scale.

Read the full post, here.

Another Explanation, Please
By Kori Schake

My first reaction to the President Obama's speech is that he should have given it ten days ago. He didn't say anything tonight that he couldn't have said when he ordered combat operations to commence. Waiting for NATO to agree to take on the mission became a good reason for the White House to delay the Commander in Chief explaining his volte face to the nation. But it didn't actually mask the president not wanting to detract from his prior obligations in Latin America or give the appearance that Americans were running the show (even when Americans were running the show).

That slight of hand feeling pervaded the president's speech; I still don't know whether he thinks we have a national interest in Libya. In the past 36 hours, the Secretary of Defense has said we do not have a national interest in the war in Libya, the Secretary of State has said our national interest is our humanitarian interest and helping our allies who really do have national interests. In an effort to break the tie, the president described our national interests in the Libyan war as: preventing a stain on our conscience (from doing nothing), stopping Qaddafi's advance on Benghazi, preventing refugees destabilizing fragile governments in Egypt and Tunisia, showing other repressive regimes we not allow them to use force, and upholding the United Nations. Which sounds like he's siding with Secretary Gates' description but Secretary Clinton's prescription.

Read the full post, here.

 SUBJECTS:
 

ODYSSEY8

12:41 PM ET

March 29, 2011

What's wrong with this picture? EVERYTHING!

There is no denying that Gadaffi is a very bad man, and if he turns his military on his own people with live ammunition, then he deserves to be overthrown, but he should be overthrown BY THE PEOPLE OF LIBYA.

Our country's economy is in dire financial straits, and before our intervention in Libya our country was already engaged in two other wars in the region.

I do feel for the people of Libya, but I feel even more for all those in this country who have lost their jobs, their homes and their life savings, especially since it is now clear that our President and our so-called "elected representatives" in Washington have ZERO INTENTION OF DOING ANYTHING TO HELP THEM OR TO FIX OUR FAILING ECONOMY.

Washington is quick to help those in need half a world away, but those in this country who are in desperate need are left to twist in the wind. What's wrong with this picture? EVERYTHING!

 

JKOLAK

9:28 AM ET

March 30, 2011

Newt Gingrich

Measuring Obama’s Speech
by Newt Gingrich

Monday morning, I posted to Facebook a five question checklist by which to measure President Obama’s speech on our military engagement in Libya.

Here is my analysis of how effectively the president answered those questions:

Does President Obama cite working with Congress more than working with the Arab League or the United Nations?
No. President Obama mentioned Congress just once in a 3,400 word speech. In contrast, he mentioned the United Nations Security Council and Arab league eight times. Furthermore, he dedicated a significant portion of his speech to the importance of cooperation between Western and Arab allies.

As I have said, I do think having allies in this effort is valuable, especially Arab ones. However, that desire must be appropriately balanced against the obligation the president has to respect Congress’ role, as well as the objectives of the mission at hand (more on this later).

President Obama made it remarkably clear in his speech that he places a much higher value on gaining the approval of the United Nations and the Arab League than he does on consulting Congress. By his own account, he committed the United States to action with a United Nations resolution before consulting with Congressional leaders, which he did only just before the bombing began.

The president also never seemed to consider the fact that allies – including Arab ones – could have been assembled faster in a way that bypassed the corruption of the United Nations.

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Does President Obama define replacing Qaddafi as our clear and explicit goal? Having said Qaddafi “needs to leave" that has to be the goal of this war.
No. In fact, he said quite the opposite, that our mission was to stop an imminent humanitarian catastrophe and that “broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.”

There are two problems with the president’s argument.

The first goes back to the disproportional value the president places on gaining the approval of the United Nations.

The president tried to make the case Monday night that our military engagement was justified in order to protect human life. Yet, the first reports of Qaddafi’s forces firing on the Libyan people, including with his air force, arose in late February. On March 5th the Libyan dictator’s army fired on unarmed protesters. On March 6th, his forces laid siege to the rebel-held town of Zawiyah.

The president, however, chose to wait almost two weeks, until March 19th, for a diplomatic consensus to emerge and resolutions to be passed in the U.N. Security Council before taking action.

The disturbing conclusion one can draw from President Obama’s actions is that he believes the special duty he spoke of, for the United States to not turn a blind eye to atrocities committed by dictators, ranks lower on his list of priorities than gaining approval from the United Nations to do something about them. He clearly favors muddled coalition consensus to moral leadership.

The second problem is that leaving Qaddafi in power will not stop the humanitarian crisis; it simply drives it underground. In the face of overwhelming military superiority, Qaddafi will most likely conclude that his best option is to retaliate in ways that cannot be stopped with air power. In fact, hearing the President of the United States publicly say he would not use the military to drive him out of power will almost certainly convince Qaddafi his best option is to dig in.

The United States is signaling that all he has to do is wait it out because the president has explicitly told Qaddafi that we are not going to force him to leave power. This leaves us with an open ended commitment to enforce a no-fly zone. The Iraq no-fly zone lasted a dozen years and did not remove Saddam Hussein from power.

The simple fact is that so long as Qaddafi remains in power, the people of Libya remain at risk of violence by their government. That’s why the president’s “mission accomplished” message rings so hollow.

3. Does President Obama pledge to send a request to Congress to pay for the cost of the war so our men and women in uniform are not asked to take it out of an already stretched budget while they are still engaged in two other wars and several small campaigns?

No. The president did not mention how this effort was going to be paid for. All indications are that it will come directly from the Pentagon’s budget, leaving our men and women in uniform who are already stretched with even fewer resources.

4. Does President Obama acknowledge the danger of Al Qaeda allies among the anti-Qaddafi forces and pledge to work for a moderate replacement government without extremist factions?

Partial credit. The president never acknowledged the likelihood of the presence of al-Qaeda within the rebel forces but did speak vaguely about diplomatic efforts to “support a transition to the future that the Libyan people deserve.” He then concluded his speech with a more specific commitment that the United States would find ways to help those around the world that believe in core American principles.

5. Does President Obama describe clearly the coalition command structure, the American role, and an allied commitment to defeat Qaddafi?

No. In fact, his explanation of handing off command to NATO made it seem as if NATO was some sort of separate country with its own military resources. In fact, NATO is simply a military alliance and command structure through which our allies conduct joint military operations. In practice, handing off control of the operation to NATO only means that command will be transferred from American General Carter Ham (Commander of U.S. Africa Command) to American Admiral James Stavridis (Supreme Allied Commander-Europe).

The president also failed to mention there is currently another engagement being commanded by NATO – the mission in Afghanistan. Of course, mentioning that would have exposed the smokescreen he was trying to create, since the United States continues to pay a heavy financial and human toll in Afghanistan every day.

The president’s long overdue explanation to the country was unsatisfactory in providing clear objectives for Libya. He did not explain why he valued the consensus of the international community over the Congress. His previously stated goal of removing Qaddafi is not in line with the goals of the coalition. He has placed the U.S. military in the position of refereeing a civil war under the auspices of a humanitarian effort without a definition of success. Lastly, the president cannot say today when our commitment to enforcing the no-fly zone might end.

What Should Have Been Done versus What Must Be Done Now

On February 24, I stated that U.S. military force was not necessary to remove Qaddafi. He was clearly in a weak position and we could have worked with our allies, particularly our Arab allies, who want to see a post-Qaddafi Libya, using quiet, covert, and indirect action to get rid of Qaddafi.

On March 3rd the president took that option off the table when he unambiguously declared that Qaddafi must step down from power and leave. This statement put the authority and prestige of the United States against a dictator, committing the United States to that objective. Anything less would be seen as a defeat for the United States.

In that new reality, I commented on March 7th that we should declare a no-fly zone in support of the president’s public commitment to oust the dictator.

By March 19th, however, the president had dropped his objective of getting rid of Qaddafi and adopted the U.N.’s objective of enforcing a no-fly zone for a humanitarian cease-fire. I said at that time I did not support using the U.S military if it was not for the expressed purpose of removing Qaddafi from power. I reiterated that prior to March 3rd, I would not have intervened militarily, but after March 3rd the only reason to use military force was to get rid of Qaddafi.

World events are becoming more complicated, intertwined, and fast paced. As such, our leaders need to be able to adjust their analysis and prescriptions as the facts dictate.