
The Doha round of World Trade Organization talks is teetering once again on the edge of total collapse, about to miss yet another absolute and final deadline for an agreement. Last month, Director-General Pascal Lamy beseeched members of the WTO's Trade Negotiations Committee to "reflect on the consequences of failure," especially for "the smaller and least-developed [member countries] which are more dependent on an improved set of global trade rules."
But, in fact, there are plenty of incredibly valuable trade reforms that poor countries can carry out without a global agreement. There are a range of trade barriers in place in developing countries that don't make sense even to those who like tariffs and quotas to support industrial development. With little local political opposition to overcome in these cases, there's no need for a WTO-style international grand bargain to push them through. And if they re-engineer their tariffs and quotas to ensure a maximum variety of goods at home, countries with small economies will do an immense service to their citizens.
Basic trade textbooks harp on about comparative advantage, the idea that countries are relatively more efficient at producing certain types of goods because of the comparative cost of things like labor and capital, and that this is what drives trade. It's the theory most commonly trotted out to justify trade agreements, among other things. But international trade is actually much more complicated than that. The nature and benefits of global trade flows are increasingly determined by maximizing the variety of goods, not the relative efficiency of their production.
In 2004, New York Federal Reserve economists Christian Broda and David Weinstein calculated that there had been a fourfold growth in the varieties of goods imported into the United States between 1972 and 2001. In 1971 the United States imported 7,731 different goods (cheese, sports footwear, cars), each from an average of about 10 countries. By 2001 it imported 16,390 different goods, each from an average of 16 countries. The United States also exported a lot of the types of goods it was importing, and many of the new trade relationships involved importing the same type of product from a second or third country -- yet consumers still benefited from more choice. Just the impact of all this extra variety raised real income in the United States by an equivalent of 3 percent.
But economies smaller than that of the United States -- that is, everyone else -- suffer from more limited import variety. They don't just import fewer goods -- they import fewer different kinds of goods. Each doubling of an economy's size involves roughly a 27 percent rise in the variety of its imported goods.
Stanford University economist Paul Romer provided an explanation for this phenomenon 17 years ago. There is a fixed cost to trade, he explained -- whether you're importing 1,000 pairs of running shoes or just one, you still have to find a supplier, figure out how to pay it, and navigate the complexities of shipping, customs, and, most importantly, local regulatory and tax rules. That makes it simply uneconomic to try to import many goods for which there aren't a lot of potential customers with a strong demand -- and ability to pay -- for the product. Romer pointed out that raising tariffs further increased the fixed costs of importing and would thus further limit the variety of goods imported. He suggested, as a result, that a broad-based 10 percent import tariff might have an impact on the purchasing power of consumers in a small country equivalent to a 20 percent reduction in national income.
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