Last week, China's nuclear envoy Wu Dawei proposed after a meeting with his North Korean counterpart that the two Koreas hold dialogue as a first step to reopening the six-party talks, the nuclear negotiations that have been stalled for two years. The Chinese proposal may or may not succeed. But until official talks resume, figuring out what Pyongyang is thinking must be done through deciphering messages in its state-controlled media or through unofficial contacts, such as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's upcoming visit to Pyongyang. When left to experienced hands, both can yield insights. When practiced by inexperienced observers, they can do more damage than good.
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I have been meeting with North Koreans for almost 20 years. As head of the State Department's section charged with implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework, I held discussions with the North Korean Foreign Ministry, scientists, bureaucrats in charge of North Korea's nuclear program, military officers, intelligence officials, and others. Those talks were often difficult but could be productive.
One of my first destinations in North Korea was the Yongbyon nuclear facility, where, as a result of the 1994 agreement, American workers were helping the North Koreans store spent fuel rods containing five nuclear bombs worth of plutonium. It struck me as funny -- but not surprising, given my own bureaucratic experiences -- that my Foreign Ministry minders were not allowed to enter the facility, while I, an American government official, was welcomed to one of the most sensitive installations in North Korea.
I met with the chief engineer, who launched into a long, angry lecture about the United States. As he talked, I fantasized about ripping into him and his country. But I didn't. When he finished venting, I didn't respond to his remarks, other than blandly telling him I would convey his message to my superiors (which I never did), before moving on to the business at hand. The session turned out to be productive.
Now that I am no longer in government, talking to the North Koreans is even more challenging. I have to operate in unofficial "Track II" settings where they are likely to be seriously constrained. After all, why reveal anything to people who essentially don't count? It is easier to stick to oft-recited, well-worn talking points.
Moreover, there is always the danger that these sessions can become permeated by what I call the "panda bear in the zoo" syndrome. Just as Americans flocked to the National Zoo to see the two Chinese panda bears after normalization of relations with Beijing, some Western groups flock to Track II meetings with North Koreans for the same reason, not for serious give-and-take.
Don't get me wrong. Some organizations have interesting discussions with the North Koreans. That's because they understand there are important guidelines to follow. For example, just meeting any North Korean, while difficult to arrange, is not a great accomplishment. Meeting influential individuals is. Talking seriously about denuclearization means not only holding sessions with Foreign Ministry officials who handle U.S.-North Korean relations, but also knowing who is up and who is down in Pyongyang. Titles are often meaningless.
Your agenda also has to be structured to produce results. That doesn't mean avoiding difficult issues. But the North Koreans know how to deal with a frontal assault. If you cast your meeting as a clash of civilizations or ideologies, then be prepared for emphatic boilerplate recitations of maximalist positions. Taking it down a notch and focusing on pragmatic steps forward can produce a very different result, a lesson I learned in my discussion with the chief engineer at Yongbyon and in countless other encounters.
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