Should Syria and Lebanon dissolve like Kaplan projects, everybody in the two countries will find themselves to have been burned by strong central governments. But the Lebanese have also been burned by overly weak centers as well, and he himself observed that the situation doesn't readily lend itself to a neat breakup into multiple successor states. Something along the lines of Switzerland or the US- with a multitude of broadly autonomous member states and a clear delineation of what level of government gets what powers- might be the best thing they can hope for.

I am afraid I profoundly disagree with Mr Kaplan's projection that Sunni Arabs in Lebanon would unite with their Syrian counterparts should the Alawite dictatorship fall.

Mr Kaplan over emphasizes the importance of Greater Syria for modern-day Arab decision-making. The history you discuss in this article is largely unfamiliar and uninteresting to the younger generation who are spearheading the Syrian revolution.

While Syria has always considered Lebanon one of its provinces, I would imagine that Assad's fall would in fact pave the way for an official border to be drawn up between Syria / Lebanon (a prospect the Assad dynasty have been blocking for over 15 years).

The question you should be asking is not whether Lebanon and Syria will officially unite into a single country, but the extent to which Syria's absolute authority in Lebanon's internal affairs will wane.

"Syria" was the 19th-century Ottoman-era term for a region that stretched from the Taurus Mountains of Turkey in the north to the Arabian Desert in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to Mesopotamia in the east. Present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, western Iraq, and southern Turkey were all included in this vast area. In other words, the concept of "Syria" was not linked to any specific national sentiment. Adult videos The collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I led to Greater Syria being carved into a half-dozen states. Although territory had been cut away on all sides, the rump French mandate of "Syria" that came into existence, nevertheless, contained not only every warring sect and regional and tribal interest, but also the spiritual headquarters in the capital Damascus of the pan-Arab movement, whose aim was to erase all the state borders that the Europeans had just created.

With an avalanche of Arab dictators falling the pretense of a Pan-Arab, anti-Israeli power seems possible in the near future, but is hardly likely.

Parents from Beijing to Bengazi would rather send their children to Disney Land than offer their children to the god of War. The same goes for the children, themselves: death is no fun.

National affluence in which economies are developing and Arab households thriving is the answer that every family whether Muslim, Jewish or Christian is earnestly seeking.

No democracy has every attacked another freedom loving land. If democracy takes hold in the Middle East there will be a "Highway of Peace" stretching from Cairo to Damascus with its center in Jerusalem.

That construction process looks ugly at first, but the finished product is well worth it -- and worth maintaining, too.

This is a mainly Sunni revolt against the minority Alawites. The revolt has thus far been restricted to mainly Sunni towns and has found little or no resonance in the Alawite , Kurd or Druze areas of the country . Most the blood is spilled in the area of the old French protectorate province of the State of Damascus, the Sunni heartland of the country.

This essentially Sunni nature of the revolt is bad tiding for a country like Syria. If the regime falls, there could be widespread jockeying for power between the various ethnic groups which might very quickly descend into strife or worse, civil war.

It would be wrong to see the various uprisings in the Arab world as identical uprisings of the disgruntled youth against corrupt leaders. These revolts had very different meanings in different places. In Syria , it is about a natural correction in a distorted power structure. A correction which is propelled by the vested interests of people who have very different aims than the idealistic youths of the Arab street.

The system of federated city states that Kaplan proposes as a possible future outcome of the end of Baath autocracy has other historical precedents, in addition to the late antique cities that he mentions. One can equally point to the later middle ages (c.1100-1400), when Syrian cities enjoyed a great deal of autonomy within the decentralized rule of family confederacies and strong governors. This system continued into the Ottoman period, although with greater centralization of power. Within this system, large cities--such as Damascus, Aleppo, or Mosul--asserted considerable economic, political and cultural influence on the surrounding provinces, maintaining order and keeping nomadism at bay. Overall, these were prosperous times that saw the expansion of cities and commercial and artisanal activities. But the system worked especially well in late antiquity and in the middle ages largely because it was widespread in use and not directly threatened by the expanisonsit ambitions of neighboring states.

I would personally welcome the dissolution of the national entities that once formed Greater Syria and the rise of city states under a confederated state. But could such a state be re-created after a century-old experiment in nation building? Who would will it into being? Who would allow it to exist? Would the elites of Syria, Jordan. Lebanon and Palestine actually work toward this purpose? Would the great powers of Turkey, Israel, and, the most egregious of all, Saudi Arabia, stand by and watch the dissolution and reformation of such a state, or would they, as is much more likely, create areas of influence: Aleppo and Mosul for Turkey; Saudi Arabia, in souther Jordan; Israel, who knows.

But yes, I would agree with Kaplan that the aftermath of the Syrian Revolution (especially if it were to spread to Lebanon and Jordan) would most likely lead to the redrawing of these antiquated borders.

"the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood rose up in Hama in 1982, he killed more than 20,000 Sunni Muslim civilians there in response, according to some estimates. "

"Some" say that Bashar is an extra terrestrial and part of the Illuminati conspiracy.

Which "Some" should I believe Mr. Kaplan? Where they all civilians? Why doesn't Israel take in those poor defenseless civilians of Hama?

BTW, I just want to tell those of you in the "intelligence community" that your little plan of revolution in Syria WAS an absolute farce. It is funny how much money and effort you have put in it and yet all you could muster was to agitate is some small town on the Jordanian border and a tourist town on the Mediterranean sea (easy places for your agents to access). Long gone are the days of Kermit Roosevelt.

Mr. Kaplan is lying to himself and to the readers. Israel is more likely to disappear in the next 10 years than Bashar. The "revolution" in Syria ended today, Lebanon's pro-Syrian, pro-Iranian government will be inaugurated next week.

"Parents from Beijing to Bengazi would rather send their children to Disney Land than offer their children to the god of War. The same goes for the children, themselves: death is no fun."

Shows a complete misunderstanding of the fanatic Islamist worship of "martyrdom". These people SEEK OUT

"Parents from Beijing to Bengazi would rather send their children to Disney Land than offer their children to the god of War. The same goes for the children, themselves: death is no fun."

Shows a complete misunderstanding of the fanatic Islamist worship of "martyrdom". These people SEEK OUT death by suicide, hoping they can take as many "infidels" as possible with them.

Mothers -- whether through belief or social constraint - gladly send their children to death as "martyrs", and openly wish they had more sons to sacrifice, thus violating the strongest bond in humanity -- that of mother to child.

Remember when the Palestinians put on the Web a photo they thought was hilarious: A tiny young child tricked out as a suicide bomber? Case closed!

Mr Kaplan over emphasizes the importance of Greater Syria for modern-day Arab decision-making. The history you discuss in this article is largely unfamiliar and uninteresting to the younger generation who are spearheading the Syrian revolution.watch online sportThis system continued into the Ottoman period, although with greater centralization of power. Within this system, large cities--such as Damascus, Aleppo, or Mosul--asserted considerable economic, political and cultural influence on the surrounding provinces, maintaining order and keeping nomadism at bay. Overall, these were prosperous times that saw the expansion of cities and commercial and artisanal activities

The Lebanese have also been burned by overly weak centers as well, and he himself observed that the situation doesn't readily lend itself to a neat breakup into multiple successor states. Something along the lines of Switzerland or the US- with a multitude of broadly autonomous member states and a clear delineation of what level of government gets what powers- might be the best thing they can hope for.This system continued into the Ottoman period, although with greater centralization of power. Within this system, large cities--such as Damascus, Aleppo, or Mosul--asserted considerable economic, political and cultural influence on the surrounding provinces, maintaining order and keeping nomadism at bay. Overall, these were prosperous times that saw the expansion of cities and commercial and artisanal activities. But the system worked especially well in late antiquity and in the middle ages largely because it was widespread in use and not directly threatened by the expanisonsit ambitions of neighboring states.I would personally welcome the dissolution of the national entities that once formed Greater Syria and the rise of city states under a confederated state. But could such a state be re-created after a century-old experiment in nation building? Who would will it into being? Who would allow it to exist? Would the elites of Syria, Jordan. Lebanon and Palestine actually work toward this purpose? Would the great powers of Turkey, Israel, and, the most egregious of all, Saudi Arabia, stand by and watch the dissolution and reformation of such a state, or would they, as is much more likely, create areas of influence: Aleppo and Mosul for Turkey; Saudi Arabia, in souther Jordan; Israel, who knows.The revolt has thus far been restricted to mainly Sunni towns and has found little or no resonance in the Alawite , Kurd or Druze areas of the country . Most the blood is spilled in the area of the old French protectorate province of the State of Damascus, the Sunni heartland of the country.This essentially Sunni nature of the revolt is bad tiding for a country like Syria. If the regime falls, there could be widespread jockeying for power between the various ethnic groups which might very quickly descend into strife or worse, civil war.It would be wrong to see the various uprisings in the Arab world as identical uprisings of the disgruntled youth against corrupt leaders. These revolts had very different meanings in different places. In Syria , it is about a natural correction in a distorted power structure. A correction which is propelled by the vested interests of people who have very different aims than the idealistic youths of the Arab street.

Any change in syria should, and will keep a national unity within a common national identify where it is not very hard to find, where the citizenship is what relates to the country, and not the sect of religion thetrafficplayerreview.Overall, these were prosperous times that saw the expansion of cities and commercial and artisanal activities. But the system worked especially well in late antiquity and in the middle ages largely because it was widespread in use and not directly threatened by the expanisonsit ambitions of neighboring states.I would personally welcome the dissolution of the national entities that once formed Greater Syria and the rise of city states under a confederated state.

This is an extremely unfortunate and tragic situation; there is a lot of bloodshed, especially in Deraa, Banias, and Homs. There are electricity blackouts for long periods of time, and severe water and medicine shortages, whilst we have also seen mass arrests, including the mass arrest of families, whilst the majority of detainees are being sent en mass to the stadiums [due to the lack of space in prisons and police stations]. In addition to this, the Jordan ? Syria border has been shut, and so the authorities have turned Syria into a huge prison, and even those who have managed to cross the border into Turkey have been placed in confinement by the Turkish authorities in order to prevent them from contacting journalists. aura viewing Their apprehension stems from what could happen if there's success in the revolt and a vacuum of power. Moeller explains that "the Christians there that we're working with are quite concerned that if there are extremists mobilizing in the rebellion and they overthrow Assad, without any clear replacement in place, there could be a period of time--perhaps even a permanent situation--where Iran or other extremist nations use their influence to make it very, very difficult for the Christians.

After Bashar al-Assad, the deluge. You are right that the concept of "Syria" was not linked to any specific national sentiment. But I don't get it what it has to do with videos. I could as well talk about articles here. "Pan-Arabism -- of which the post-World War II independent state of Syria claimed to constitute the "throbbing-heart" -- became a substitute for Syria's very weak national identity. Indeed, Syria's self-styled "steadfast" hatred of Israel was a way for Syrians to escape their own internal contradictions commodities futures. Those contradictions were born of the parochial interests of regionally based ethnic and sectarian groups: Sunni Arabs in the Damascus-Homs-Hama central corridor; heretical, Shiite-trending Alawites in the mountains of the northwest; Druze in the south, with their close tribal links to Jordan; and Kurds, Christian Arabs, Armenians, and Circassians in Aleppo. " These revolts had very different meanings in different places. In Syria , it is about a natural correction in a distorted power structure. A correction which is propelled by the vested interests of people who have very different aims than the idealistic youths of the Arab street.