
Insurgents now understand that they can lose a war to a more powerful adversary but still win by fighting from inside the ranks of civilians, thus forcing the other side to kill many innocent people. This tactic has virtually no effect on countries such as Sri Lanka and Russia, which seem perfectly prepared to kill any number of civilians in order to crush an uprising. But it can be very effective against states that are answerable to public opinion, which is why Taliban soldiers in Afghanistan try to lure NATO troops into attacking villages. Israel, as I said in my earlier Goldstone piece, "called Hamas' bluff," going after the insurgents who hid behind civilians. It was a tragic choice -- for the Palestinians, not the Israelis.
If we concede that many civilian deaths were both foreseeable and unavoidable, the essential question shifts from the way Israel chose to prosecute the war to the very fact that it chose to do so. Did Israel really have to do what it did? Israel and Hamas had observed a ceasefire during the second half of 2008; it unraveled only after an Israeli operation in Gaza in early November, which prompted Palestinians to fire rockets into Israeli cities. Hamas had continued to stockpile weapons, and plainly posed a long-term threat, but not an imminent one. Israel could have eased the chokehold on Gaza's economy by opening some crossings with Israel and Egypt, and by expanding the list of products that could be trucked into the area (which it in fact did in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident in the summer of 2009). Such a choice, of course, would have transferred some of the risk from Palestinians to Israelis, especially if Hamas continued to import weapons despite the concessions. But it also might have avoided a war that killed hundreds of innocent women and children.
What, in the end, did Israel gain from Cast Lead? A few very welcome years of relative freedom from rocket attacks. But now the attacks have resumed, including a horrendous missile attack earlier this month on a bus full of schoolchildren. The tide of reciprocal violence is rising once again, raising fears of a new Gaza war. Hamas is, if anything, under more pressure from extremist groups to take the fight to Israel.
And Israel lost a lot, too. Goldstone's partial recantation cannot begin to compensate for the reputational damage Israel suffered as a result of the military operation. And reputation matters to Israel more than it does to Russia or Sri Lanka: Thanks to growing anger and frustration at the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, many Western countries now seem prepared to recognize a Palestinian state at the U.N. in September, though the United States will do everything it can to forestall a vote. Israel may also have lost a previous opportunity at a wider peace. We now know that in the fall of 2008 top Israeli officials were conducting secret, parallel peace discussions with the Palestinian Authority and Syria. Cast Lead put an end to both sets of talks. Peace talks, of course, come and go, and both might well have failed in any case. But in both cases, Israeli negotiators felt more optimistic than they had in years.
Israel's losses, of course, pale before Gaza's. And Gaza wasn't the only loser. The Palestinian Authority was seen as a helpless bystander and the United States was rightly viewed as Israel's chief defender and enabler. Recent revelations about the lengths to which Barack Obama administration officials have gone to quash the Goldstone report have only added to the damage.
Cast Lead, in short, may not have been a crime, but it may have been something just as bad: a terrible mistake. It was fully consistent with Israel's policy in Gaza: defensible to the same degree, short-sighted and self-defeating to the same degree. Israel knows it can't win the game of tit-for-tat violence. But so long as it keeps playing that game, Hamas will respond with brutal acts against civilians that seem to leave Israel no choice but to respond with massive force. Now the two sides seem to be preparing to plunge into war once again. There's no sign that either Israel or Hamas feels enough regret about the tragedy last time to avoid repeating it.

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