"Gates Made the Military Into a Better Counterinsurgency Force."
A little. He did lean on the services to heighten their dedication to irregular warfare. According to Gates, asymmetric war will constitute "the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time," and we should think of the fight against terrorism as a "prolonged, worldwide, irregular campaign."
But
the counterinsurgency transformation was more talk than reality. It had little
impact on Pentagon spending outside the scope of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been funded
time and again through supplemental budget requests. A Pentagon that was truly
committed to counterinsurgency would pay for the manpower needed for several
occupations, meaning that it would shift funds to the Army from the other
services. Spurred by Congress, Gates did grow the ground forces starting in 2008,
but once again mostly through supplemental funds. The Navy and Air Force, which
play a limited role in counterinsurgency, kept their traditional shares of the
non-war military budget: about a third each.
But the real problem with Gates' enthusiasm for counterinsurgency doctrine is that it amounts to a set of best practices for fighting dumb wars. Counterinsurgency relies largely on a chain of arguments that has caused Americans great misery in the last decade: that terrorists thrive in failed states, that Americans won't be safe unless those failed states have been put on stable footing, and that this means Washington must train its military to occupy states, build new systems of governance, and defeat local insurgents who rise up against these new regimes.
That argument, which Gates embraces, is not only a recipe for endless war, but badly flawed on its own terms. International terrorists thrived in 1990s Afghanistan because the Taliban welcomed them, not because the state was weak. Since then, the United States has spent nearly a decade showing that no matter how many cups of tea they drink or wells they dig, U.S. soldiers lack the power to fix failed states, at least at reasonable cost in blood and treasure. The country also now has at its disposal the technology and tactics -- and more than enough political will -- to attack terrorists, wherever they may be. Counterterrorism does not require counterinsurgency.
Defense secretaries are policymakers, not servile executors of presidential whimsy. Gates could have questioned the need for perpetual counterinsurgency campaigns. Instead he endorsed the conceit that the U.S. military can be trained to meet this impossible task, inspiring false confidence that has encouraged military officers and civilian policymakers to repeat the errors of the past decade. His dedication to "winning the wars we are in" seemed sensible. But trying to end them would have been better.
Chris Hondros/Getty Images


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