I'm already in agreement with many of the arguments against trying to use aid to promote peace. Development work has to have some hope of sustainability to justify the allocation of scarce funds. Humanitarian assistance must first and foremost be prioritised according to an impartial assessment of need, not in support of even the most noble political aims.

Can cash prevent or bring an end to conflict? Maybe, sometimes. If the source of the conflict is access to resources, then aid that addresses those root causes might be just the ticket (or at least, an important part of the solution). But where the temperatures are rising over less tangible issues, the impact of cash is likely to be limited and short-term or, worse, utterly illusory.

Cash can buy compliance, but it's unlikely ever to deliver hearts and minds.

For compliance with relatively short-term goals (like participation in immunization campaigns), or to promote activities that were already seen as desirable but financially difficult (like school attendance for children whose economic contribution to the family would otherwise have been missed) there are strong arguments for direct cash transfers.

But you can't buy love, or lasting peace. Even if you assume that self-interest drives all people, the calculations of how that interest is best served is a complicated one in Afghanistan, where longer-term social and physical security depends much more on family, clan and tribal ties than anything else.

Quick final point... The to note as a criticism that aid and development money tends to get spent in more secure areas where aid workers have relatively safe access does rather undermine the argument that injecting cash into conflict zones will somehow promote peace. Shouldn't this underline the message to less peaceful corners of Afghanistan that security attracts assistance?

In my time in Afghanistan humanitarian assistance in more secure areas was constantly being held up by local authorities as a "pull factor" attracting people away from their places of origin. It seems reasonable to believe that if they were able to bring about peaceful conditions in their places of origins, and thus avoid the many disadvantages of displacement, they'd do it.

I'm a big believer in the adage that the simple ideas are often the best, but there's a significant difference between simple and simplistic.

I think that it was Ranjit Singh, ruler of the Punjab, who said that it was better to be Britain's enemy than its friend as "The British sell their friends and buy their enemies."

This is an interesting theory and although not new, it does perhaps approach the issue in a uncommon light. However...

There's no arguing that aid efforts in Afghanistan have had mixed results - at best. However, I don't think the poor results are necessarily attributable to misguided application. Rather, I think in many areas, the failures are directly attributable to American ignorance. Many Afghan's are simply indifferent to receiving aid. Yet we American's are quick to assume that everyone wants more schools, better roads, more governance, etc. The primary issue in Afghanistan however, is that most rural Pashtuns are indifferent to such aid, at best.

It's been my experience, that what most Afghans want is simply to be left alone. Granted, they'll accept our development and governance projects. But, most often they'd be just as happy without. It's convenient for them to have improved roads for example, but not important enough for them to have real buy-in when it comes to successful sustainment. Consequently, when Coalition Forces attempt to hold the local's feet to the fire by promising more aid in return for increased security - or more often than not, threatening less aid when security declines - the proverbial carrot is not as enticing as we would like to believe.

If applied carefully though, it may be possible to find aid efforts that are genuinely wanted by a given population. And in those instances, aid efforts, via a project or simple cash, have been somewhat effective. But the fact remains, villages don't necessarily support the TB because they're pro-Taliban or even because they're neutral. Rather, more times than not, they support the Taliban for a very simply reason. The Taliban are the ones in their villages flexing their muscles nine days out of ten. We Americans don't show up until the tenth day.

Touching on another point -

To say that giving money may increase security? I question any such claims. Power and strength rules in the land of the Pashtun. Granted, there are areas where security is great - areas where the Taliban have limited influence. By and large though, areas with good security are areas where the community is united - area's where the tribal structure is still very strong.

Sadly though, tribal unity and traditional elder systems are quickly fading. Though anthropologists claim this breakdown began long before American's entered into the picture - the previous decade of war has greatly expedited the process. Increasing Taliban influence is often directly attributable to this cultural and societal break down. Without unity and strong leadership, villagers are incapable of standing up against Taliban pressure. In my mind, aid efforts should not simply be focused on increased security, but rather, focused on population unity - which should in turn increase overall security.

While I never understood why we didn't put a $25 billion dollar bounty on the head of our favorite hide and go seek world champion, this article only goes to show how little we understand about foreign countries. The bounty may have done nothing, or possibly something which is something our government obviously didn't want. We wanted to rule a land, change the rules they follow, force democracy into a place that didn't want it, and possibly take some oil while were are it. Other countries who enter as Peace keepers are far more likely to be accepted, opposed to those who arrive at soldiers demanding change by force. When a population wants something they will rise and take it for themselves, and this includes democracy. Bribing people will only work until the people who you've bought want more. Since these people have nothing to lose and everything to gain by taking and than disobeying(more money) you can see why this will not work, and you do not have to be a trained assassin from Seal Team 6, a cook from Tokepa, KS, a chiropractor Seattle, or a chief economist from the Fed to understand the basic principles of what we are dealing with. I still wish the bounty for the big guy was bigger, as this would have made a few people think long and hard about going against their custom of protection, and would've save us a whole log of money. Just imagine if we spent this money on jobs, homes, infrastructure and anything else we needed in the U.S. Healthcare? Crazymaking.

Why don't we just leave Afghanistan, Iraq, et al and let them deal with all this for themselves? The foreign policies we (US, UK) currently practise don't belong to this era and day/age...these countries are no longer strategically important for conventional warfare as that itself (warfare) has changed so much no to be dependent on location, etc. It truly no longer matters as the plot line ‘combating terrorism’ was faulty to begin with, to combat terrorism you begin by improving security at home not running off chasing after people abroad!

Anyway Iraq/Afghanistan were always meant to be pressure points to levy on Iran but that clearly hasn’t worked and trillions of dollars/pounds of tax payer money later we are being fed the same tune to dance to. I just call that plain madness!

You can obviously buy peace; it is called a protection racket, and the mafia has been doing it for years. As long as you pay (and the price will go up), you have peace. Miss a payment or fail to go with the regular price increases and they break your knees. Not a long term strategy-- see Iraq, where the Sahwa, Sons of Iraq program is fading away.

The problem is that reconstruction just will not work, cannot work, that the failure of the process is inherent in the conditions that require it. When a relationship begins with a war and an invasion, and all the acts of violence that go along with that, you start deep in a hole. As corruption, mistakes, accidents and half-hearted efforts plague reconstruction, that hole only gets deeper. It may just be that reconstruction does not work no matter how many cups of tea one drinks.

Peter wemeantwell.com

I think it might work. In a sense you can buy peace. But then whether it works or not will largely depend on how you communicate your message. In a place where we are seen as enemies, anything we do can be twisted to mean something else. So unless we communicate our message well, the effect could be worse. Cory

In many rural Afghan outposts like mine, we are going through RIPs/TOAs (Relief in Place/Transfers of Authority). With every change, we have a new crop of soldiers with great ideas—from saffron to cold storage to dairy farms to sewing trainings to wells. All seem to be the “silver bullet” to instability, violence, poppy production—you name it. Unfortunately, I have to put this idea of “paying for security” in the category of well-intentioned, yet flawed concepts for the following reasons:

1) paying an individual does not preclude them from also being paid by the insurgency to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their (or a neighboring) district--we are running into this fantasy of “mutual exclusivity” with regards to the Cash for Work (CFW) program, where laborers are paid 300 Afs a day to “work” (I use this term liberally!) for eight hours under the premise they will not also be working for the “dark side” and planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their off hours. Unfortunately, we have the proof that this is not the case;

2) the locals here in rural Kandahar view life (and resources) in a survivalist light, which means they will too eagerly take the money and also plant an IED without much thought as to what that means for their neighbors or even themselves--and when the security situation deteriorates and the coalition forces (CF) stop paying them this “safety money” (as the article hints the CF should do if security deteriorates), Afghans will have a "Well, it was a good run" mentality and be back at square one without much thought;

3) the threats made by insurgents to the actual well-being of an Afghan are very real--a lot of Afghans are pressured to plant IEDs, grow poppy, continue the instability through SIGACTs, etc.; when an insurgent comes through town to plant an IED, the only deal brokered is between the villagers and IED-diggers (i.e. "Don't go here because there is a bomb for the Americans. If anyone in this village reports us, we will indiscriminately attack you." The CF cannot battle this type of threat (even with $100 per person!), as CFs actually have codes of conduct that they follow (i.e. no unnecessary harm to civilians, due process for suspected insurgents, etc). In other words, the villagers know we are trying to win them over (and we apologize for every civilian casualty we inflict), while the insurgency has and will make good on their threats of ruthless killings and intimidation (as can be seen from beheadings of government officials in relatively peaceful Bamiyan to wedding explosions in remote Kandahar);

4) the billions of dollars in aid money is drying up as we speak from all angles, whether it is due to countries exiting (i.e. Canada) and taking their cash with them, USAID reigning in their budgets, or the military cutting back on their CERP funds. This lack of this development money in the Afghan economy is going to create a depression, no doubt, and 50% of existing USG/CF resources has already been allocated to go through the federal GIRoA system to prop up the ministries. I can only imagine the fake economy that would be created by “paying for security”—and then eventually taking it away—leaving a depressed economy that leaves an even more ideal situation for insurgents to exploit;

and 5) if we pay $20, the insurgency will pay $25; simple as that (though they would not be tasked with blanketing the entire country to be “fair;” instead, they would be able to target specific, traditionally sympathetic regions). This can be seen with the rates of CFW, which drives our prices even higher because insurgents will pay an unemployed teenager a certain percentage higher than CFW rates. It is the simple truth.

Furthermore, with regards to the examples in South America and Africa, the comparison breaks down: in Afghanistan (which is a FAR cry from Namibia, believe it or not), we are dealing with insurgents that execute 80 year old elders on the sides of the roads in front of their families (which, unfortunately, happened to nine leading maliks (village elders) in my district two weeks); this is far different than trying to get a child vaccinated or fed properly. The pressures these Afghans feel are intense.

Remember, there are a lot of isolationist tribes/villages that prefer to be left alone by BOTH the Afghan govt/Coalition Forces and the insurgency/Taliban. They allow insurgents to plant IEDs in their orchards and fields to drive out the larger of the beasts, but once they "get rid" of the Afghan govt/Coalition Forces, they will actually turn on the insurgency--and the TB recognizes this and will allow them to remain isolated (i.e. the TB center of control in very urban areas in Kabul and Kandahar City pre-2001; they never fully won over rural areas).

And no amount of money is going to change these factors—a concept that development officials also need to realize with regards to ALL money spent here.

So I give Mr. Kenny a nod on the idea, but unfortunately is a bit naïve and the support for its success lacks real “ground truth” with regards to what is happening day-to-day in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, paying off Afghans will not—in my estimation—show the results predicted above.

If only it was this simple...

When a relationship begins with a war and an invasion, and all the acts of violence that go along with that, you start deep in a hole. As corruption, mistakes, accidents and half-hearted efforts plague reconstruction, that hole only sázkové kanceláre gets deeper. It may just be that reconstruction does not work no matter how many cups of tea one drinks.The foreign policies we currently practise don't belong to this era and day/age...these countries are no longer strategically important for conventional warfare as that itself (warfare) has changed so much no to be dependent on location, etc. It truly no longer matters as the plot line ‘combating terrorism’ was faulty to begin with, to combat terrorism you begin by improving security at home sázkové kanceláre not running off chasing after people abroad!Anyway Iraq/Afghanistan were always meant to be pressure points to levy on Iran but that clearly hasn’t worked and trillions of dollars/pounds of tax payer money later we are being fed the same tune to dance to. I just call that plain madness!