- William McCants: The al-Qaeda Zawahiri inherits
- Leah Farrall: Al-Qaeda’s delayed announcement
- Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: Zawahiri’s ascension won’t change al-Qaeda’s strategy
- J.M. Berger: Zawahiri’s American court jester
Zawahiri's elevation as emir of al-Qaeda was expected, particularly after his eulogy of Bin Laden last week in which he pledged an oath of allegiance on behalf of al-Qaeda to the head of the Quetta Shura Taliban, Mullah Omar. Only the emir would have the requisite authority to make such a pledge.
Zawahiri faces a number of daunting challenges. First, he has to stay alive. Bin Laden was a micromanager and micromanagers usually leave a thick paper trail, as indicated by the persistent reports about intelligence seized from bin Laden's Abbottabad compound. If so, his subordinates are on the run like never before. Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan was already constrained before bin Laden's death, and now the noose has grown far tighter.
Second, Zawahiri has to play nice with the various factions of al-Qaeda. Those who joined before Zawahiri did in 2001 are going to worry that he will take the organization in a direction they will not like. The Gulf Arabs, for instance, are going to worry that Zawahiri and his Egyptian entourage will not give them the respect they feel is their due.
Third, Zawahiri has to reassure bin Laden's allies in the Taliban that he will not harm their interests. He also has to ensure they do not withdraw their protection from al-Qaeda. Some measure of his concern about the organization's vulnerability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is evinced by his pledge of loyalty to Mullah Omar in his eulogy of Bin Laden, and by the so-called General Command's pledge the same in their announcement of Zawahiri's elevation to emir.
Fourth, Zawahiri has to manage the chaos in Yemen, so that al-Qaeda's branch there (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP) comes out on top. The brewing civil war in that country has given AQAP an opportunity to take a leading role in the Sunni Arab uprisings after being on the sidelines for months. But there are major obstacles standing in its way; al-Qaeda tried this before in Iraq, and blew it, because it did not play nice with the other insurgents and their tribal allies. The United States is also taking advantage of the chaos to attack members of the organization, according to press reports, posing a major threat of disruption to the group's operations.
Finally, the swooning support accorded bin Laden by many jihadis was never enjoyed by Zawahiri, even though Zawahiri enjoyed far greater media exposure. It is not that Zawahiri is not respected; it is that he is not loved.
Despite these daunting challenges, Zawahiri is not a talentless neophyte. He is a career revolutionary, a skilled propagandist, and a clever strategist. He is cautious about alienating potential Islamist allies, and in the past has counseled against sectarian conflict and supported building broad coalitions. He also has a keener appreciation of the utility of non-violent protest than bin Laden or some other al-Qaeda ideologues like Abu Yahya al-Libi. All of this will serve al-Qaeda well in the months ahead, as it struggles to cope with the fallout from bin Laden's death and the aftermath of the Arab revolutions.
William McCants, the founder and co-editor of Jihadica, is a research analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies at CNA and adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins University.
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