Food Fight

The new geopolitics of agriculture aren't new.

Lester R. Brown's article takes us on a breathless tour across the troubled terrain of global agriculture ("The New Geopolitics of Food," May/June 2011). At every turn he exaggerates the danger.

He begins with an assertion that last year's 75 percent increase in international wheat prices implied a similar price increase for the urban poor in India. Not true. India, like many developing countries, has used trade restrictions to insulate its domestic consumers from volatile international prices. According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the retail price of wheat in New Delhi today is actually lower than it was in the spring of 2010. In real terms, wheat prices in Delhi have been declining since 2008.

Brown's second worry is that technology-driven farm productivity gains are beginning to slow. Not true. A 2009 expert report to the FAO shows a yearly productivity growth rate for world agriculture of 1.56 percent in the most recent two decades, roughly twice the 0.79 percent growth rate in the previous two decades. Brown specifically predicts that rice yields in China "may level off soon." Rice yields in China have actually increased 13 percent since Brown first made this erroneous prediction in 1995.

Brown also worries it will not be possible to increase crop production "with less water." Not true. A 2008 OECD report on the environmental performance of agriculture shows that between 1990 and 2004, while OECD food production increased by 5 percent, water use on irrigated lands declined by 9 percent. Pesticide use and excess nitrogen use also declined in the OECD region, as did soil erosion and greenhouse gas emissions from farming.

Brown asserts, finally, that this year's street demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were triggered by high food prices. This ignores the testimony of the demonstrators themselves, who said they wanted jobs, personal dignity, and an end to government corruption, not cheaper bread.

Robert Paarlberg
Professor of Political Science
Wellesley College
Wellesley, Mass.

It may be the "New Geopolitics of Food," but it's the same old Lester Brown. Since 1960, he has pushed one urgent message: the need to increase production and force down prices. Brown neglects to mention that the disastrous inflation-deflation "supercycle" prevailing since 2008 is largely a consequence of this policy.

The bottom billions suffer when food prices are high, but that's nothing compared with when they're low. Most of the world's poor make a living from agriculture, and national and international policies have for 50 years relentlessly slashed prices at their expense. It should come as no surprise that they respond by abandoning their agricultural livelihoods. Growing slums and fluctuating prices are signs of the collapse in farm earnings.

The United States is responsible for instigating this regime. But Brown, casting Washington as rescuer of a hungry world, focuses on a history more friendly to his thesis: the Indian "famine" of 1966. In November 1965, as a young U.S. Agriculture Department economist, Brown predicted a catastrophe in India the next year, and President Lyndon B. Johnson urged Canada and Europe to join in a "war on hunger" to meet the crisis. No famine occurred, but to conclude that only Johnson's quick action averted it assumes the forecast was right in the first place.

Indira Gandhi had a different explanation: U.S. officials had promised to ship surplus grain "indefinitely," and Indian planners foolishly trusted them, shifting wheat acreage to cotton. Stalemated in Vietnam, Johnson needed a "dramatic rescue" to reassert American leadership in Asia, so surplus disposal became famine relief. Brown supplied the analysis that made a famine without any actual starvation deaths seem real.

Brown's version buttresses a Malthusian interpretation of the past and future of the global food problem. Instead of historical problems facing farmers squeezed by creditors, landlords, and a global trade system rigged against them, he asks us to focus on population explosions, water wars, and other speculative, future dangers. The geopolitics of food isn't new -- it's old, and it's time we changed it.

Nick Cullather
Associate Professor
Department of History
Indiana University
Bloomington, Ind.

From ForeignPolicy.com:

DALLAS WEAVER: Environmental activist NGOs oppose both genetic engineering and offshore aquaculture. If the world does end up in a serious food crisis, perhaps we should put the blame where it belongs, on the Luddite environmental activists' prevention of any technological solutions to the problem.

TFERNSLE: It is telling that Brown offers no solutions, just a grim analysis of a big problem getting worse. But there are many other people who are concerned about this problem and are publicizing practical solutions. The local-food movement encourages people to learn to eat what can be grown in their climate, which supports smaller local sustainable farms and heads off the possibility that any kind of crisis will cut off the food supply. The organic food movement supports a much more sustainable means of food production.


The End of Hunger

Cut the development NGOs some slack.

The impetus behind Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo's arguments seems to be that there is a false consensus among development experts that the poor will always choose improved nutrition over anything else ("More Than 1 Billion People Are Hungry in the World," May/June 2011). They argue that the failure to understand that people have other needs (whether for community or for entertainment) and other priorities (whether involving the demands of their religion or the authority of cultural custom) explains why there has been so little progress in improving nutritional outcomes among the so-called bottom billion.

If they are right, then God help us! But though it is true that the history of development theory is replete with follies of every sort, from the intellectual fraud and moral affront that is Malthusianism to the rational-choice assumptions that Banerjee and Duflo appear to have been targeting, development thinking is not that benighted, and to a very considerable degree they are arguing against a straw man, which, satisfying as it may be personally, is not very helpful in advancing the debate.

It is true that those who argue against further help for the poor, whether they are foreign donors and NGOs and international agencies, or the elites in and out of government in countries where there are many chronically malnourished people, often indignantly ask, as Banerjee and Duflo put it, why the poor "don't invest in what would really make their lives better." But such an attitude is nowhere near as dominant as they suggest in their article. Development agencies are nowhere near as good at listening as they should be, but they are not the "Lady Bountiful" caricature Banerjee and Duflo present.

To put it bluntly, in the words of the old Oxbridge wisecrack, what's true about their argument is obvious and what isn't obvious isn't true. Banerjee and Duflo vastly oversimplify. To cite only the most egregious example, they make heavy weather of the fact that, as they put it, in Indian households that have grown richer, "[adults] and their children are certainly not well nourished by any objective standard." One would never know from this the terrible extent to which the reality of such households is that men and boys are actually quite well nourished and women, and especially girls, quite malnourished. Talking about the poor in the way Banerjee and Duflo do -- that is, without disaggregating the two genders as a point of departure -- is not a help but a prophylactic to better understanding.

A quick point on Lester Brown's essay: There is a great deal of evidence that he has either unwisely dismissed, or at the very least written as if he is unaware, that the real heart of the global food crisis is not the spike in food prices but rather the past decade's dramatic rise in price volatility. Price rises exacerbate the problem of food security for the very poor, but they do not preclude it; in contrast, price volatility almost invariably does just that.

David Rieff
New York, N.Y.

The paradoxes and dilemmas highlighted by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo will resonate strongly with historically minded famine experts. Indeed, for economic historians, today's world is remarkable for its near absence of catastrophic famine. Banerjee and Duflo mention "famines that kill and weaken millions," but in reality recent famines have been small and short-lived by historical standards. Twentieth-century famines killed at least 70 million people, more than either world war, but since the late 1980s, the total number of deaths from famine has paled by comparison with deaths from natural disasters. Even in particularly stricken countries like Malawi and Niger, HIV/AIDS has proved a bigger scourge. Clearly, humankind is making some headway with hunger.

Still, some aspects of Banerjee and Duflo's historical framework could use greater scrutiny. They are a little too ready to contrast hunger-based poverty traps of the past with the plight of contemporary victims of hunger. Banerjee and Duflo invoke, for example, Robert Fogel's long-standing claim that a significant proportion of people in the past were too hungry to function effectively as workers. But that's a line of analysis cast into doubt by the most recent research, for England at least: Craig Muldrew has found that before the Industrial Revolution, English laborers consumed food in quantities that rule out the possibility of a malnutrition trap. Banerjee and Duflo make an important point that today's poor don't lack for adequate food, but they oversell their findings as an entirely new phenomenon. In the past, too, many people surely resembled Javanese laborer Pak Solhin and his family in opting for mild malnutrition over a physiologically sustainable diet. The question is whether education can now make a difference. Can we help convince Pak Solhin and millions of others like him -- in both the developing and the industrialized world -- that televisions and Big Macs are not more important than healthy food?

Cormac O Grada
Professor of Economics
University College Dublin
Dublin, Ireland

Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo reply:

We thank Cormac O Grada, whose work on famine we greatly admire, for shedding historical light on our argument. We absolutely agree with the point that famines have been rare in recent years. In fact, our main argument is that low availability of food is not really the driving factor for undernutrition in today's world. It is worth noting that even in the earlier part of the 20th century, where there were catastrophic famines (Bengal, China, Ukraine), political and institutional factors seemed to have played a fundamental role in causing and sustaining the disaster. The fact that famines are largely "history" is something that we could have highlighted even more forcefully -- though that's not to say that they might not return (one never knows).

The main point of our essay is that in today's world, the main problem is one of nutrition, rather than hunger, let alone starvation. Not being historians, we don't have strong opinions about whether this is an "entirely new phenomenon" or not, so we certainly would not want to oversell the point. After concluding that we don't see Pak Solhin trapped in a conventional nutrition-based poverty trap, we write, "None of this is to say that the logic of the hunger-based poverty trap is flawed. The idea that better nutrition would propel someone on the path to prosperity was almost surely very important at some point in history, and it may still be today." In light of the evidence O Grada brings up, we should have been more skeptical of the examples drawn from Fogel and others that we mention.

If it is indeed the case that there have not been any nutrition-based poverty traps (which seems like a strong claim to us), it only serves to reinforce our argument: The problem with nutrition is not one of availability of food. It is a problem of balancing people's legitimate desire for things other than mere physical fitness with the importance of eating healthily. Education may be part of the solution, though we suspect not all of it -- making good nutrition easier to obtain may be even more important. This requires a radical rethinking of the way countries conceive of their policy on food subsidies today.

From ForeignPolicy.com:

TOWNLEY89: Man cannot live on bread alone. So maybe the fact that they have a TV doesn't mean they're not hungry. They value a TV more because it makes staying alive bearable, as opposed to simply "possible."

THE GLOBALIZER: Too often, the people who say that groups of people are acting against their self-interest are simply misunderstanding what that group's interest actually is. I'd say that more than thriving, poor people want to live with dignity.