Blue Water Dreams

Why China wants an aircraft carrier.

BY JAMES HOLMES | JUNE 27, 2011

On a visit to Washington this month, Chinese Gen. Chen Bingde, chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff, confirmed what Asahi Shimbun and the Financial Times reported last December: China, he said, has officially committed itself to deploying aircraft-carrier task forces, a program that has evidently been under way since 2009. A Soviet flattop called Varyag, refitted and reportedly rechristened Shi Lang, may take to China's "near seas" for sea trials sometime around July 1. Whenever it takes place, the maiden cruise of the Varyag will mark a milestone in China's return to great power.

Any number of excellent technical studies of Beijing's carrier plans have appeared in recent years, and much ink has been spilled debating the ship's design characteristics: flight-deck configurations, launch and recovery systems, and propulsion plants. But to my mind, the best guide for figuring out what it all means in terms of China's naval strategy isn't the latest edition of Jane's Fighting Ships, but rather the two-plus-millennia-old History of the Peloponnesian War. In his chronicle of the protracted war between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century B.C., the Greek general and historian Thucydides proclaims that "three of the strongest motives" animating states' actions are "fear, honor, and interest." Peoples must arm lest they fall victim to the "law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger." China's aircraft-carrier ambitions can be seen in similar terms.

During his tenure as chairman of the early People's Republic, Mao Zedong took little interest in the sea, focusing instead on land defense. Even after the Great Helmsman's demise, Chinese leaders like Deng Xiaoping contented themselves with free-riding on U.S. maritime supremacy, reasoning that finite resources were better spent on economic development than on putting steel in the water. But with development came increasing reliance on the sea for imports of fuel and raw materials, not to mention exports of finished goods. Shipping lanes now figure prominently in China's foreign-policy calculus. Chinese statesmen accordingly fret that the United States will hold China's economic interests hostage during a crisis or war in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere in maritime Asia, mounting a "distant blockade" to interdict the crucial sea routes on which Chinese commerce overwhelmingly depends.

Fear that the U.S. Navy will cut China's economic lifelines from afar beckons China's strategic gaze irresistibly seaward. An editorial in the official People's Daily last December captured China's broader geopolitical anxieties. The United States, the editors write, is intent on preserving "its hegemony across the world," including on the high seas in Asia. Focused on latter-day containment, Washington has stayed outside the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Why? Because, the editors write, it "considers exclusive economic zones to be international waters, which, by its hegemonic logic, should be included in the U.S. sphere of influence." In voicing their own fears, Chinese pundits -- not unreasonably -- impute fear to the United States. "Any fast-developing country," concludes the Daily, will be "instinctively seen" as a challenge to U.S. primacy. Such countries must construct strong military and naval forces, equipping themselves to resist a domineering America.

Such a bleak analysis would be instantly familiar to Thucydides, who found the "real cause" of the Peloponnesian War in the "growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta." Fear made great-power war "inevitable." From Beijing's standpoint, assenting to permanent U.S. maritime supremacy would amount to knuckling under to Thucydides's law condemning the weak to remain subservient to the strong. Dread of what U.S. leaders might do with overwhelming sea power helps account for China's quest for a great navy.

But why aircraft carriers specifically? Beijing is already fielding an impressive cruise-missile navy specifically designed to deny U.S. naval forces access to Asian seas and skies during a Taiwan confrontation or some other upheaval. Cruise missiles, augmented by submarines, ballistic missiles, and land-based tactical aircraft, would be far more lethal against the U.S. Navy than any carrier fleet Beijing will put to sea anytime soon. Writing in International Security, Boston College professor Robert Ross ascribes China's carrier-centric naval buildup to "naval nationalism." In this view, high-end warships represent tokens of great power that Beijing simply must have to fulfill its destiny as a seafaring state. Such talismans fire popular enthusiasm for nautical endeavors, and for the state that undertakes them.

LARRY DOWNING/AFP/Getty Images

 

A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, James Holmes is associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College and co-author of Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, an Atlantic Best Book of 2010. The views voiced here are his alone.

AFGHANGOOD

9:33 AM ET

June 28, 2011

in 10-20 years...

These events are significant, not so much from the military sense in the next 10 years but from the long term strategic sense, it is another matter. The US and most other carrier operating countries have done so for a longtime, and China isn’t going to be able to match than in the next decade, but in 10-20 years, If China has a carrier force of 4-5 carriers, it will be a huge strategic strain on the anyone to match that dominance in Asia. China’s rise is methodical and calculated, not fast and furious, so they are taking the long view to this, and these carriers won’t be to intimate the US, but instead to co-op its neighbors. All of Asia will get more accustomed to seeing China as a superpower economically and militarily, and watch how they will start to increase their deferment to China on Global matters. China doesn’t need to invade Taiwan, in 10 years, Taiwan will be beginning China to let it join with them.

 

NANJING03

2:43 PM ET

June 28, 2011

Global Seapower Dynamic

Many people fail to realize that America's dominence of the world's oceans and the ability to project that power in foreign policy and war was due to a counter-force in the form of the old Soviet Union. Granted, the Soviets never matched our seapower, but then they didn't have to since their sphere of influence was the Asian land mass, and to a lesser extent, Africa and the Middle East. Unlike the old Soviet Union, rich in natural resourses and with little need to protect a smaller merchant fleet, the United States, like the United Kingdom, Japan and other highly industrial and trading countries, survives on intercontinental trade. China is fast approaching a similar stage. Like any maritime country, China will have to protect it's sea lanes of communication -- if from no threat other than from pirates to rouge nations. Unlike contemporary maritime countries since the end of World War II, China may unwisely choose to agressively influence her economic standing with her navy. Until then, be prepared and expect the unexpected. We learned the hard lesson of unpreparedness 70 years ago this upcoming December.

 

GUY HARDROCK

6:46 PM ET

June 28, 2011

The long view...

AFGHANGOOD has it exactly right...

China takes the long view, something the United States is culturally UNABLE to do.

Consider that the United States elects a new President every four years, that US corporations must announce financial results every three months... and that 20 years represents roughly 5% of ALL United States history, while an equivalent cultural time span in China would encompass an entire century...

These 'pace-of-life' comparisons illustrate a tremendous strategic ADVANTAGE enjoyed by China. American strategists are not necessarily inferior to their Chinese counterparts, but they have no real chance of ever actually executing a five-year plan, much less a 20-year or 50-year strategy. (Given similar context, it could well be argued that "American strategist" is in fact an oxymoron...)

Today, the United States Navy would annihilate anything China could put to sea, regardless of the so-called ASBM threat. In ten years, it may be much the same... but one day the USN will meet its match in the Chinese fleet, and the era of American high-seas dominance will come to an end...

 

MORRISTHEWISE

1:58 PM ET

June 30, 2011

WMD At Gun Shows

Costs of WMD have gone down. It now costs China less then 50 thousand dollars to produce an ICBM together with its mobile launcher. It can pinpoint and destroy any target on land or sea. In contrast a Western naval craft performing the same functions costs between 300 million to one billion to build. It is highly likely that those inexpensive Chinese WMD might be imported and sold at Walmart or gun shows.

 

SCOOP

1:54 PM ET

July 8, 2011

A Sino-Persian Grab for the Indian Ocean?

by Jamsheed K. Choksy, SWJ Editors, July 7, 2011

"China and Iran are constructing a series of strategically placed harbors – their strings of salt water pearls – partially for independent strategic reasons but equally to ensure maritime commerce in oil, gas, other licit resources, and illicit technologies between both nations can continue uninterrupted. Those ports provide facilities for the two countries’ warships as well, extending their military power into a region hitherto dominated by the U.S., Britain, and India. To ensure the Indian Ocean’s vital transportation lanes continue remaining accessible to all nations and transfer of prohibited items does not occur, the U.S and Britain need to remain actively engaged in building political, social, and economic relations with several nations in South Asia. Diminishment in access to Indian Ocean ports will have serious long-term consequences for American and British military and commercial operations in a troubled yet important region of the world."

 

TAVARES

12:35 AM ET

July 19, 2011

Unlike the old Soviet Union,

Unlike the old Soviet Union, rich in natural resources and with little need to protect a smaller merchant fleet, the United States, like the Tavares United Kingdom, Japan and other highly industrial and trading countries, survives on intercontinental trade.

 

BETALOVER

1:50 PM ET

July 21, 2011

China is not the old USSR

China is not the USSR.

China does not have the ideological lust to expand. It does not seek out to confront the USA in areas where the US does not confront it. In areas where the US feels the need to confront China, they center on American ideology. China is the pragmatic party; the US the ideological one.

For China, there are two reasons to have carriers. One is simply that every power has them (at least one) so should China. It is just keeping up with the Jones. The second is to safeguard shipping lanes, especially for oil transport. China is not interested in ferrying troops by carriers to fight wars in distant lands.

Taiwan is not the reason why China wants carriers or even a great navy. The Taiwan issue will not be and needs not be resolved by naval power. This is dictated by Taiwan’s geography. Taiwan is actually hopelessly vulnerable due to the Taiwan Strait. All supplies will be hopelessly exposed. China will not even need a comprehensive blockade, just on Taiwan’s oil supply. And not all of Taiwan’s oil supply, but simply to create an anti-business atmosphere based on uncertainty in Taiwan that will be greatly detrimental to the Taiwan economy. Taiwan’s economy will not survive the shake and bake from the Chinese mainland for many more decades to come. I see Taiwan’s fate as another Hong Kong as basically sealed.

When the time comes in a few decades, may be 30 years, what could the “free world” do for Taiwan? Nothing. For one thing, the “free world” will never know what Taiwan really wants, war or a negotiated settlement as another Hong Kong. The Chinese mainland will be very unlikely to initiate the first major military offensive. All it will do is to harass Taiwan’s oil supply to create uncertainty that will stymie the Taiwan economy gradually. The idea of China attacking Taiwan is very primitive; isn’t going to happen. Taiwan really has feet of clay and will need to attack first, and through great sacrifices, to break away. Taiwan can only break away after a devastating war which China loses, which isn’t going to happen. Another Hong Kong is coming up.

Sympathy for China’s ethnic minorities is completely misplaced. In fact, I believe China actually has a good minority policy. Americans should revisit our racist past. Think of light-skinned blacks “passing for white”. I mean think of the degrading desperation when dark-skinned relatives were discovered. It is distasteful to think about it now, but it is elucidating. The desperation of racism is based on external physical appearance, not culture. For the most part, China’s ethnic minorities are East Asian in appearance. This is a very essential feature.

We had an anti-Slav mentality in mainstream America not that long ago, although that bigotry had never been as strong as racism. The anti-Slav mentality was induced by the conceived social backwardness of the Slavic people. Stalin was the grandson of a serf.

So what did Slavic people in America do? Many changed their names and jettisoned their Slavic roots to become Americans. A white face is the ticket; Anglo-Saxon is a choice. Natalie Wood was Russian. She, as all Russians who chose to, was, in essence, a light-skinned black who successfully “passed for white”. No doubt the same social phenomenon has existed in China for centuries in the continual creation of the Han Chinese. Assimilation is the best for all, in China as in the USA.

Traditional culture is simply not important to happiness; being socially included is. I quite agree with the US Senate rejecting the Akaka bill that could have given the Hawaiians cultural autonomy. I want to see the Hawaiian cultural identity come to an end. I see the Indian Nations as a legal impediment to social progress in the USA. I want to see the end to any ”Native” cultural identity. The USA does not need any minority cultural autonomy or cultural identity; we need assimilation.

It is not reasonable for the US President, on official duty, to have a dialog with a monk who seeks segregation to preserve a minority culture. It is not reasonable to urge China to take steps to preserve the Tibetan linguistic tradition while the US Senate in 2000 rejected the Akaka bill that could have granted cultural autonomy to the Hawaiians.

What minorities want, eventually, no matter what their ancestors once struggled for, is equal opportunity to your bedroom, to make babies with you, or you son’s or daughter’s, not their culture, if you would let them.

The USA is not focused on the core issues re China, which is economics. If you want your neighbor to stop making noise after 11 pm, you should stay focused on him not making noise after 11 pm, not on how he must not spank his children.

China will likely be far more powerful than the USSR once was. Its capacity will be far greater, but the intentions can be far less challenging to the USA. I think some US policy misjudgments notwithstanding, US-China relations will remain stable with rather slow progress toward greater mutual acceptance. Pragmatism will prevail.

 

LALOPARSAD

6:20 AM ET

July 25, 2011

Consider that the United

Consider that the United States elects a new President every four years, that US corporations must announce financial results every three months... and that 20 years represents roughly 5% of ALL United States history, while an equivalent cultural time span in China would encompass an entire century earnextramoney.It is not reasonable for the US President, on official duty, to have a dialog with a monk who seeks segregation to preserve a minority culture. It is not reasonable to urge China to take steps to preserve the Tibetan linguistic tradition while the US Senate in 2000 rejected the Akaka bill that could have granted cultural autonomy to the Hawaiians.