Argument

The Cowboy Abroad

We know plenty about what Rick Perry, the GOP's newest presidential front-runner, thinks of America. But what about the rest of the world?

In May, after President Barack Obama called for Israel and Palestine to negotiate their borders based on "the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps," Texas Gov. Rick Perry's office sent around a statement of his own. "As someone who has visited Israel numerous times," it read, "I know that it is impracticable to revert to the 1967 lines." It was a departure from the Perry camp's usual missives, which are typically about how Texas has just created 40 new jobs by poaching a paper-clip company from California or something like that. And it was revealing -- but what it revealed, to this Perry watcher, was simply that he really was thinking of running for president.

This is the tricky thing about governors who would be commander in chief: Unlike members of Congress, who arrive on the campaign trail encumbered by voting records and committee-hearing transcripts, we have little idea what state-level chief executives think of the world beyond the borders of Texas, or Arkansas, or Alaska. In the case of Perry -- the longtime governor of Texas who before officially announcing his candidacy on Aug. 13 was better known in parts of the national media for carrying a gun while jogging than for his position on anything -- what little we know is as follows: This summer, he reportedly met with Douglas Feith and William Luti, neoconservatives who served in George W. Bush's administration. He also met with former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in Austin last month, though Musharraf explained that this was because he, like so many other observers, was curious to learn about Texas's economy. In his 2010 book, Fed Up!, Perry warns that Washington has lost its focus on its "fundamental defense mission." Perry dings  Obama for indulging in the "utter fantasy" of a world without nuclear weapons and for having devoted more attention in his Quadrennial Defense Review to climate change than to China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. (That last bit is probably especially vexing to Perry, who says he doesn't believe in man-made climate change.)

Going on these scant data points, Perry certainly looks like another Republican hawk, and possibly of the neocon variety. But rhetoric is one thing, and behavior another. Indeed, looking at his record as governor, there are indications that a Perry White House's foreign policy could be more pragmatic than his words and political associations might suggest.

Perry's record on foreign affairs, such as it is, suggests that business interests take precedence over more abstract concerns. Perry has been hawkish on border security, for example, and has even said that the United States should consider deploying troops to Mexico to stop the country's bloody drug war from spilling over the Texas border. But he also campaigned for Mexican trucks to be allowed on American highways -- a development that was promised in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement and anticipated by Mexico, but held up by the United States until earlier this year, when the Obama administration lifted the ban.

Perry also riled the nativist wing of the Republican Party with his plan for a significant expansion of the state's overloaded infrastructure. The Trans-Texas Corridor, proposed in 2002, would have built a new network of roads and rail lines, including a major thoroughfare cutting through the middle of the Lone Star State, from Mexico to Oklahoma. Because the state budget was already strained and Texans are resolutely opposed to tax hikes, the plan called for the roads to be privately financed and tolled. A half-Spanish developer partnership, Cintra-Zachry, was contracted for much of the work; fringe commentators warned that the whole thing was a step toward the dreaded North American Union. The plan eventually met with less-paranoid criticism -- Texans were not enthused about large swaths of their land being seized by eminent domain for a for-profit enterprise -- and was scuppered. But Perry has been a pragmatic business-first internationalist on other issues as well, publicizing his willingness to do business with countries whose regimes he has criticized in other contexts. In 2004, he announced a $5 million grant to Venezuela-owned Citgo as it relocated its corporate headquarters to Houston, and last year he riled the cybersecurity community when he wooed Chinese telecom Huawei to set up its American headquarters in Plano.

Perry's constant cheerleading for the 10th Amendment -- the constitutional touchstone of states' rights advocates -- points to another pattern in his politics, which is that he defers to the will of the people on those occasions when they coalesce to express it. This, combined with his pro-business bent, may mitigate Perry's hawkish tendencies. One of his critiques about entitlement spending, for example, is that it contributes to the deficit so much that it diminishes America's ability to maintain the world's most effective military. But having a strong military doesn't mean you have to use it. And on the campaign trail Perry has struck some pragmatic notes. "We need to be thoughtful before we ever go into an area that America's interests are truly being impacted," he said last week in South Carolina, speaking of Afghanistan. These aren't the words of a man who wants to spread democracy from Kyrgyzstan to Syria; they are the words of a politician who doesn't like losing causes.

One thing that can be said with confidence about Perry is that as president he wouldn't be much concerned with international opinion (which is lucky for him, because otherwise he would get his feelings hurt -- a President Perry is unlikely to be be feted in Oslo). Two factors make this so. The first is Perry's cynical-yet-not-inaccurate belief that the global community is not always effective. Remarking on the 2010 sinking of South Korea's Cheonan in Fed Up!, Perry observes acidly, "The United Nations responded with its characteristic force, passing yet another resolution expressing displeasure." On Barack Obama's 2009 call for a new treaty to end the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, he writes, "We don't need a stable of U.N. lawyers to tell us that the international system has no reliable mechanism for enforcing such a treaty." Given that North Korea has yet to be punished for the Cheonan's sinking and that the fissile material treaty is going nowhere fast, Perry seems on solid ground here.

The second, and more problematic, is Perry's conviction that the United States isn't always bound by international rules -- a tricky argument for him to make, given that he believes a lot of American laws are themselves suspect. This was most clearly on display in the 2008 case of Medellín v. Texas. José Medellín was a Mexican national who, along with several other criminals, raped and murdered two teenage girls in Houston in 1993. He was also a vicious thug who, having admitted to the assault and signed a confession, was summarily sentenced to death. The case was straightforward, except that Medellín was not advised of his right to contact the Mexican Consulate. Mexico sued the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2003, arguing that it had the right to review the cases of Medellín and 50 other Mexican nationals in American prisons. The ICJ sided with Mexico, finding that the United States had breached the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. President George W. Bush issued a memorandum ordering state courts to examine the convictions, and Medellín sued. In 2008, the Supreme Court sided with Texas, finding that the ICJ's judgment was not enforceable as domestic law. "Amazingly, however, three justices did not agree," Perry writes in Fed Up!, "perhaps believing instead that international law should trump the laws of Texas."

None of this is predictive of Perry's hypothetical behavior as president, of course; Bush, you'll recall, spoke on the campaign trail in 2000 of a "humble" foreign policy, and we all know how that turned out. The best predictor, should it come to that, might be the views of the voters. Recent polling from the Pew Research Center suggests an uptick in isolationist sentiment. In 2004, 44 percent of respondents and 58 percent of those identified as conservative Republicans agreed that it was "best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs," as opposed to concentrating on problems at home. By this year, only 33 percent of respondents took that view, including 39 percent of conservatives.

These results may be on account of war fatigue or the beleaguered economy, but it is the mood of the day. Although this election will likely center on economic issues, it would hurt Perry's chances if he took a starkly different perspective from the voters on foreign policy, and if elected, he is not the kind of politician who will try to convince people otherwise. While Perry hardly sounds like an isolationist, neither does he have the record that would suggest a hard-core neoconservative temperament. There will always be the known unknowns and the unknown unknowns, as former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld -- who has also reportedly had a hand in Perry's foreign-policy education -- would say. But looking over Perry's record, there are no examples of him leading people somewhere they're already determined not to go.

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Argument

Stopping the Fifth Column

How to end a post-Qaddafi insurgency in Libya before it starts.

The imminent fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime in Libya opens a world of possibilities for Libyans that would have seemed almost impossible a year ago. But scenes of rebels and their civilian supporters celebrating in Tripoli's Green Square and in Qaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound should not obscure the still volatile situation in Libya. Even before Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi's cameo appearance at the Rixos hotel on Aug. 21 made it clear that the war was not yet won, triumphant declarations were premature. Toppling a dictator is difficult; stabilizing a country and building a functional government is much harder. Not only is the rebel coalition internally divided, but now battlefield compatriots must make the transition to become political allies -- and, just as importantly, political opponents -- without devolving into violence. Libyans must avoid the fate of Afghanistan and Iraq over the past decade: two countries where ruling cliques were removed from power with similarly remarkable speed, but subsequently stumbled into civil war and long-running insurgencies.

The triumph of Libya's rebels over Qaddafi loyalists in Tripoli and elsewhere represents a genuine victory by the Libyan people over a corrupt ruling elite. But the narrowness of Qaddafi's power base should not obscure the fact that there are losers in this revolution -- enough of them to plunge Libya into a protracted insurgency if the postwar period isn't handled properly. Like Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi favored some tribes over others during his rule: Libya specialists point to the relatively small Qaddafa tribe and elements of the much larger Magariha tribe (reportedly Libya's second largest) as clear beneficiaries of the eccentric autocrat. Just a small cadre of Qaddafi loyalists or disillusioned tribesmen could be a major impediment to Libya's future. Even relatively isolated attacks on oil infrastructure or factions within the rebels' National Transitional Council (NTC) could have destabilizing political and economic effects. In an unstable environment, a little violence can go a long way. Supporters of the old regime may be in no position to seize power, but they might be able to play spoiler.

For better or worse, the NTC and their supporters in European and North American capitals do have a number of relevant case studies to learn from: Algeria in the 1990s, Egypt and Tunisia in recent months -- and, of course, the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which both offer a litany of lessons for what not to do when replacing a tyrannical government:

Do not put Western boots on the ground. Although reports of British and French special forces supporting Libya's rebels have circulated for months, these specialized troops have done a remarkably good job of staying out of the limelight. Their assistance to the NTC fighters has no doubt been a force multiplier both militarily and politically, but it is their ability to remain in the background that will prove critical in the phase ahead when the wide array of rebels and Qaddafi loyalists must chart a path forward that is deemed credible and authentic by both the winners and losers of Libya's revolution.

Although Western troops have played critical roles stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, their presence on the ground also serves as a rallying cry for nationalists intent on resisting change violently. The Western coalition has facilitated the fall of Qaddafi with much subtler tools than it used to overthrow either the Taliban or Saddam. It should keep things that way. If foreign troops are needed for training, advisors from Qatar or other Arab states should take the lead, but even those roles should be limited and apolitical.

Put people to work, especially soldiers and technical experts. In the annals of recent U.S. foreign-policy history, it is difficult to think of a more disastrous decision than Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2. That edict, issued on May 23, 2003, put 250,000 Iraqi soldiers and police out of work. This not only undermined one of the few national institutions in which Iraqis took great pride, but also immediately created a large cadre of disillusioned and reasonably well-trained young men primed for criminality and insurgency. Qaddafi's security forces and state apparatus are not nearly so large or capable as Saddam's were in Iraq, but the basic point still holds. Rank-and-file Libyans who fought in organized units for Qaddafi should be incorporated into the post-Qaddafi state structure -- as should fighters from the full range of rebel factions. Loyalist leaders should be vetted and, if necessary, tried and punished, but units as a whole should be shown respect and offered a place in Libya's future. Moreover, individuals with specific technical skills -- budget experts, petroleum engineers, port managers, and the like -- need to be identified and offered a paycheck.

Treat the defeated leadership with respect. No matter how just their cause may have been, there is little doubt that many of Libya's rebels fought Qaddafi's forces to avenge past grievances. Such is the nature of revolution against repressive autocrats. Revenge can motivate in war, but it is less valuable when building peace. It is crucially important to allow low-level Qaddafi government officials a chance to develop a private life in the new Libya. After the fall of the Taliban, Afghan government officials and tribesmen who had suffered under the previous regime harassed their erstwhile tormenters, which in turn spurred the Taliban insurgency that rages today. Officials guilty of crimes should be charged, tried, and punished transparently (and in some cases, severely), but other bureaucrats must be allowed to normalize their life. This is not solely a matter of human rights, but of future security as well.

Don't forget about the police. Demobilizing the ad hoc rebel forces who have been waging a fierce guerrilla campaign since February will be difficult, and the natural impulse will be to put the ex-guerrillas into a new Libyan army. This is part of the answer to Libya's inevitable security challenges, but only a part. Stability in the new Libya should be based in civilian security structures, above all reliable police forces. The international community in particular should invest resources into effective policing immediately rather than focusing on traditional military forces.

Again, a look at recent history suggests just how bad the alternatives can be. The Iraqi Interior Ministry became home to terrifying Shiite death squads that meted out awful punishments to Sunnis and were a key ingredient in the sectarian violence that engulfed Iraq in the years immediately following the coalition invasion. In Afghanistan, police units are still weak, and the failure of the judicial sector writ large continues to be a source of instability. Neither the NTC nor their foreign backers should wait five years to make effective policing a priority, as the world did in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Buy back the guns. The fragmented Libyan rebels are rightfully considered freedom fighters, but the risk that a portion of that coalition has links with al Qaeda is real. And there is no doubt that militants of various stripes will converge on Libya to buy weapons for various purposes. The most dangerous of these are the reported stocks of Libyan man-portable surface-to-air missiles, but smaller arms have done damage enough across Africa and beyond.

Staunching the flow of these weapons out of Libya is a Sisyphean task, but one the international community should embrace nonetheless. At a minimum, a program to purchase these weapons from Libyan factions will raise their market price. No doubt some will question the cost of such a program, but in the long run such an effort is a relatively low-cost, high-return investment. If Libyan weapons are used in a terrorist attack in Egypt or to target a Western airliner, we will regret not being more aggressive now.

All of this, of course, is easier said than done -- after all, experts offered similar warnings in the early days after the fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. The key is to identify social and political groups with real power and allow them to negotiate Libya's future in a structured manner rather than impose a vision from abroad or allow narrow domestic factions to monopolize government authority. Minimizing the chance of an insurgency by the disempowered in Libya will be as much art as science. And that, perhaps, is the best lesson for both NTC leaders and their supporters in the international community to take away from Iraq and Afghanistan: Treat the challenges in Libya with humility and respect. Broad principles from other conflicts are useful reminders of potential missteps, but they are not a blueprint for peaceful transition. Qaddafi looks as if he will go the way of Saddam Hussein; the important thing now is to ensure that Libya in 2012 does not go the way of Iraq in 2004.

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