Small Wars

This Week at War: The New Pacific Theater

The United States and its allies take the first steps toward countering a growing China.

The U.S. and Australia try a new military deployment plan for the southwest Pacific

This week Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton flew to San Francisco to meet with their counterparts from Australia. The occasion was the anniversary of the ANZUS mutual defense treaty, signed 60 years ago in San Francisco's Presidio. That treaty was signed near the start of the Cold War, while the United States and its allies were locked in bloody combat against the Chinese army in Korea. This week's event in San Francisco was an effort to update the defense pact, with China again looming over the meeting.

Six decades later, the Korean War still seems to have a strong influence on the positioning of U.S. military forces in East Asia. U.S. ground, air, and naval forces remain concentrated in Japan and South Korea in the northwest Pacific, seemingly focused on the prospect of renewed fighting in Korea. North Korea's continued belligerence since 1950 created a requirement for a U.S. military presence in the northwest Pacific. Over the decades, the United States, Japan, and South Korea built up a basing structure to support this permanent deployment, which they have long settled into.

But China's improving air and naval power and its assertion of claims in the South China Sea are very likely moving the most important defense mission 2,000 miles south from where U.S. forces in the region are now concentrated. This mismatch is presumably not lost on the U.S. and Australian ministers gathered in San Francisco.

In addition to pledging greater cooperation on cyberdefense (a problem increasingly blamed on sources in China), the United States will gain greater access to Australian military training areas, pre-position military equipment in Australia, obtain access to Australian facilities and ports, and establish options for more joint military activities in the region.

This step-up in military coordination with Australia follows similar U.S. diplomatic forays around the South China Sea. In 2005, the United States and Singapore signed a strategic framework agreement on military cooperation that was expanded this year with an agreement to deploy new U.S. Navy littoral combat ships to Singapore. The deepening of this agreement will enhance the ability of the U.S. Navy to support the multilateral military training exercises it leads every year with partners around the South China Sea.

However, Washington appears to be taking a notably different approach in the southwest Pacific. Unlike its agreement with Japan and South Korea, the new agreements with Australia and Singapore, along with other low-key arrangements with the Philippines and others in the region, do not call for the permanent basing of U.S. combat units in these countries. Both the United States and its partners in the region have an interest in maintaining the "forward presence" of U.S. military forces in the region. But the permanent bases and garrisons in South Korea and Japan have become corrosive, especially on Okinawa, where the local population has become hostile to the U.S. military presence. In addition, restrictions on training areas in Japan and South Korea are impairing the readiness of U.S. forces there and reducing the utility of their presence.

The model the U.S. planners appear to have in mind for Australia, Singapore, and around the South China Sea involves regular and frequent training exercises, temporary access to host countries' facilities, and frequent consultation by staff officers and advisors. For training exercises or in response to crises, U.S. air and ground forces would fly in and meet up with pre-positioned equipment, with naval forces arriving soon thereafter. This method would avoid the political friction the United States has encountered in Japan and South Korea and allow U.S. soldiers to remain at bases inside the United States that have better training facilities and provide better living arrangements for soldiers and their families.

This new method of providing security for the southwest Pacific remains mostly a theory and will face increasing pressure if Chinese forces eventually threaten easy access to the region. But if the model succeeds, it could call into question the utility of maintaining the existing garrisons on Okinawa and South Korea, which in any case are increasingly untenable as the Chinese missile threat expands. The trick for U.S. military strategists and diplomats will be implementing this more flexible deployment model while simultaneously reassuring regional partners that U.S. security commitments are as firm as ever. As pressures increase, that trick may not be easy to pull off.

Does the Army need to prepare for another Afghanistan-sized training effort?

It took 20 hours this week for Afghan police and international troops to subdue the Taliban insurgents who attacked several high-profile sites in downtown Kabul, including the U.S. Embassy compound. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker described the attack as "not a very big deal," while the coalition military commander, Marine Gen. John Allen, conceded that the Taliban "did get an IO [information operations] win on this." Eleven Afghan civilians, four police officers, and 10 insurgents were killed during the battle.

Although the attack did not display much Taliban expertise or have much lasting effect, it raises questions about whether the effort to train Afghan security forces is on track. Last week the Rand Corp. released "Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan," a detailed study of the training program and its lessons for future large-scale training efforts. The report described the immense challenges specific to the Afghan case and cataloged numerous suggestions to improve the program.

The Pentagon and the rest of the U.S. government have learned quite a lot about security force assistance from Afghanistan. There is a near-consensus among policymakers that successful assistance programs elsewhere in the world should be an effective and low-cost way of both preventing conflict and lowering the probability of future U.S. military interventions. The question for the Pentagon is whether the Afghanistan case, with its high level of difficulty, should be the standard scenario that U.S. forces prepare for.

The Rand authors found numerous shortcomings with the Afghan security force assistance program during the time of their field research. That research wrapped up in 2009 just at the time U.S. policy in Afghanistan was undergoing a major overhaul, many changes in top leadership occurred, and a large infusion of additional troops, equipment, and money came in. The researchers found that the assistance effort in Afghanistan lacked a tight linkage to the actual security requirements in the country, lacked appropriate measurements for tracking progress, and did not match up well with the enfeebled capacities of the rest of the Afghan government. In spite of the steep challenges of training an indigenous army in war-torn and largely illiterate Afghanistan, much has improved since 2009, some perhaps due to the interaction between the researchers and the training staff in Afghanistan.

U.S. policymakers have high hopes for using security force assistance to build up regional deterrence, help partners prevent insurgencies and lawlessness, and reduce the demand on U.S. forces for global security. Security force assistance and foreign internal defense training are normally tasks for special operations forces. But the training requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq were so large that conventional forces were drawn into the effort. The U.S. Army established new doctrine and wrote training manuals for conventional combat units reassigned to assistance duties.

But a sharp reduction looms for the Pentagon's budget, with the Army facing a substantial cut to both its force structure and very likely its training budget (indeed, the assistance effort in Afghanistan is getting a big cut). The Army envisions its combat forces having mastery of "full spectrum operations," which could range from complex high-intensity offensives to "wide area security," peacekeeping, support to civil authorities -- and security force assistance.

But reductions in manpower and money for training will likely require officials to set priorities and make choices. Regarding security force assistance, Pentagon leaders will have to make a judgment about how many training resources should be consumed preparing conventional ground combat units for training duties. Do policymakers predict another "worst case" Afghanistan-scale assistance scenario, requiring training resources far above the capacities resident in the special operations forces? If so, in what other areas of conventional readiness are they willing to take risks?

Over the past decade, U.S. soldiers have learned a lot about training indigenous security forces. Skill at security force assistance is a major U.S. asset just like aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and missiles. And it will have to compete with those other assets during the looming budget crunch.

Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Greg Johnson/U.S. Navy via Getty Images

Small Wars

This Decade at War

What have we learned about combat since 9/11?

After a decade of adaptation, the war against terrorists disappears into the shadows 

War is frequently a matter of experimentation and trial-and-error. The wars of the past decade have been no exception. The United States has churned through several warfighting doctrines over the past ten years as elusive adversaries and looming political and financial constraints have forced policymakers to adapt. We are currently witnessing an accelerating decline in the size of the military effort against terrorism. Increasingly, the war against terrorists is fought in the shadows, out of sight, and by civilians or a few commandos seconded to civilian commanders. The vast majority of the U.S. military will soon exit the wars that 9/11 started. And the arrival of heavy financial and political constraints will force U.S. policymakers to develop a real national security strategy for the first time since 1950s. As other security challenges rise up, the War on Terror is already becoming a backwater.

COIN is out, civilian warfighters are in

Actual combat has always ground up and thrown out warfighting doctrines and theories. There will undoubtedly be a great debate in the years ahead whether modern Western counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, with its focus on protecting and winning over the indigenous population, is a realistic approach.

Several years ago, it was accepted that the only suitable end state in Iraq and Afghanistan that would work for Western interests was one where strong and stable governments in both countries kept out terrorist sanctuaries. U.S. and other Western military forces would conduct major combat operations to clear away extremists, followed by counterinsurgency patrolling to protect the population, and training indigenous forces to take over security operations.

That model may yet succeed in Iraq and (less likely) in Afghanistan. But with political patience and money having run out, U.S. political leaders will do everything possible to avoid another COIN campaign in the future.

Instead, civilian policymakers in Washington have found much to like with the discrete (and discreet) killing done by the CIA's drones and the Joint Special Operations Command's (JSOC) raiders, particularly this May's successful operation in Abottabad. By contrast, over the past several years they have questioned the benefit of COIN patrolling. The costs -- in lives, money, and political support -- they now know all too well. Meanwhile, nearly every day the CIA and JSOC report to the president on the terrorist operatives they have killed, at relatively low cost and with measurable benefits to security.

Budget outcomes now demonstrate the policymakers' revealed preferences. In the past decade, Congress has rewarded the CIA's counterterrorism staff with a nearly seven-fold expansion while JSOC has grown by 14 times. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army's conventional ground combat forces, those needed for counterinsurgency patrolling, face a cut of at least 22 percent.

As I have discussed previously, the fight against terrorists and irregular adversaries is rapidly becoming "civilianized." For U.S. policymakers, it is more convenient and effective to fight this war in the shadows using intelligence officers, paramilitaries, local proxies, contractors, and special operations soldiers seconded to intelligence agencies (as was done in the bin Laden raid). After a decade of experience, U.S. officials have figured out that they get the best results by employing some of the same tactical advantages enjoyed by their adversaries, such as using civilian guise, establishing cellular networks, and operating in a borderless world. This style of fighting leaves out conventional military formations, whose role in War on Terror will soon wind down.

The Pottery Barn Rule is repealed

The Western intervention in Libya presents another interesting case of how the views of civilian leaders have changed over the past ten years. Although humanitarian concerns, not terrorism, sparked the intervention, Western military power was crucial in driving the Qaddafi regime from power. Now Libya faces the same "post-conflict" stabilization issues that Afghanistan and Iraq faced after Western intervention toppled regimes in those countries. But in a break from the Afghanistan and Iraq cases, the U.S. and European government have repealed former Secretary of State Colin Powell's 2003 "Pottery Barn Rule" referring to Iraq -- "you break it, you own it."

Instead, Western governments have pledged to let Libya's rebels sort out the future, come what may. A few years ago, when political and financial capital was more plentiful, U.S. politicians felt a greater obligation to clean up after themselves. They also felt compelled to spend whatever was required to ensure that a pro-Western regime emerged. Today, they no longer have the money to worry about those concerns.

Thanks for being a hero -- here is your pink slip

The past decade of combat has been a demanding teacher for junior leaders in the Army and Marine Corps. Fighting has been decentralized, requiring these organizations to delegate authority and responsibility down to small unit leaders. As a result, these leaders have now developed leadership and decision-making skills they would not have otherwise gained.

But in a cruel irony, these young sergeants and officers, the ones who were placed under the most pressure and put at the most risk, are now most likely to be laid off, as the Pentagon cuts its budget in the years ahead. With irregular warfare becoming civilianized, the role for conventional ground forces in ongoing operations will rapidly shrink. In addition, the major security challenge for the United States is now in East Asia and the southwest Pacific, a mission primarily for the Navy and Air Force.

The United States still needs substantial ground combat power, both as a hedge against a variety of contingencies and as a source for special operations soldiers and other specialists who will lead the fight against irregular adversaries. The challenge for the Pentagon will be figuring out how to retain adequate ground power at a much reduced cost. One solution might be to expand the number of military reserve units, with improved plans to quickly regenerate ground combat power during crises. If nothing else, a larger force of reservists, who are both civilians and soldiers, might improve the linkage between the civilian and military worlds, the chasm between which is likely to expand in the years ahead, as U.S. military tasks and personnel become even more specialized and technically focused.

A new golden age for grand strategists

The coming era of budget austerity and political constraints on the use of military power will bring back the importance of grand strategy to policymaking. During the period of U.S. hegemony after the Cold War, strategy and strategists were ignored. Sandy Berger, President Bill Clinton's national security advisor from 1997 to 2001 (the recent apex of U.S. hegemony) expressed his disdain for strategic theorizing by declaring that he would instead, "worry about today today and tomorrow tomorrow." During this period, when many policymakers believed there were few external financial or political limits on their policy options, strategy appeared to have little relevance and therefore merited little attention.

Strategy is all about matching up scarce resources against a set of ranked strategic priorities and likely adversary responses. When policymakers perceived that they enjoyed nearly unlimited resources and weak adversaries, careful attention to priorities and resource decisions were thought unnecessary.

Of course, that world is now long gone for U.S. policymakers. The looming crash in the Pentagon's budget while China's continues to expand at a 12 percent annual rate after inflation should be enough to focus policymakers' minds. A new golden age for long-ignored security strategists is arriving as policymakers look for advice on how to match shrinking resources against expanding challenges.

With China rising, can the Pentagon afford a War on Terror?

To realize how much has changed in the past decade, consider (hypothetically, I hope) how the United States would respond today should terrorists in some ungoverned territory achieve another 9/11-style mass casualty attack inside the United States. Clearing that territory with major combat operations, followed by stabilization, counterinsurgency, and nation-building, is not likely to be the U.S. response. Much more likely would be a punitive raid, with CIA drones and JSOC periodically following up against the survivors. 

Such an approach may not accomplish much in the long run. But it won't risk much either, which is now a much important consideration than it seemed to be in 2001. Shoring up East Asia is now the Pentagon's main task; fighting terrorism is a secondary concern. That's what's changed over the past ten years.

Mark Wilson/Getty Images