This Week at War: Let's Talk About China

A new book argues that it's time to have an open conversation about the security challenges posed by the Middle Kingdom's rise, even if Beijing gets offended. 

BY ROBERT HADDICK | SEPTEMBER 23, 2011

A Contest for Supremacy calls on America's China-watchers to get real

In the preface to A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, Aaron Friedberg, an international relations professor at Princeton, describes how, in the waning months of the Clinton administration, he was hired to review the U.S. intelligence community's assessment of China. The experience, he says, left him deeply troubled about what he saw coming between China and the United States. By contrast, the "China hands" he knew in and out of the U.S. government "seemed to believe that a Sino-American rivalry was either highly unlikely, too terrifying to contemplate, or (presumably because talking about it might increase the odds that it would occur) too dangerous to discuss. Whatever the reason, it was not something that serious people spoke about in polite company."

Like tossing a dead skunk into a garden party, A Contest for Supremacy aims to shake things up among the foreign-policy elite inside the United States. Friedberg presents all of the arguments employed in favor of optimism and complacency regarding the trends facing the United States in East Asia then systemically shoots them down. His book is the most thorough wake-up call yet regarding the security challenges presented by China's rise. It is also a plea to have an honest conversation about the difficult questions facing the United States in Asia. 

The book's straightforward organization bolsters Friedberg's arguments. The first four chapters summarize the history of China's dealings with the West and explain the origins of the Middle Kingdom's rivalry with other great powers, including the United States. Thucydides and Bismarck would quickly recognize Friedberg's description of a rising China that has growing interests and that sees that it must take action to defend its position. The unfortunate fact that China's new interests overlap with those of the current dominant power is nothing new in the history of great-power collisions.

The second section of the book discusses China's view of its strategic situation. Friedberg draws extensively from Chinese sources to describe Beijing's view of the United States and the Chinese leadership's conceptions of its long-term interests and probable grand strategy. According to Friedberg, China's leaders view the United States not as a status quo power, but as a revisionist force determined to one day overthrow one-party rule inside China. This argument may come as a surprise to those in the United States who thought a revisionist China was challenging the status quo United States. 

Friedberg analyzes why, in addition to its economic potential, China is such a difficult challenge for U.S. policymakers. It has been two centuries, with its struggles against Britain, since the United States faced a strategic adversary that was simultaneously a broad and deep trading and financial partner. Friedberg catalogs the numerous business and academic interests inside the United States that profit from their relationships with China and who seek to downplay the strategic rivalry. Finally there are China's tactics, which emphasize patience and outwardly profess modesty about China's intentions and capabilities. Meanwhile, according to Friedberg, China seeks "to win without fighting" by establishing alternative networks and alliances that will eventually supplant and replace those global institutions created and defended by the United States and its allies.

After conducting a net assessment of China's and America's hard and soft power, Friedberg concludes with an analysis of the strategic options available to U.S. policymakers. He has little regard for the idea that being firm with China's leaders will merely catalyze an avoidable conflict. For Friedberg, China's rulers are tough and thick-skinned realists whose decisions will benefit from a firm U.S. approach and who, by contrast, could tragically miscalculate if they perceive American vacillation. He recommends reinforcing conventional military deterrence, reaffirming U.S. alliances in Asia, and taking steps to maintain U.S. research and technological advantages. Perhaps most important is Friedberg's plea for U.S. policymakers and citizens to openly discuss the adverse trends facing the United States in East Asia and to reject the idea that merely discussing these issues will create a confrontation.

The fragility of China's internal situation and the cresting in two decades of its demographic advantage do not escape Friedberg's scrutiny. Although Chinese leaders have displayed caution and patience, the window will close on their ability to take advantage of their growing power. With the next decade or so possibly being the most dangerous, there is all the more reason for both U.S. policymakers and the electorate to engage the difficult arguments presented in his book.

STR/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS:
 

Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal.

DODOBIRD

6:50 PM ET

September 24, 2011

nascent military threat to Middle East peace?

the upper banner caption read, ChangDu military region send Engineering Battalion to Lebanon for assitance;

- presumably under mandate of UN peacekeeping force, or possibly just to ingrate themselves w/ Arabs,

the right & left caption said, faithfully execute the mission, and help to maintain world peace!

Gasp! what affrontry, no shame?

 

EZRA

5:51 AM ET

September 25, 2011

?

"He recommends ... reaffirming U.S. alliances in Asia."

I would have said just the opposite. The US should, as gently as possible, withdraw from its east Asian alliances. Let Japan, S. Korea, Vietnam, et. al., feel the fear of being exposed to a China that could defeat each of them piecemeal. Then they will do one of two things: acquiesce in Chinese hegemony, or band together to fight it. Which one they choose depends on how they judge the likelihood of winning. If they believe they are strong enough together to counterbalance China, they will do so; if they believe even their combined strength will not be sufficient, they will seek individual accommodations. At present, I would say the advantage lies with this hypothetical anti-China alliance, but that advantage is diminishing. The US must therefore implement this policy right away. The same policy pursued ten or twenty years from now may well have the opposite effect.

Having an explicit alliance with any country is really only a matter of convenience, of formalizing a relationship that already exists naturally. In the event of war, Japan et. al. will be forced to seek an American alliance if their own strength is insufficient. The trick is to arrange it so that if/when a general war breaks out, the US is not involved at first. Let China and an anti-Chinese alliance fight it out for a spell; thereafter, the US may become involved, if necessary. This is, of course, exactly the opposite of the current US "tripwire" policy.

Of course, there is little hope for any constructive change as long as a leading contender for the presidency of the US makes foreign policy decisions based on what Zeus says, oh, wait, I mean Jehovah.

 

SAIF UR REHMAN

12:21 PM ET

September 25, 2011

option for taiwan

Rather americans thinking options of strike,counter strike or preemptive strikes for taiwan, why dont Taiwanese people think for themselves that is it not better to combine with mainland rather be divided and give a chance for the foreigners to intervene? Afterall both mainland and taiwan are chinese.

 

XINGLONGNITE

1:24 AM ET

September 26, 2011

China policy is subject the US can't discuss in the open

The long stream of US policies toward china has neither been just nor moral. Had China just disappear like Iraq or Libya everthing would be alright to talk about. But China didn't. The more we discuss about China the more awkward and incoherent our policies toward China will become. So it's better to let everhthing be cloaked in a thick fog of mystry, so that one day it could be gradually undo or changed without raising much a fuss.

 

BIG THINK

3:15 PM ET

September 26, 2011

is Taiwan worth it?

What would be the threat to US interests if we supported the PRC policy of reintegrating Taiwan into the greater (and true) China much the same as how Hong Kong has survived the British giving it back to them?

Why should we risk our relationship with China now that the "cold war" BS of backing "the Peanut" Chiang-kai shek's legacay is over? He didn't help us a bit against fighting the Japanese in WWII. We"ve dumped billions of dollars into Taiwan - for what? Why should we continue to risk the future for idealogical nostalgia? Do Americans support going to war with China over who does or does not control the Formosa straights?

The USA has always had much better relations with the chinese than the Europeans have had. The future is at our doorstep. We need to pull our heads out of where the sun doesn't shine and place much greater importance on forging permanent and long-lasting relations with the PRC.

 

SARAHZ

7:28 PM ET

October 11, 2011

U.S vs. China-A Hidden Rivalry

Friedberg’s analysis does bring the unspoken ugly truth that is lurking in between U.S and China to the surface, in spite of the constant evasion, denial and rubbishing of the same by both these countries. China has slowly risen to be a great power posing a potential threat to the hegemony of U.S in the East Asia. U.S’ sale of Arms to Taiwan has put both these vitalzym countries on the radar of China and it will not be long before it acts vindictively against these nations. U.S should devise new strategies to address this issue.

 

YARINSIZ

7:18 PM ET

October 18, 2011

The same policy pursued ten

The same policy pursued ten or twenty years from now may well have the opposite effect. Having an explicit alliance with any country is really only a matter of convenience, of formalizing a relationship that already exists naturally. In the event of war, Japan et. al. will be forced to seek an American alliance if their own strength is insufficient. seslichatThe trick is to arrange it so that if/when a general war breaks out, the US is not involved at first. Let China and an anti-Chinese alliance fight it out for a spell; thereafter, the US may become involved, if necessary. This is, of course, exactly the opposite of the current US "tripwire" policy