Atomic Dogs

Why can't the world's nuclear energy watchdog do anything about Fukushima or Iran's weapons program? I went to find out.

BY KONSTANTIN KAKAES | SEPTEMBER 28, 2011

The Incident and Emergency Center of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is on the eighth floor of the organization's headquarters building in Vienna. It is a low-ceilinged room, with a small conference table and a handful of cubicles, that somehow manages to be claustrophobic despite its expansive views toward the center of the city -- one set of windows looks down on the IAEA's plaza, where over 100 national flags line a fountain; the other looks across the Danube. It was a gray and stately vista of European order the day I visited.

For almost two months following Japan's March 11 earthquake and tsunami, which triggered a still-unfolding crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the room was staffed around the clock by 230 IAEA staff members working in shifts. I asked Elena Buglova, the Incident and Emergency Center's (IEC's) director, what they had accomplished during their 24/7 alert. "We did accomplish the activities of the IEC in line with the plans and procedures agreed in advance, which were known to member states, which were known to the competent authorities," she said. These are some of the plans and procedures Buglova followed, which she showed me on a slide: Fundamental Safety Principles; Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety; Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency; Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency; and, lastly, the Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency.

But for all this preparedness, even as the Fukushima Daiichi plant leaked a radioactive cloud into the atmosphere, all Yukiya Amano, the IAEA's head, could do was relay reassuring messages from the Japanese government, bound as he was by IAEA regulations limiting his authority. Even Buglova couldn't tell me what any of this had actually accomplished.

I was in Vienna for the IAEA's annual General Conference -- a chance for the ambassadors of the 151 IAEA member states to take stock of the past year and make plans for the next. Assorted VIPs also make an appearance, including U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu, the highest-ranking American official there.

In a week in Vienna I heard exactly one person -- George Felgate, head of the World Association of Nuclear Operators -- express some sense of responsibility for the disaster. "Did we fail? Yes, we did," Felgate said, referring to the Fukushima plant's lack of preparation for a massive tsunami and the resulting loss of electrical power. By contrast, Amano's opening statement went directly to the public reaction: "[Fukushima] caused deep public anxiety throughout the world and damaged confidence in nuclear power," he said. Amano's attitude was not one of contrition, but rather was directed at how to assuage public fears, the implication being that such fears stem from ignorance and could not possibly be well-founded.

Can the IAEA prevent the next Fukushima? Can it prevent the spread of nuclear weapons? I'd come to find out the answer to these questions. And the answer, which saddened me and should sadden you, is no. The story of the IAEA is a story of good intentions getting tangled in officiousness. It is a place where the dominant culture prevents smart people from taking risks. Its mandate is limited by law, but also by an attitude that revels in these limitations.

The week-long conference began on Monday morning, Sept. 19. For the next three days, each member state made its statement, with sessions sometimes going late into the night. Without fail, each of these would ritually include congratulations to the conference's new president, Romanian diplomat Cornel Feruta; condolences to the people and government of Japan; and then a welcome to the new IAEA members: Commonwealth of Dominica, the Kingdom of Tonga, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. (There was some confusion when Mozambique's energy minister mixed up Dominica and the Dominican Republic.)

SAMUEL KUBANI/AFP/Getty Images

 

Konstantin Kakaes is a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation. He reported this piece with funding from the International Reporting Project and the Stanley Foundation. Follow him on Twitter @kkakaes.

HASS

9:03 PM ET

September 28, 2011

The author is plain wrong on oh so many points.

The people who need to be 'stopped' by the IAEA are not Iran and the Japanese but the US and Israel.

First of all, the IAEA has explicitly stated that none of the so-called hidden activities by Iran had any relation to a nuclear weapons program. Iran was forced to engage in some clandestine activity which was otherwise quite legal (to import nuclear centrifuge technology for example) because the US was busy pressuring other countries to not cooperate with Iran's nuclear program - the same nuclear program that the US encouraged Iran to build in the first place. Fordow was not "built in secret" and furthermore, Iran was not even required to declare its existence under the terms of its safeguards agreement, which only requires disclosure of a facility 180-days prior to the introduction of nuclear material in it, and not when it is in the planning/construction phases. In fact, the duties of Iran with respect to the IAEA are explicitly spelled out in Iran's safeguards agreement, which in its very first paragraph states clearly that its "exclusive purpose" is to ensure that no nuclear material has been diverted to non-peaceful uses - something the IAEA has certified to be the true in every single report it has issued on Iran, meaning that Iran is and always has been in full compliance with its obligations under the NPT.

Iran and the IAEA made a list of issues to be resolved in Aug 2007, and by Feb 2008 all of them had in fact been resolved with zero evidence of nukes found. Even the US accuses Iran not of having an actual nuclear weapons program, but of seeking the "capability" to make nukes at some indefinite point in the future - a nonsense charge that can be applied right now to about 40 other countries and soon to over 100 since any country with even a civilian nuclear technology could in theory use it to make nukes. Despite this, Iran has repeatedly offered to place additional restrictions on its nuclear program well beyond its legal obligations under the NPT - such as the offer to cap enrichment, to ratify the Additional protocol, and to open its nuclear program to joint participation with the US - but these and many other Iranian compromise offers have been ignored simply because the nuclear issue is just a pretext, just as WMDs in Iraq were pretexts, and even former IAEA head Elbaradei has noted that the US is using the nuclear proliferation claim as an excuse for its real goal: regime change in Iran. Thus, no matter what Iran does, no matter how many inspections it allows etc. the issue will not be resolved to the satisfaction of the US. This was already proven when Iran suspended enrichment for 2.5 years as a good faith gesture of compromise, only to face moving goalposts and increasing demands from the US.

The author is also wrong when he says that nuclear-armed countries are happy to export nuclear know-how. In fact since the late 1970s the US has led an effort to attempt to deny developing countries the technology to produce their own nuclear fuel thru enrichment, ostensibly on the grounds that thjs would allow them to make nukes but in fact it creates an illegal monopoly on the supply of reactor fuel by the few countries that have granted themselves the right to it whilst attempting to exclude everyone else. This has been the subject of a continuing dispute between developing and developed countries for a long time, a dispute and conflict that the West is not keen to acknowledge but which exists nonetheless.

Furthermore, the author seems to conveniently forget that in addition to sharing nuclear technology, and not making nukes, there is a third element to the NPT: the obligation of nuclear-armed countries to disarm. With all the emphasis on non-proliferation we forget that disarmament is also a part of the NPT, an obligation that the nuclear-armed states have blatantly declared to be non-binding. The US has in particular violated other duties under the NPT, the duty to NOT share nuclear technology with non-signatories - such as India and ISrael.

 

HASS

3:12 AM ET

September 29, 2011

What the Europeans say . . .

I suggest the author read and address the points made by 6 former European ambassadors to Iran on the nuclear question (note that this op-ed was totally ignored in the US media)

Iran is not in breach of international law
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/09/iran-nuclear-power-un-threat-peace

 

CYBERFOOL

3:36 PM ET

September 29, 2011

NPT signers

No, there are 4 countries that haven't signed the NPT. Israel, Pakistan, India & Republic of China. North Korea did sign it, but later they withdrew - while developing nuclear weapons. ROC follows the treaty even though they didn't sign it. The NK status is highly troubling for those that see Iran heading down the same path.

 

MAIGARI

4:46 PM ET

September 29, 2011

Iran's weapons program?

Obviously the writer has just one mission viilify Iran. How many NUCLEAR bombs does tha U.S have; is the U.S. a signatory to the NPT and has the U.S. kept faith with the Treaty on Israeli weapns programme?
This whole facade of Iranian bomb is taking credulity too far. Yes Iran signed the NPT, does that in anyway make it subservient to U.S. interests? The issue is simply beyond Israeli fears, no, it is more to do with the reckless American policy in the Middle East and unfortunatelybecause the U.S. has kindled the Sectarian divide, it must be seen to be on the Sunni side no more no less!
I am really suprised that the Iranians have NOT withdrawn and dare the U.S on this issue. The whole world knows the facts but because of the dominant power status of the U.S. or economic interests, many are cowed,

 

BENIGN ZIONIST

10:22 AM ET

October 2, 2011

An ashamed Israeli Jew

Ashamed of these Jewish nutcases like JGARBUZ whose mouths are watering to start Holocaust II, this time on the Musiims.

 

YARINSIZ

3:54 PM ET

October 25, 2011

This whole facade of Iranian

This whole facade of Iranian bomb is taking credulity too far. Yes Iran signed the NPT, does that in anyway make it subservient to U.S. interests? The issue is simply beyond Israeli fears, no, it is more to do with the reckless American policy in the Middle seslichat East and unfortunatelybecause the U.S. has kindled the Sectarian divide, it must be seen to be on the Sunni side no more no less!

 

GINCHINCHILI

3:11 AM ET

October 27, 2011

Future of Nuclear Energy

The issue is the next IAEA set of the Iranian nuclear threat is a result of be published the following month. Before he is able to disclose the surveillance data on Tehran’s nuclear development programme, Yukia Amano must obtain a permission to do this. Meanwhile, the U.S. Britain and France are pressing for that disclosure from the data. This is because the info could make up-thevisual impact muscle building reviewfoundationfor the discussion on new UN Security Council sanctions on Iran. Based on the Associated Press, Russia and China think that this kind of action would drive Iran right into a corner and lower its readiness to cooperate using the IAEA, says a Russian-Chinese document.