The End of the Innocents

How America's longtime man in Southeast Asia, Jim Thompson, fought to stop the CIA's progression from a small spy ring to a large paramilitary agency -- and was never seen again.

BY JOSHUA KURLANTZICK | NOVEMBER 3, 2011

By the time Jim Thompson reached his cramped corner of the temporary U.S. legation in Thailand each morning in 1946, a small crowd had already formed waiting to see him. In the soupy, humid air, they squatted on their haunches, chewing sour mango slices and dried pork skins, waiting for their savior, the best-connected intelligence man in Indochina, a man unaware that he would soon be among the last of a dying breed -- a lone idealist in an increasingly power-hungry, militarized CIA that would never be the same again.

Thompson pushed through the waiting crowd and grabbed his seat. There were Thais in the crowd, but mostly Laotians, Cambodians, and Vietnamese from resistance groups fighting the French colonists. Most afternoons, these nationalist fighters would come to see Thompson, but on weekends Thompson often tried to catch a flight to the Thai northeast, where tens of thousands of Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians lived and where Ho Chi Minh's forces had built a sizable operation.

Thompson made little effort to conceal his sympathies for these militants. He quietly met regularly with the prime minister of the Free Laos movement, who was living secretly in Bangkok; brought the leaders of the Free Cambodian groups to meet with other U.S. officials; and even got a clandestine rendezvous with Prince Souphanouvong, a leftist member of the Lao royal family who, during the Vietnam War, allied himself with the communists and would become known as the Red Prince.

When Lao militants launched a brief border war with French forces in Laos, Thompson traveled to the Lao border to negotiate a truce. He had been winning their trust on foot, walking day after day through Vietnamese refugee camps, Lao villages, and Cambodian towns just inside Thailand's borders, where these refugees had set up replicas of home, complete with stalls serving steaming bowls of pho, sticky rice, and charred pieces of gamy grilled chicken. Arriving at the Thai border after reports that fighting was breaking out along the frontier and that men, women, and children were fleeing with their possessions into Thailand, Thompson was a calming presence.

In Thailand's northeast, where Thompson traveled with Tiang Sirikhanth, a populist sympathetic to the anti-French insurgents, he assured the Indochinese insurgent leaders that they would eventually get their independence, with America's backing. "The sooner the European suckups of the State Department realize that the days of colonies are over, the better," he wrote in one letter back to the United States. "I see a great deal of the Laos, the Vietnamese, and the Indonesians here and they are a very intelligent bunch and not ones to be fooled."

Working first in the Office of Strategic Services and then for the CIA, which at the time was trying to broker some kind of exit for France from Asia, Thompson had contacts among the Lao, Cambodian, and Vietnamese militants that no one else had. But despite his enormous knowledge of the Southeast Asians, Thompson seemed to understand little about his own agency; he knew the people he was working with needed help and assumed that the United States would come to their aid.

The Laotians brought together all of Thompson's beliefs all at once: his idealistic anti-imperialism, his desire to help the most alienated and hopeless of people, his need to have a mission that was his alone. Because no one else in the U.S. mission focused on the Laotians -- even though, one day soon, Laos would become vital to American interests -- Thompson basically ran the operation himself.

Thompson did not only have a unique affection for Laotians; he truly believed that, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt had promised during World War II, the United States would help free countries from colonial masters and set them on the road to democracy. Neighbors on all sides of Thailand -- Indochina, Burma, India, and Indonesia -- were deep in it. "Jim was an idealist, a romantic, an anti-imperialist, and there was no more idealistic time than just after the war," remembered Rolland Bushner, who served in the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. "We had stood with the anti-colonialists, the democrats, in the war, and we expected that would continue."

 

Joshua Kurlantzick's book, The Ideal Man: The Tragedy of Jim Thompson and the American Way of War, will be released in early November.

HURRICANEWARNING

9:24 PM ET

November 3, 2011

hmmmm...

you know, by almost every account from an insider that i've ever read regarding the CIA it was pretty much considered a failure of an agency, and every-one of those people advocated for a return to more of an OSS-like culture (aka: Para-military). So while I appreciate that there was a way that espionage was practiced during the cold war; it is no longer practiced that way (if it ever really was in the first place), and getting dirty and gritty and para-military is more often than not the only way that makes sense to prosecute its current mission. Understand this, very clearly: without the para-militarization of the CIA post 9-11, we get attacked again, and again, and we are in this war for an even longer time. Heck, if we had HAD the para-military capabilities we have now prior to 9/11, you could infer that we might have averted the attacks all-together, and may even have gotten some MUCH better intel regarding WMD's prior to Iraq. Diplomats and gentlemen are NOT spies, they want to be, but history has shown them to be useless when the chips are down. The best spies are the ones who are trained to get mean, and to go into dangerous situations when the moment calls for it...usually the ones with para-military training.

 

DELTA22

12:34 AM ET

November 4, 2011

"Diplomats and gentlemen are

"Diplomats and gentlemen are NOT spies, they want to be, but history has shown them to be useless when the chips are down."

Maybe, but diplomacy is still very much needed. America has a bad habit of seeing enemies where none exist, and it's only after burning down someone's house that we're left with people who are very angry at us. That's no way for a democracy to act.

 

HOKIEFAN

1:52 AM ET

November 4, 2011

Yeah, what he said; because being mean clearly works

As it did in Iran in '79 and South America in the '80s.

You might drink your own kool-aid and claim para-military organizations could have averted 9/11, but that's just BS. Remember it was the CIA that played a large role (albeit unknowingly) in the creation of the Taliban.

All the CIA's aggresiveness did was kick the can down the road. Just like it did in Iran after the '53 coup.

 

TOMEST05

9:00 AM ET

November 4, 2011

Inflated?

Joshua,

Appreciated the article, and very good piece of reductionist or "small history", and that is meant as a compliment not as an insult. And I do appreciate the fact that you're trying to link the CIA's ascent to the policy table by re-establishing a para-military capability like the OSS had mainly in Europe and SE Asia but even then it's arguable the great effect or import OSS's PM activities had on actual operations, the debate is still hot, so it leads me to believe that it wasn't as effective as one would have it portrayed especially from a parochial standpoint.

While, I would agree with you that many CIA mandarins probably saw PM as the option to get "at the table", I do believe from my readings that even today the discourse rages on within Agency walls regarding the path they want to take as an INTELLIGENCE organization. Most interesting to me is the fact that while the Agency was busying themselves trying to figure out where they should go and who should be leading the charge, a few short years after 9/11, DOD/military quickly discovered that the CIA was not providing the type of tactical/combat/wartime intelligence it needed and so it appears that DOD maintains a much larger intelligence apparatus of ALL the intelligence disciplines than the CIA ever had or probably ever will have, and the also obviously have the greatest military and para-military capabilities.

It was not a mistake that SEAL TEAM 6 was "loaned" to Panetta to grab Bin Laden, the simple fact is that as far as open source materials discuss the Agency alone, after all it's years and chest thumping about para-military, still cannot do simple (and complex) military operations like major raids or assaults. I believe the fact that they do not want to however, is a good thing, and those who have straddled the fence of intelligence and military operations would know that they are different sets of people. Ops people always tend to believe their intelligence is the best and shiniest as it is "from the ground", analyst tend to wait for the perfect nuggets to produce intelligence, so the military soldier is left out in the cold with either hastily collected intelligence or slowly analyzed products. The solution seems to be somewhere in the middle where Analysts meld closer to operators/collectors. And I do believe that is what is going on in the military and intel communities, but as for the larger question of the CIA, we must also take a step back and listen to how they define themselves, the Agency prides itself in being the premier HUMINT organization, I don't think they are, but I think they could be if they just stayed true to their skin and charter. Para-Military is a bright shiny object that like in the movies always offers the "third way" to any complex foreign policy problem, the truth of the matter is, I think the outcomes are at the very best estimate split 50-50, so why not focus on getting the data points right and then making a major military/diplomatic/economic/political decision?

Either way, I digress, great article.

 

WICKBAM

2:30 PM ET

November 4, 2011

The CIA had nothing to do with the Taliban

I don't know why people keep saying that. The Taliban emerged from the power vacuum of the early 1990's in Afghanistan, quite some time after the Soviet withdrawal.

 

HURRICANEWARNING

4:06 PM ET

November 4, 2011

The Taliban were not created

The Taliban were not created by the CIA. The CIA had NOTHING to do with their creation, nor with Bin Laden and AQ. Why do people fail to read actual history on these types of things?

Also, I am confused by some comments here which refer to Para-military ops as "bright and shiny" or wanted by the "Mandarins" at the CIA. In actuality, it is the exact opposite. In the 80's and 90's the CIA had no real PM capability to speak of, and almost all it's intel was coming from official cover operatives stationed under State Dept. cover abroad. This intel, needless to say, is less than useless when dealing with sophisticated intel agencies or non-state actors. Essentially, until around...oh, the last 3 years, the CIA has been a colossal failure of an agency. It was the Mandarins you speak of who wanted to keep it that way, who wanted to keep it like a business, not getting into Para-military ops, and staying safe and clean in their offices, whilst delivering "intelligence" reports from Paris. If the CIA is going to get good at HUMINT, then it better damn well get good at Para-military ops. This is not to say that diplomacy and a lighter touch doesnt have a place as well, but it IS to say, that if you look at the worlds most successful spy agencies (KGB, Mossad etc.) they train their spies to be more than just pretend businessmen. They make sure, through hard paramilitary training, that they have chosen the right people, capable of discretion, good judgement, and explosiveness when needed. Everything I have heard regarding CIA Case Officer training at the Farm is that it is about as PC and unimpressive as one can imagine. We should stop selecting Harvard grads for cushy overseas posts, and start selecting the "RIGHT" people for the job, then training them to the knifes edge. All I'm saying is that the CIA is roundly considered somewhat of a laughing stock by other intel agencies...and for good reason. We should take our national intelligence gathering operations a bit more seriously. Bill Donovan and the OSS certainly did, and that's what the CIA should aim for now.

 

JBROCKLE

5:06 PM ET

November 4, 2011

Hurricanewarning

I disagree with what you say quite rarely and this isn't one of those times. You are dead on.

 

NAVANAVONMILITA

8:35 AM ET

November 4, 2011

I Spy. Why? Cuz I ain't got nothin' better to do.

Your article, as usual, stinks. However, this is the first time I have noticed that some intelligent readers do read your crap. Me included. Self punishment, I guess.

Not para-military, its the military style occupation of a suspect, (practically all Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Yemen and let us not neglect Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Kashmir, (POK) Azerbaijan, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Baluchistan, and any country which has sizable minority of Muslims, such as India).

Go out and get them rascals, rogues and ruffians before they get under your CIA skin. Skin them alive, I say. Smash them. Mash them like boiled potatoes. If and when you get them all, celebrate. You have killed almost one sixth of human population.

One terrorist is born every second, somewhere, including the good old USA, morons. Muslims don't have it registered and patented it, yet.

...and I am Sid Harth@arabuhuru.org

 

MIKEROL

9:15 AM ET

November 4, 2011

OSS/CIA

As the once 9 year old pet of the OSS in Bremen,post 1945, I recall these chaps
as quite wonderful guys. What happened to the them when the OSS

 

MIKEROL

9:21 AM ET

November 4, 2011

OSS/CIA

As the once 9 year old pet of the OSS in Bremen,post 1945, I recall these chaps
as quite wonderful guys. What happened to the them when the OSS became the CIA is what happened to the US - the successor to the European imperialist impulse, leaving a lot of the liberation movements to become beholden to the USSR. Now the US has had no end of S.O.B.s for friends. Recall the unnecessary elimination of Mossadegh, the overthrow of the Guatemalan democracy in 1954. By that time, in less than ten years, the CIA had become the tool of a misbegotten foreign policy which guaranteed further wars and hatred of the US. A paranoid policy.

 

CHARLESFRITH

10:40 AM ET

November 4, 2011

Knights Of Malta

This is mid level machinations. An excellent article otherwise.

 

CHARLESFRITH

10:41 AM ET

November 4, 2011

Knights Of Malta

This is mid level machinations. An excellent article otherwise.

 

WMCCOMNINEL

10:43 AM ET

November 4, 2011

The Era of On-the-Cheap-War-for-Profit

“Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson told peers in 1971 that the Hmong operation was "very cost-effective." In other words, as one historian later wrote, Hmong lives were cheap…Meanwhile, as the war dragged on, the United States abandoned aid projects -- education, health care, and other efforts -- that had accompanied the secret war (as the country would in Nicaragua in the early and mid-1980s and as appears to be happening in Afghanistan today)… The changed focus on running the war from the United States attracted a new breed of military contractors, too, men who saw dollar signs in the secret war -- a young industry of contractors that would grow to be the CIA's essential paramilitary partners.”

The more sensitive ‘not for public consumption’ aspects of today’s semi-secret wars utilize costly ‘security contractor’ corporations which augment the all-volunteer military and compete with the CIA as a paramilitary force. Or are their checks signed by; never mind. Just as long as they don’t draft my son I don’t care how they spend my tax dollars.

The use of the Hmong to wage on-the-cheap-war was the model for how to later operate the post-Vietnam era all-volunteer American military. Use slick commercials to promise Soldiers, Sailors and Marines benefits galore; education, healthcare, VA guaranteed housing loans, fast track citizenship etc. and then thoroughly screw most of them. More than the ascendency of the CIA as a paramilitary organization this ‘Hmongification’ of the American military volunteer is the real legacy of America’s ‘secret wars’. (Think of ‘Hmongification’ as the opposite of ‘gentrification’.)

The sheer number of Vietnam-era veterans assured them political leverage in Washington D.C. but the relatively few scattered war weary veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq (both 1991 and 2003-2012) are politically marginalized. The Patriot Act will quickly quell any upstart veterans seeking recognition and the Occupy Wall Street protests cast a long shadow over them. Combine that with the ‘Great Recession’ and the era of on-the-cheap-war-for-profit may have reached its culmination. Anyone else feel a draft in here?

 

XTIANGODLOKI

10:58 AM ET

November 4, 2011

CIA pulled similiar operations with Tibet before Laos

What the CIA did in Laos wasn't as unique for its time as suggested by the author. It's unique however for any of these operations and people involved to be covered by the media at all today.

 

JSONAS

12:43 PM ET

November 5, 2011

This revelation came in

This revelation came in support of her idea that there was no negotiation between the current administration and the government of Iraq about how long the US military should stay in Iraq

 

FRICHST854

9:40 PM ET

November 30, 2011

HUMINT organization

The answer appears to be somewhere in the centre where Analysts meld nearer to operators/collectors. And that i do think that is exactly what is happening within the military and intel badonkadonk, but when it comes to larger question from the CIA, we should also have a take a step back and pay attention to the way they define themselves, the company is honored in becoming the premier HUMINT organization, I do not think they're, however i think they may be when they just stayed in keeping with their skin and charter.