Syria Comes of Age

An extraordinary population boom fuels the revolt against Bashar al-Assad's regime.

BY DAVID KENNER | DECEMBER 8, 2011

Each day, for 268 days, there have been the same videos: Syrians coming come out of the woodwork, filling alleys in previously quiescent neighborhoods. They have become experts in the art of protest, employing ornate signs and candles to call for the end of Bashar al-Assad's regime and, increasingly, the president's execution. They are killed in steadily increasing numbers -- more than 4,000 by last count, according to the United Nations.

Who represents these protesters is a matter of dispute -- a Syrian opposition delegation was memorably pelted with eggs in Cairo last month by fellow anti-regime activists who objected to the group's apparent willingness to negotiate with the Assad regime. But who the protesters are is no mystery: They are the product of an extraordinary demographic boom in Syria that has left huge swathes of the country disenfranchised and poor. And they are very angry.

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Syria boasted one of the most rapidly expanding populations in the world. The country's population doubled from 5.3 million in 1963 to 10.6 million in 1986, and then more than doubled again during the past quarter-century, to approximately 23 million. Before birth rates began falling in the mid-1980s, only two countries -- Yemen and Rwanda -- had higher fertility rates, according to Youssef Courbage, a researcher at the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris, in a paper titled "Fertility Transition in Syria."

At the peak of Syria's demographic boom, 44 Syrians were born for every 1,000 people, far exceeding the population growth in neighboring Lebanon (30 births per 1,000 people), and dwarfing that in the United States (16 births per 1,000), according to World Bank data. Population growth was also disproportionately focused in the countryside, creating a swelling class of have-nots in the new Syria.

Syria's birth rates have declined in recent years, but still remain equal to other revolutionary states in the Arab world. Twenty-four Syrians were born for every 1,000 people in 2008 -- the same as Egypt, and exceeding Tunisia's rate of 18 births per 1,000 people.

If the areas where these trends have been felt the strongest were superimposed on a map, they would largely line up with the regions of greatest unrest in Syria. From the south in Deraa, where the protests first gained momentum, to the east in Deir al-Zour, this is a revolt of the neglected countryside. It is also a revolt of long-persecuted cities such as Hama and down-and-out suburbs in Damascus and Homs -- neighborhoods that many of the migrants from the countryside call home.

The Syrian government is at least partially to blame for the country's runaway birth rates. As far back as 1956, Youssef Helbaoui, the head of economic analysis in Syria's Planning Department, argued that "A birth-control policy has no reason for being in this country. [Thomas] Malthus could not find any followers among us."

President Hafez al-Assad, who presided over the population spike of the 1980s, followed the same policies as his predecessors. As Courbage notes, he kept contraceptives scarce and argued that high growth rates "have stimulated proper socio-economic improvements." Until 1987, his government even encouraged births by awarding medals and small material gifts to families with over 10 children.

The result is that, in this era of youth revolt, Syria has one of the youngest populations in the Arab world. From the mid-1960s through the 1990s, the proportion of Syria's population below age 15 held constant at roughly half, while the percentage of Syrians older than 70 declined to a meager 3 percent. Even today, after fertility rates have declined, nearly 60 percent of Syrians are believed to be under the age of 20.

LOUISA GOULIAMAKI/AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS: MIDDLE EAST
 

David Kenner is an associate editor at Foreign Policy.

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9:51 AM ET

December 9, 2011

No end of a lesson

The demographic problem confronting Syria is not unique to the area. The US championing of “Globalization” has exerted economic pressure on many nations. The pressure to integrate into the world market finds many countries unprepared for the challenges. Education is one element mentioned by Mr. Kenner. Education for the mass of people in Asian and African, and some European, countries is inadequate. Nations like Syria have few natural resources. In this respect, it shares a commonality with Jordan and Lebanon. Historically, Syria gained its wealth as a transit for goods from the east to the west, and vice versa.

Prior to Hafez al-Asad’s November 1970 coup, Syria suffered many of the divides that Mr. Kenner points out. The very idea of Syrian nationalism was weak as regional, ethnic, and sectarian divisions pulled people apart. The rural-urban divide was active too as traditional Sunni leadership concentrated around Aleppo and Damascus, and rural areas suffered neglect.

Ironically, Hafez gathered support from disenfranchised Syrians such as minorities and rural areas. Not mentioned in the article is extension of roads, communications, electricity, hospitals and schools to rural areas under Hafez’s rule. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regime faced the loss of economic as well as diplomatic and military power. With an outdated economic system, Syria was unready. Attempts to open up the economy did not turn out well. Those connected to the Asads and a number of Sunni business leaders profited. The failure came, Mr. Kenner points out, in that economic benefits did not spread widely enough.

Not brought out in the article is the terrible drought that has struck Syria. The rural areas suffered twice as much as the urban areas. Discontent was rife before the March 2011 protests. Feeling neglected and isolated, these areas were ripe for revolt. It is sometimes skipped over that it was the rural areas that ignited the rebellion--not the urban centers of Aleppo and Damascus. Other elements saw their opportunity to capitalize on the outburst.

It is going to be a big disappointment to many of the dissidents when Bashar al-Asad is removed. Political change will not bring the relief that they anticipate. Once the excitement settles, the hard problems of governing a very divergent country will remain. Problems with the economy and education will not disappear. Regional rivalries, sectarian and ethnic hatreds, rural-urban divide let alone what vision they hold on domestic and international issues will arise. Blogs and cell phones don’t govern. Masses that are disillusioned often turn to those who promise that they can fix things--strong men are always in the wings.