The Damage Done

The 10 big takeaways from America's adventure in Iraq are also clues to its uncertain future. 

BY IAN LIVINGSTON, MICHAEL O'HANLON | DECEMBER 21, 2011


With a wave of over a dozen bombings ripping through Baghdad just a week after U.S. troops officially pulled out, new questions are being raised about the country's ability to stand on its own without U.S. security assistance. Before looking ahead to whether Iraq can withstand a potential new wave of sectarian violence, it's crucial to take measure of where the country currently stands and the effect of eight years of war on its people and institutions.

Shortly after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, researchers at the Brookings Institution began the Iraq Index to keep tabs on how the war progressed. As students of counterinsurgency know, it is difficult to find the right metrics to evaluate how a war effort of this type is going. It is also challenging to obtain reliable data even if relevant metrics have been identified. The most important metrics can also change with time; additionally, some can be leading indicators of change, while others tend to lag broader improvements.

In the war's early days, the general sense of disorder and chaos and the disempowerment of many former Baathists and former soldiers were probably the most important metrics. They augured poorly for the future -- while official U.S. data focused more on restoration of infrastructure and other generally positive indicators that though important may not have been quite as crucial as they seemed at the time. Then U.S. attention turned to building up Iraqi security forces, but, alas, progress in their training, numbers, and equipment could not trump the growing sectarian fissures that were widening within the government, Army, police, and country writ large.

Metrics of violence were recognized as the most important indicators by 2006 and 2007, when the country was being ripped apart. The success of the surge was fairly easy to see, as these numbers plummeted in late 2007 and 2008. Since then, however, tracking Iraq's changes has become harder as progress has slowed and politics have become at least as important as security and quality-of-life indicators.

With U.S. military engagement in Iraq having come to an end, here are 10 key metrics that reveal both the damage wrought by the war and the state of the country that U.S. forces are leaving behind:

Scott Peterson/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS: IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST
 

Ian Livingston is a senior research assistant at the Brookings Institution, and Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research there whose latest book is The Wounded Giant: America's Armed Forces in an Age of Austerity. Additionally, this eight-plus year effort could not have been accomplished without the diligence of Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Nina Kamp, and Jason Campbell. More information on the Brookings indices can be found at www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex.

JESSIE MACIAS

10:18 PM ET

December 22, 2011

Great summation

Ian and Michael, a fantastic summation of the aftermath of the war and what our troops will be leaving behind. Even with these metrics, it's still hard to say... are we (both Iraq and US) worse or better off now than in 2001. The first statistic on the death of US troops is the most obvious, but one I have to be honest never thought of was the casualties of Iraqi civilians. It's just so hard to visualize the landscape of Iraq here looking out the American streets below through tinted windows in the climate controlled comfort of my office.

 

B881428

4:44 AM ET

December 25, 2011

a time of sectarian civil war

a time of sectarian civil war between Sunni community and the public Siah could have been predicted and a matter of time. of the matter, it seems like it takes more U.S.PDF Editor for Mac
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KINIKDEV

10:15 AM ET

December 23, 2011

?raq

the real battle begins now. Status of the Iraqi people very hard-set Kontor Wholesale I hope will find rest for a short time...

 

MIGUEL691

1:36 PM ET

December 23, 2011

I don't think Iraq is

I don't think Iraq is ready... just yesterday i was watching the skies with myorion xt8 when i saw a missile, at least that's what i think i saw...

 

BEATRIZFOFINHA

9:09 AM ET

December 24, 2011

I said

i Agree in "that has finally ended is not yet done! New wars, new soldiers and new people will die. very frustrating. janinasantos" Thanks !
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DONKISSOTES

5:37 PM ET

December 24, 2011

subterfuge US

with the withdrawal of troops the United States indicates that the CIA instruments have entered into civil society iraq. a time of sectarian civil war between Sunni community and the public Siah could have been predicted and a matter of time. of the matter, it seems like it takes more U.S. troops in Iraq so that American troops will eventually go back into Iraq as saviors

 

JUANSOTO12345

1:52 PM ET

December 25, 2011

They will never get out of there

Hope this soldiers learn a lesson and go back home with their families.
diez boligrafos - yeast infection

 

KUNINO

4:54 PM ET

December 25, 2011

A carelessly written piece

I have read sundry criticisms of the Brookings Institution through the years and paid them no mind. This piece from a senior analyst there suggests the critics could well have been on to something I was too obtuse to pick up.

Let's look at Livingston on Iraqi refugees.

Some Iraqi refugees seem to have drowned in the Indian ocean south of Indonesia a few days ago, failing to make it to Australia. Countless more are in refugee facilities of one kind or another, and struggling to do better. Discussing the refugees issue, Livingston guessed that perhaps two million Iraqis had fled their homeland, and perhaps their number was three million. Thus writes the senior analyst. Having not got the figure right, he loses interest in them. Why exactly did they flee their homeland? How many have returned to it? How many plan or hope to? How many plan never to return? How many remain in Syria and Jordan, the border states? How many have fled to other nations? How many died in exile? Again, outside Livingston's interests. How many were Christians (the nation was virtually stripped of its Christian population by 2007)? How many were medical and other professionals? Outside the Livingston interest: one blasted Iraqi in this piece is pretty much like any other.

Similarly, he speaks approvingly of trying to restore electricity generation and supply in Iraq without mentioning what impaired the system in the first place (Hint: not Iraqis), and similarly mentions violence levels in the nation without seeming to consider that what NATO forces were doing there at the relevant time was violent, or homicidal -- as it was, and by design.

Evidently professional rigor means little within the Brookings head office, and Livingston knows that his senior analyses get away with things -- many things -- like his reference to deaths of "as many as 200 to 300 Iraqi Army and police deaths per month." There is only one respectable way to end an "as many as" sentence, and it's a single number. Perhaps he means here 300, perhaps he means 200. Instead of making his analysis clear, he weasels by offering both figures.

His piece stands with one a couple of months back in which a retired US soldier busy shooting up Iraq in the early days of the occupation (i.e., "hero") returned and found the place much improved. This National Geographic piece was illustrated with photographs of a heavily-damaged city in which few readers would care to live. This made that story seem smug. Same thing here.

 

NICOLAS19

8:05 AM ET

December 27, 2011

couldn't have said it better

All these post-war articles are about the same thing over and over again: is Iraq in better shape now than in 2003 (always read: AFTER the bombing/occupation)? This pretense is faulty by design. The comparison should be to apt with the Iraq BEFORE the bombing/occupation.

Why? Because all damage done to Iraq is attributable the America and its allies. Yes, even the suicide bombings, because they are the failure of the security establishment of the occupier.

More to the point. The apparent "good signs" are refugees returning, terror attacks lessening, infrastructure rebuilding, etc. Now, if the Americans didn't destroy Iraq, there would not have been refugees, terror attacks, infrastructural damage, etc. If you expel 2 million people and then see 200.000 return, you are still 1,8 million short. It is always easier to cheer for the 200.000, point at some "good" statistics and pat yourself on the back than to admit the failed, genocidal outcome of the whole campaign.

Now, I know that eight years of failure can't be undone by a week of reminiscence. But please don't add insult to injury by declaring victory, progress and salvation. Bottom line: if you whitewash your failure, convert it into a victory, you give a false example to the next generation and they are bound to make the same mistake. The same happened with Vietnam, result is another pointless, catastrophic war.

 

WILLIEJOE

12:08 AM ET

December 26, 2011

Brookings & other "think" tanks

Well said Kunino. I for one would prefer to apply Bing Wests' 10 rules for US intervention as federal law and ship the "thinkers" off to Iraq and Afganistan with shovels to clean up the mess they proposed and we very foolishly bought.

 

NANJING03

11:41 AM ET

December 26, 2011

Excellent Assessment

Excellent article. In 2006 and 2007, I was in western Iraq (Al-Anbar) as a DOD specialist in support of U.S./Coalition Forces. Iraq was a moonscape of uncertainty, but even then there was hope among segments of the population that the country was destined to pull away from the grip of al-Qaeda on the one side and the threat of sectarian violence on the other. Since then, al-Qaeda was severely mauled and ejected as a viable force with the close help and cooperation of Iraqis from all political persuasions. Notably, the long anticipated -- and even hoped for civil war by detractors here at home -- never came to pass. Unfortunately, many, if not most Americans chose to know little about the Iraq War and where Iraq is today as they desire to sink into 1930s-style Isolationism and foreign policy doldrums.

 

FPLOVERAAA

8:15 PM ET

December 26, 2011

Similarly, he speaks

Similarly, he speaks approvingly of trying to restore electricity generation and supply in Iraq without mentioning what impaired the system in the first place (Hint: not Iraqis), and similarly mentions violence levels in the nation without seeming to consider that what NATO forces were doing there at the relevant time was violent, or homicidal -- as it was, and by design.mkv converterMKV ConverterYouTube Converter for MacYouTube To MP4 ConverterPdf Converter for MacPDF Editor for MacPDF Editor for MacPdf Converter for Mac

Evidently professional rigor means little within the Brookings head office, and Livingston knows that his senior analyses get away with things -- many things -- like his reference to deaths of "as many as 200 to 300 Iraqi Army and police deaths per month." There is only one respectable way to end an "as many as" sentence, and it's a single number. Perhaps he means here 300, perhaps he means 200. Instead of making his analysis clear, he weasels by offering both figures.

 

TTURAIDERS

2:06 AM ET

December 30, 2011

Lesson Learned

Some of the most important take aways from Iraq were:
1. Make sure you have a good relationship with the haji mart where you buy your DVDs so they will take back bad copies.
2. Have plenty of cash to buy the cool t-shirts when hopping from one FOB to another.
3. When briefing the entire USFI command staff via vidieo conference make sure you know how to operate the microphone.
4. Also during those briefings, remember that your image is projected on a 100 foot screen at VBC so don't pick your teeth or nose when you think the camera is not on.
5. You can't buy booze at the FOB so make sure your buddies at the Embassy give some to the diplomats to smuggle in to you when they tour the PRTs.

 

YARINSIZ

7:27 AM ET

January 21, 2012

More to the point. The

More to the point. The apparent "good signs" are refugees returning, terror attacks lessening, infrastructure rebuilding, etc. Now, if the Americans didn't destroy Iraq, there would not have been refugees, terror attacks, infrastructural damage, etc. If you expel 2 million people and then see 200.000 return, you are still 1,8 million short. seslichat It is always easier to cheer for the 200.000, point at some "good" statistics and pat yourself on the back than to admit the failed, genocidal outcome of the whole campaign