The 20 Percent Solution

On Monday, Jan. 9, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran had begun producing 20 percent enriched uranium at Fordow, a fuel enrichment plant buried deep underground near the holy city of Qom. On the surface, there is little new here: Since February 2010, Iran has been producing 20 percent enriched uranium at Natanz, another once-secret site located about 3 ½ hours from Tehran.

Iran disclosed neither the Natanz nor the Fordow site to the IAEA until forced to do so, in 2002 and 2009, respectively, when outside observers discovered and publicized them. Fordow is smaller than Natanz in scale, but better protected from prying satellites and, potentially, a bombing campaign. Worryingly, the plant appears designed to focus on producing higher enrichments.

What has raised the world's suspicions is that Iran continues to produce 20 percent enriched uranium despite the fact that this exceeds its civilian needs and, as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged in September, does not make economic sense.

There are serious concerns over the proliferation aspects of Iran's enrichment activities. Increasing stockpiles of enriched uranium, together with studies related to an advanced nuclear weapon design, are building blocks for attaining a virtual nuclear weapon capability. (A state has a virtual nuclear arsenal if it possesses weapons-usable nuclear material and the knowledge and experience needed to design, manufacture, assemble, and deploy nuclear weapons.) So Iran's recent announcement that it plans to increase production of 20 percent enriched uranium is alarming.

Over the last few days, Iran has begun operating two enrichment cascades at Fordow. Furthermore, Iran is completing installation of two additional cascades, with their planned operation already announced. Once the four cascades at Fordow, in addition to the two Natanz ones, are operating, Iran will be able to produce 15 kg of 20 percent enriched UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) per month. This process uses as feed 3.5 percent enriched uranium, which is produced currently at a rate of 140 to 150 kg UF6 per month at Natanz.

This means that Iran's entire uranium-enrichment program is now being devoted to producing 20 percent enriched uranium. At current production rates, Iran can expect to have a stock of 20 percent enriched uranium of around 250 kg UF6 by the end of 2012, as well as more than 4 tons of 3.5 percent enriched UF6. (These estimates are based on the use of IR-1 centrifuges, which are now also operating at Fordow.) Iran will not likely be able to commission a large number of more advanced and powerful centrifuges before 2013. But if that happens, it will be an altogether different scenario.

If Iran decides to produce weapons-grade uranium from 20 percent enriched uranium, it has already technically undertaken 90 percent of the enrichment effort required. What remains to be done is the feeding of 20 percent uranium through existing additional cascades to achieve weapons-grade enrichment (more than 90 percent uranium). This step is much faster than the earlier ones. Growing the stockpile of 3.5 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium, as Iran is now doing, provides the basic material needed to produce four to five nuclear weapons. With IR-1 centrifuges, it would take half a year to go from 3.5 percent enriched uranium to weapons-grade material for the first nuclear device. More advanced centrifuges would cut the time required in half. If, however, IR-1s are using 20 percent enriched uranium as a feed, 250 kg UF6 with that level of enrichment can be turned to weapons-grade material in a month's time. This does not automatically mean Iran will be able to build a nuclear weapon in one month -- building an atomic bomb is a complex endeavor that requires precision engineering capabilities that Iran may lack -- but it does mean that the country would be able to "break out" of its international obligations very quickly should it decide to do so.

How can Iran convince the international community that its nuclear program will follow a peaceful track?

There are a few ways to go about it. One way would be to suspend the production of enriched uranium and convert the existing 3.5 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium stocks, with the assistance of the international community, to fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, as well as for another modern research reactor that could be provided to Iran. This approach would be good for Iran, as it would give the country a sustainable production of radioisotopes for industrial and medical uses in the shortest time.

Iran would also have to address the world's concerns about the military dimensions of its nuclear program, concerns laid out in the IAEA's most recent monitoring report. So far, Iran's leaders have failed to do so, despite being signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With sanctions beginning to bite, tensions growing in the Persian Gulf, and international patience running out, there's no time like the present.

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BEN10

6:36 PM ET

January 11, 2012

This isn't about enrichment...

On the disingenuous NPT.... http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2749

and http://www.newleftreview.org/A2732

And finally, on Iran http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2011/11/15/norman-dombey/old-news/

VICENTEP

8:57 PM ET

Its not if but when...

By the way things are going is not a question of if they produce but when they produce it.
The problem really is in the lack of good arguments by the west to prevent them from doing it. From morally to geopolitically the west lack its legitimacy to arbitrate in the middle east.
Defense of the state is as important for the iranians as it is for Israel or other powers in the region.
I guess the ones that came up with this technology should have thought about others wanting to have it anyway.
Sure the world will look much worse with more nukes around, but the ones that hold the power to diminish them are hold hypocrite.
Aren't they?

JOHNBOY4546

10:04 PM ET

I have two problems with this article.....

1) I find it very difficult to reconcile these two sentences:
"What has raised the world's suspicions is that Iran continues to produce 20 percent enriched uranium despite the fact that this exceeds its civilian needs and, as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged in September, does not make economic sense."

(Soooooo, Heinonen just claimed that Iran doesn't need 20% enriched uranium)

"There are a few ways to go about it. One way would be to suspend the production of enriched uranium and convert the existing 3.5 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium stocks, with the assistance of the international community, to fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, as well as for another modern research reactor that could be provided to Iran."

(Oh, wait, Heinonen just admitted that Iran *does* need 20% enriched uranium i.e. for the Tehran Research Reactor)

How odd, because those two sentences appear to be at odds with each other.

2) There is a weasel-word in this sentence:
"Iran would also have to address the world's concerns about the military dimensions of its nuclear program, concerns laid out in the IAEA's most recent monitoring report."

The weasel-word is, of course, "concern", which has not at all the same meaning as the word "violations".

Is 20% enrichment a violation of the NTP?
No.

Is Iran refusing to allow IAEA inspections of its facilities?
No.

Have IAEA inspectors detected any uranium being diverted elsewhere?
No.

So what grounds do you have for demanding that Iran cease enrichment?
You are "concerned".

Excuse me for being monumentally unimpressed, because if you were searching for a synonym for "concerned" you'd reach the word "paranoia" well before you get anywhere near the word "violations".

Tell me what Iran is doing that violates its obligations under the NPT, and then you can talk to me about forcing Iran to give up some of its sovereign rights.

You know, like this one: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty."

GREATPET

3:54 AM ET

January 12, 2012

Re:

Regarding the first point, the author doesn't mean that 20% is a level exceeding civilian need, but the *amount* of 20%-enriched uranium that Iran is trying to produced has exceeded reasonable civilian need. (In reality, uranium far above 20% has been used for civilian purposes.)

3:55 AM ET

Typo

produce, not produced

BASE

12:05 PM ET

Spot on JohnBoy4546

One other point of BS in this article:

The NNPT states that disclosure is not necessary until 6 months before the plant is operational. Fordo was not operational until 18 after they disclosed it. The fact that the West 'discovered' this plant is not at all a reason to call them out on the NNPT. There was no violation there whatsoever.

The author appears to be deliberately misleading readers by phrasing it the way that he has. So, lets cry 'bullshit' on that as well...

5:26 PM ET

How much is "too much", GREATPET?

"Regarding the first point, the author doesn't mean that 20% is a level exceeding civilian need, but the *amount* of 20%-enriched uranium that Iran is trying to produced has exceeded reasonable civilian need."

So Iran isn't allowed to stockpile?

Dude, its need for 20% uranium for that reactor stretches off into the indefinite future.
Dude, there is every prospect that its uranium enrichment facilities will Soon Be Pulverized.

Since it has
a) an continuous future need for 20% feed, and
b) every prospect that it will soon be prevented from making any more, then
c) there is every reason for Iran to be stockpiling as much 20% uranium as it can while it can.

Your argument only holds up if Iran can be assured that no-one will interfere with its production, at which point - sure, no argument from me - it makes "economic sense" to run production at a level suitable for its everyday use.

But since Iran can't be sure of that then it makes perfect "economic sense" for Iran to stockpile the stuff while it still possesses the ability to do so.

*sheesh*

Has it ever occured to you or to Heinonen to put yourselves in their shoes?

9:53 PM ET

"what are you, an 8 year old girl?"

Heh, at least I am what I claim to be.

But what about you, Mr US Marine?

10:05 PM ET

"nice chicken and egg comment about stockpiling. "

Nice chickenshit comment, "Marine".

Here's something to consider:
After the 1970s oil shocks the USA decided that it had no choice but to stockpile a Strategic Oil Reserve.

Anyone can argue that it makes no "economic sense" to horde SIX MONTHS worth of oil consumption and, therefore, that horde *must* signify that the USA is planning to do something monumentally evil with that oil.

Correct?

Or does it simply indicate that the USA does not want to be caught with its pant's down, as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Yom Kippur War?

Now, consider this:
Iran has already been caught short once when suppliers reneged on contracts to supply 20% uranium for its research reactor, forcing the Iranians to shut down that reactor.

Economics 101: If you can see a future where something vital may be choked off then it makes perfect sense to stockpile it, even if that requires you to manufacture it at levels far above your immediate needs.

After if that has ALREADY happened to you once before then, honestly, Fool Me Once.....

3:44 AM ET

Uranium Enrichment

1. The Hiroshima bomb uses 50 kg of 88% enriched uranium, and 14 kg of 50% enriched uranium. The author is correct that 20% enriched uranium is not practically useful for weapons, but something as high as 90% is not needed, either, though it works better.

2. Highly enriched uranium is also useful for civilian production of medical isotopes, so technically speaking enriching uranium to levels far above 20% does not conclusively prove there is a weapon program. Having said that, Iran's stubbornness in the presence of Western pressure suggests that Iran is certainly pursuing weapons.

3. I'm doubtful about whether bomb design, at least a crude one, will present much difficulty to the Iranians once they have obtained enough enriched uranium. The Hiroshima bomb was the first uranium-based gun-type weapon to be ever detonated. The only nuclear test preceding Hiroshima bombing is the Trinity Test which used a different fissile material (plutonium) and a different detonation mechanism (implosion). Facing a scarcity of enriched uranium at that time, it was thought that the uranium-based weapon was too simple that it *had* to work, and the bomb did flatten Hiroshima.

4. Once weapon-grade enriched uranium is made, it's anyone's guess where Iran will hide the material across the country. If the US is *really* serious about denying Iran the bomb, early actions are needed. Once the first test bomb exploded, it will be too late, as Iran will likely have stockpiled large quantities of enriched uranium in unknown places.

4:08 AM ET

Of course, the Stuxnet virus

Of course, the Stuxnet virus which damaged Iranian centrifuges, and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists are "early actions" against Iran, but it's clear to me that only military operations can halt, rather than delay Iran's nuclear program. It's interesting to see as Iran makes further progress in the coming years, what further actions we will see against the regime.

6:28 AM ET

Where GREATPET's argument falls down....

... is right here: "4. Once weapon-grade enriched uranium is made, it's anyone's guess where Iran will hide the material across the country. If the US is *really* serious about denying Iran the bomb, early actions are needed."

The flaw is obvious i.e. he has just conveniently taken a leap of logic to jump FROM 20% uranium TO weapons-grade uranium.

And the Iranians simply can not begin to take that first step (i.e. feeding their existing stock of 20% uranium back into the centrifuges) without the IAEA instantly detecting it, which still leaves time for a "serious USA" to take action to take out those enrichment facilities.

If you listen to Leon Panetta he actually spells this out: "Are they trying to develop a nuclear weapon? No. But we know that they're trying to develop a nuclear capability. And that's what concerns us. And our red line to Iran is do not develop a nuclear weapon. That's a red line for us."

The red line is not the *capability* to make nukes, but the *actual* making of nukes.

The instant Iran starts to enrich beyond 20% then the USA will know the Mullahs are starting to make nukes, and that's when you bomb them.

But not a moment before, no, precisely because you don't need to bomb them.

12:11 PM ET

? GREATPET ?

"Iran's stubbornness in the presence of Western pressure suggests that Iran is certainly pursuing weapons"

No it doesn't. Not at all. The only conclusion that you can draw from this is that Iran is taking the position that possessing the capability to create nuclear fuel is their right under the NNPT and that they will be exercising that right.

5:13 PM ET

USMARINESNIPER might like to read that post again

I am quite correct that GREATPET got to his chosen scenario by waving A Magic Wand i.e. he went directly to "weapons-grade uranium" without explaining how Iran can get there.

There is only one way they can make that step, and that is by feeding their existing stockpile of 20% uranium back into the centrifuges, and EVERY SINGLE GRAM OF 20% URANIUM IS UNDER CONSTANT IAEA SUPERVISION.

Get it?

No, of course you don't.

MSAM

7:04 PM ET

To "Marine"

Here you go again, talking out of your back side. "Spotty record of supervison at Natanz' according to whom? this statement is complete non-sense. Ever since enrichment began, the site has been under complete IAEA supervison.

You know, words have meaning, you can't just make up sh#t on the fly and expect to be taken seriously

10:19 PM ET

"How would you know that all of its 20% enriched uranium"

The IAEA knows where all of Iran's uranium is, US Marine.

It knows where all the yellowcake is.
It knows where all the 3.5% enriched uranium is.
It knows where all the 20% enriched uranium is.

It knows that all of the 3.5% uranium has been enriched from all of that yellowcake, and it knows that all of the 20% uranium has been enriched from all of that 3.5% uranium.

In short: it inspects the ENTIRE CHAIN from raw material to finished product, and any discrepencies have been at the level of mere grams of material.

So if Iran has "hidden" weapons-grade uranium from the IAEA then that also means that
a) Iran has previously hidden HUNDREDS of kilograms of 20% uranium, and
b) Iran has previously hidden TONNES of 3.5% uranium, and
c) Iran has previously hidden THOUSANDS OF TONNES of yellowcake
from the IAEA inspectors and from the CIA, Mossad, and Everyone Else.

Which, honestly, simply beggar's belief.

Honestly, USMARINESNIPER, do you know a.n.y.t.h.i.n.g?

REDACTED

7:44 AM ET

Fear Mongering!

The DNI and Panetta both say: Iran has no nuclear weapons program!

Ollis says:

"So Iran's recent announcement that it plans to increase production of 20 percent enriched uranium is alarming. "

OK, yes, and so are Israel's nukes and Pakistan's nukes.

This may be alarming but it is not illegal see:

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=CF319F46-19C3-4378-BCED-E82700FA36C9

SPOOD

11:27 AM ET

Iran is the one trying to generate the fear

Piss poor argument.

Israel and Pakistan they never announced their enrichment and production to the world as they were developing them. Nobody had a clue as to Pakistan's nuclear weapon production until after their test. By then its too late to stop it. Israel never had a test, they just leaked the information years after the fact. Even then it was in response to a diplomatic flap which had to be addressed. Again, nobody had an inkling of their efforts until it was far too late for anyone to stop them.

Iran OTOH is practically calling in the BBC every time they raise their enrichment %. They are so open and obvious as to their intentions and their actions that they are literally inviting the world to stop them. This is not the action of a country which is actually seeking nuclear weapons. It is the action of a nation looking to extort and cajole its neighbors. Exactly like what Kim Jong Il did several years ago.

Iran is playing up its nuclear potential to deliberately create a conflict. They are being coy enough for people who want Iranian nukes to claim its peaceful, but belligerent enough that they will say Iran deserves nukes anyway. Either way its a dishonest argument to make since Iran is obviously advertising its efforts in an openly threatening manner.

Its also dishonest to make much of what the IAEA has found. They have never, ever, ever been effective in curbing a nation's ability to create nuclear weapons. If a nation wants to hide its efforts in this respect, it will stay hidden.

10:30 PM ET

"Piss poor argument. "

Indeed, you are.

"Israel and Pakistan they never announced their enrichment and production to the world as they were developing them."

Neither signed the NPT, and so neither was under any treaty obligations to keep anyone informed of their enrichment or production efforts.

"Iran OTOH is practically calling in the BBC every time they raise their enrichment %."

!!!!!!

Iran signed the NPT, which requires that they agree on an inspection regime with the IAEA, part of with obliges Iran to inform the agency BEFORE they take any steps to raise the level of their enrichment.

Or, in short: Neither Israel nor Pakistan are under any obligation to tell anyone what they are doing, and so they don't. By way of contrast Iran is under an obligation to tell the IAEA, and so it does.

Yet SPOOD considers the latter to be very sinister indeed, while the former is something that should be praised to the heavens.

Bizarre.

Totally and completely bizarre.

2:08 PM ET

huh?

How is announcing what they are doing, and being fully monitored the entire time, generating fear? This makes no sense. It would generate fear if they were doing things that were outside the bounds of the treaty, but they arent. It would generate fear if they were threatening to develop a bomb and drop it on people, but they havent. They are doing explicitly what they allowed to do within the NNPT, which has been done by a couple dozen other countries. What is the fear?

The only people that should be afraid are the Iranians who live within 500 miles of a nuclear site built on a fault line...

HUMANIST_2

8:26 PM ET

Have no time to read? Just watch to 2 videos

This author who is not trusted by Iranians (a long story) does not analyze the issue from a conscientious responsible perspective. Seems he doesn’t see the dark horizons where another unjustifiable vicious war is looming. He sounds the alarms with a new tone, the same false alarms as Sy Hersh (in the video below) says have been sounding for about 20 years.

http://www.democracynow.org/2011/11/21/seymour_hersh_propaganda_used_ahead_of

Fact is no matter what Iran does even if it completely ends its enrichment program the delusional Likudniks (and their Western allies) will concoct new excuses to sadistically sanction Iran (as they did in Iraq), will continue demonizing and destabilizing Iran in order to stage a war for installing a friendly regime or a cowed regime that acknowledges their hegemonic rules..

Delusional planners .....because their chance of success is close to nix. This is because Iran is not comparable to any Middle Eastern country. Today Iran has taken long strides towards the long dreamed independence. Majority of Iranians today are not only literate but as Joe Klein of Time observed are political junkies ( I would say, the size of the march on February 11 proved they are politically savvy).

In their psyche the humiliating long experiences of dictatorships imposed by the UK and US (to plunder their wealth) and the historical eight year war with Iraq are engraved forever.

Likudnik warmongers are blinded by their deep tribal convictions thus are unable to fathom the realities around them. Even if they could repeatedly convert Iran to piles of rebels (far worse than what happened in Iraq) the Iranians will rebuild their country. This assertion can be easily deduced from a close examination of their war with Iraq where, figuratively they fought with their nails and teeth while their foe was using all kinds of weapons including CHEMICAL weapons.

In the following video Hilary Mann Leverett shows Iran avoided manufacturing and using Chemical weapons during that war. This is a very important relevant subject which is masterfully hidden from the general public.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anQmSq6Kz_U

Why Iranians decided not to stoop so low as Saddam? Among other things not using Nerve Gas, Blistering agents or burning the lungs of opponent soldiers subjecting them to slow excruciating death?

Was that decision based on religious, moral or cultural grounds? It really doesn’t matter what the reason was. They just didn’t avenge. If this fact is properly analyzed one direct conclusion could be that the probability of Iranians building any type of WMD is very low.

In my amateurish research I noticed an assertion that Iran had the capability of manufacture chemical weapons. Babak Yektafar of Washington Prism believes Iran had a stock of chemical weapons but he is not sure if Iran ever used any while UN after two years of purposefully delayed investigation concluded Iran never used any kind of chemical weapons.

One has to see the color photos of huge masses of Iranian soldiers and the related close-up photos to sense the gravity of the situation and what a tragic story is the story of chemical weapons in Iran Iraq war.

Then it will be time to praise Iranians for what they did not do, since everyone else would have done it .....including the Swedes?. I suspect Olaf Palme, the Prime Minister of Sweden also indirectly hailed Iranians for resisting the primitive acts of harsh revenge since he arranged treatment of the affected Iranian soldiers in Sweden and most probably supplied Iran with surface to air missiles to shoot the Iraqi planes down.

He was a conscientious observer, this author is not. He apparently has no vision and no heart.

BEINGTHERE

8:24 AM ET

January 13, 2012

This may be true, but who in the U.S. can we trust?

Lots of information on this topic now, much of it apparently vetted. But The People of this country don't know whom or what to believe. This may be a lack of faith in our leadership - President Obama, Leon Panetta and others who should provide official updates of these situations. Instead, we receive what often appears to be leaks from media.

Last fall we heard what sounded like a trumped-up story about a death plot involving a Saudi ambassador, some kind of nebulous Iran connection and a Mexican thug-turned-killer-turned-informant. Sure, this is plausible, but The People have a lack of trust in our own elected officials and media, many of whom have long been in bed with Administration sources and people like David Petraeus, now CIA Director. (That love-in began when he was general and seems to have continued with media who failed then to ask him hard questions about the wars he commanded.)

Well, Americans have a lot to think about these days - survival, in many cases. Media can continue their hype and hand-wringing, and so many of us just say, "So what?"

Foreign Policy Magazine

Iran's provocative uranium-enrichment program is at the center of its confrontation with the West. It's also, potentially, the way out.

BY OLLI HEINONEN | JANUARY 11, 2012

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