
With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict arguably no closer to being resolved than it was a decade ago, one has to wonder: Has the much-vaunted "peace process," hailed by U.S. presidents from both parties, become a charade? The phrase's long history suggests that there's been a lot more process than peace. Now, as Arab uprisings transform the Middle East and Israelis and Palestinians go their separate ways, it may be time to pick a new buzzword: stalemate. --Uri Friedman
1967
After the Six-Day War, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242 calls for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories in
exchange for the end of hostilities and respect for the sovereignty of all
states in the area. The imprecise language neuters the resolution, but the
land-for-peace formula will inform -- or haunt -- peace efforts thereafter.
1973
Egypt and Syria launch coordinated surprise
attacks on Israel in Sinai and the Golan Heights on Yom Kippur. The U.S.-Soviet brinkmanship over the war and the Arab oil embargo highlight the
conflict's geopolitical dimensions, and the United States devotes more
diplomatic muscle to resolving it.
1973-1975
In what the media dub "shuttle
diplomacy," U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger holds bilateral talks with
the Yom Kippur War belligerents, helping defuse the immediate crisis. Kissinger
and his advisors refer to these diplomatic efforts as a "negotiating process"
and then, as the political climate in the region defrosts, a "peace process."
The process stalls as U.S. President Richard Nixon resigns and Six-Day War hero
Yitzhak Rabin assumes power in Israel.
1974
Arab leaders recognize the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) as
the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," transforming
the Palestinian question from one of refugee rights into one of nationalist
aspirations. "I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun,"
PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat informs the U.N. General Assembly a month later. "Do
not let the olive branch fall from my hand."
1975
An influential Brookings Institution study breaks with Kissinger's incremental
peace process, advocating a "comprehensive" Arab-Israeli settlement that would
include Israel's withdrawing to roughly its pre-1967 borders and support of
Palestinian self-determination in return for diplomatic recognition and peace
with its Arab neighbors.
1977
U.S. President Jimmy Carter brings several
authors of the Brookings report into his administration and resolves to pursue
a more ambitious peace process, surprising even his closest advisors by openly
calling for a Palestinian "homeland." Israel's Menachem Begin and Egypt's Anwar
Sadat express an appetite for peace, and Sadat becomes the first Arab leader to
visit Israel.
1978-1979
Sadat and Begin meet with Carter, producing the
Camp David Accords and, a year later, an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in which
Egypt recognizes Israel and Israel withdraws from Sinai. The treaty invites
Israel's other neighbors to "join the peace process with Israel." No takers.
1982
After Sadat's assassination and Israeli attacks
on the PLO in Lebanon, U.S.
President Ronald Reagan calls for a "fresh start," urging Jordan to work with
the Palestinians to achieve self-government.
The goal goes unrealized.
1985
Dennis Ross, who would advise five U.S. presidents on the Middle East, argues that the United States should cautiously
facilitate diplomacy in the region "while patiently awaiting real movement from
the local parties."
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