The Parchin Trap

Don't count on the IAEA uncovering a smoking gun at Iran's military complex.

BY MARK FITZPATRICK | MARCH 13, 2012

As dysfunctional as the U.S. political system can be, Washington is a model of unity in comparison with the politics in Tehran. Disarray in the Iranian capital was on full display in February when a high-level team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was needlessly sent home for the second time without anything to show for its trouble. And that's just a preview of the sort of confusion that's in store for international powers as they prepare to once again sit down at the table with Iranian officials to discuss Iran's nuclear program.

The dispute between the IAEA and Tehran partly centers on the Parchin military complex, located about 20 miles southeast of Tehran. IAEA inspectors want to confirm evidence that, some years ago, Iran conducted high-explosives tests there that the IAEA termed "strong indicators of possible weapon development."

In anticipation of coming out ahead in the PR game, the Iranian diplomats who negotiated with the IAEA indicated in January that they would allow a visit to the Parchin military base. They also indicated that they would agree to a plan for addressing other questions about nuclear activities with "possible military dimensions," as the IAEA puts it.

On the first day of the follow-up visit in mid-February, the Iranian Foreign Ministry team was tough but workmanlike in negotiating an IAEA plan to provide access to sites of interest and full information about past and current nuclear activities. When Iranian diplomats sought to clear the tentative plan with others in the ruling elite, however, they were rudely overruled by Iranian hard-liners -- the inspectors were denied access to Parchin and returned to Vienna empty-handed. Think Colin Powell being boxed in by Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld, or Russia's Trotskyites outmaneuvered by Stalinists.

To make matters even more opaque, it's not even clear who the "Stalinists" were in this scenario. Although the main political intrigue in Tehran concerns a no-holds-barred power struggle between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the dispute in this case appears to have been between forces in the executive branch nominally under the president. Vienna insiders suspect that the veto was voiced by Saeed Jalili, whom Ahmadinejad appointed four years ago as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator. That would be a confusing development because Jalili was the official who tentatively accepted -- on Ahmadinejad's behalf -- the nuclear fuel-swap plan offered by U.S. President Barack Obama in the autumn of 2009. Under the terms of that deal, Iran would have sent the bulk of its enriched-uranium stockpile to Russia in exchange for replacement fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). But back then, Ahmadinejad's rivals, from all sides of the political spectrum, shot down the plan in order to deny the president a diplomatic victory.

This is far from idle Kremlinology. In upcoming nuclear talks, Jalili will be Iran's lead negotiator with the P5+1 -- the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States), plus Germany. The negotiations promise to be contentious. The P5+1 is demanding a suspension of uranium enrichment and of work on a research reactor near the city of Arak that would be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium. As a confidence-building measure, the P5+1 wants Iran to stop producing 20 percent enriched uranium, remove its stocks, and stop work in the deeply buried enrichment facility at Fordow, which has fueled Israeli fears that Iran is entering a "zone of immunity," robbing Israel of its ability to destroy Iran's nuclear program through conventional military means.

With the passage of time, the prospects of Washington and Tehran reaching a deal have only grown dimmer. Last fall, Ahmadinejad offered to halt the 20 percent enrichment if Iran was provided TRR fuel, which is enriched to that level. Iran's foreign minister repeated the offer, but some analysts doubted whether others in the regime would go along, especially given the way Ahmadinejad has been emasculated by Khamenei during the past year. Indeed, it is questionable whether Khamenei would accept any deal that is also acceptable to Washington.

ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images

 

Mark Fitzpatrick is director of the nonproliferation and disarmament program at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

JOHNBOY4546

11:46 PM ET

March 13, 2012

"Iran surely would not have revealed it voluntarily"

Oh, realllllllllllllly?

Iran was under no obligation to reveal the Fordow site to the IAEA until it was ready to introduce radioactive material.

Which they did and well before time, and that is a fact.

YOUR statement, however, remains nothing but conjecture no matter how "surely" you insist on putting it.

"If Fordow had not been discovered by Western intelligence agencies,"

Again, that is mere conjecture, because it is a fact that NO western intelligence agency revealed their knowledge of this "discovery" prior to the communication by Iran to the IAEA.

Not. A. One.

That they subsequently claimed that:
a) They already knew allllllllll about Fordow, and
b) were juuuuuuuuust about to reveal that to the world but
c) Iran beat 'em to the punch
is something you (and I, and everyone else) have to take on trust.

I think it touching that you do seem to trust the "Western intelligence agencies" when they make such claims.

Which is odd indeed, since you give no indication that you know which of those "western intelligence agencies" claim to have made that fantastic "discovery".

Apparently it doesn't matter: unnamed "Western intelligence agencies" have SUBSEQUENTLY advanced that claim 'n' that's good enough for you.

Me? I think this is all a comedy act, because it is a truism that the secret of good comedy is "timing".

 

JOHNBOY4546

11:57 PM ET

March 13, 2012

OK, this bit is spinning so much it becomes a flat-out lie

"Such reporting is required in IAEA safeguards rules that Iran had agreed to in 2003 and then unilaterally abrogated four years later."

The weasel-words are "agreed to" and "unilaterally abrogated".

Q: Why?
A: Because the Iranians UNILATERALLY implimented the Additional Protocols in 2003, which means they were also entitled to UNILATERALLY revoke that implimentation whenever they wished.

Q: How so?
A: If Iran had *signed* the Additional Protocols then, yes, that is a treaty, and such treaties can not be UNILATERALLY abrogated.

But Iran never *signed* that agreement in 2003; they merely told the IAEA that they would UNILATERALLY implement those protocols as a goodwill gesture while Iran was in negotiations with the (then) EU3 group.

The Europeans then strung the Iranians along for four years, until the Iranians decided that this was simply a farce and Enough Was Enough.

Get it? There was no "2003 agreement" between the Iranians and the IAEA.

There was - then and now - no signature on any document showing that Iran ever A.G.R.E.E.D. to be bound by the inspection regime of the Additional Protocols.

Not once.
Not ever.