Democracy Lab

Getting Ready for Life after Castro

Managing the transition to a democratic Cuba: A user’s guide.

Early this month, a senior Cuban official raised the possibility of loosening travel restrictions, potentially making it far easier for Cuban citizens to travel abroad as tourists. So far, little is known about the details of the policy Havana has in mind. But the flurry of interest stirred by this news reminds us that change in Cuba can potentially have far-reaching strategic and political implications, for its own people as well as for the regions that surround it.

There is a great deal that can be done in advance to prepare for the day when the post-Castro transition begins. The Cuba Transition Project (CTP) at the University of Miami, created in 2001 with the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development, has become a major authority on Cuban affairs. The project has released major studies on transition by both academics and experts, as well as a variety of other reports on topics such as political parties, labor unions, a free press, and economic reform. (The works cited in this article have all been produced under CTP auspices.)

In the early 1990s, many people expected the communist regime in Cuba to collapse. Those of us who followed the situation closely knew better, and subsequent events have borne out our caution. The post-Castro transition will indeed come one day, but when it does, it promises to be a long and complicated process.

The challenges are many. First, there will be the tremendous task of economic reconstruction. For nearly four decades, Cuba's extreme dependence on the Soviet bloc for trade, and the distorting effects of huge subsidies from Moscow, created an artificial economy. Most of Cuba's exports are in decline, and poverty is correspondingly growing. The internal market is weak, as domestic consumption is controlled by a strict and severe rationing system. Many transactions take place in the illegal black market, which operates in American dollars and with merchandise stolen from state enterprises or received from abroad. The Cuban peso has depreciated and its purchasing power has waned considerably. Huge and persistent government deficits, and the absence of virtually any stabilizing fiscal and monetary policies, have accelerated the downward spiraling of the economy. (Socio-Economic Reconstruction: Suggestions and Recommendations for Post-Castro Cuba, Antonio Jorge, and Institutions to Accompany the Market in Cuba, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata).

Moreover, sugar production, Cuba's mainstay export, has dropped to Great Depression levels. With low prices, a decline in sugar consumption worldwide, an increase in the number of competitive sugar producers, and widespread use of artificial sweeteners, sugar is a losing commodity with dire prospects for the future. Thus tourism, nickel exports, and even exile remittances have replaced sugar as the mainstay of the economy. Oil exploration in Cuba's northwestern waters seems promising, but profits must be shared with foreign partners, and costs are extremely high.

In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems, particularly concerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cuban nationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation. (Property Rights in the Post-Castro Cuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Post-Castro Cuba, Mátias F. Traviesco-Diáz.) The U.S. and other countries whose citizens' assets were seized without compensation are likely to support such demands. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate the complexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-Socialist Transformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, János Kornai).

Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in major need of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry. Transportation is inadequate. Communication facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitates have deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases constitute a real menace to the population. In addition, environmental concerns such as the pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention. (Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.)

Economic and legal problems are not, however, the only challenges facing Cuba in the future. A major problem that will confront post-Castro Cuba is the power of the military. (The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Brian Latell.) Cuba has a strong tradition of militarism, but in recent years, the military as an institution has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable future scenario, the military will continue to be a decisive player. Like Nicaragua, Cuba may develop a limited democratic system in which Cubans are allowed to elect civilian leaders, but with the military exercising real power and remaining the final arbiter of the political process.

An immediate and significant reduction of the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible. A powerful and proud institution, the military would see any attempt to undermine its authority as an unacceptable intrusion into its affairs and as a threat to its existence. Its control of key economic sectors under the Castro regime will make it difficult to dislodge it from these activities and to limit its role strictly to external security. Cutting the armed forces will also be problematic. The civilian economy may not be able to absorb large numbers of discharged soldiers quickly, especially if the government cannot come up with viable programs for retraining them.

The role of the military will also be shaped by social conflicts that may emerge in a post-Castro period. For the first half of the twentieth century, political violence was seen by many as a legitimate method to effect political change, and this could well have an effect on societal expectations in the future. Communist rule has engendered profound hatred and resentment. Political vendettas will be rampant; differences over how to restructure society will be profound; factionalism in society and in the political process will be common. It will be difficult to create mass political parties as numerous leaders and groups vie for power and develop competing ideas about the organization of society, economic policy, the nature of the political system, and unraveling the legacy of decades of communist dictatorship.

A newly free and restless labor movement will complicate matters for any future government. During the Castro era, the labor movement remained docile under continuous government control; only one unified labor movement was allowed. In a democratic Cuba, labor will not be a passive instrument of any government. Rival labor organizations will develop programs to protect the rights of workers, and to demand better salaries and welfare for their members. A militant and vociferous labor movement will surely characterize post-Castro Cuba.

Similarly, the apparent harmonious race relations of the Castro era may also experience severe strains. There has been a gradual Africanization of the Cuban population over the past several decades due to greater intermarriage and out-migration of a million mostly white Cubans. This has led to some fear and resentment among whites in the island. At the same time, blacks feel that they have been left out of the political process, as whites still dominate the higher echelons of the Castro power structure. The dollarization of the economy and the recent relaxation in the amount of remittances allowed to flow from the U.S. to Cuba has accentuated these differences. Since most Cuban-Americans are white, black Cubans receive fewer dollars from abroad. Significant racial tension could well result as these feelings and frustrations are aired in a politically open environment. (Race Relations in Cuba, Juan Antonio Alvarado - in Spanish).

Perhaps the most difficult problem that a post-Castro leadership will have to face is acceptance of the rule of law. (Establishing the Rule of Law in Cuba, Laura Patallo Sánchez.) Every day, Cubans violate communist laws: they steal from state enterprises, participate in the black market, and engage in all types of illegal activities, including widespread graft and corruption. They do this to survive. Getting rid of those necessary vices will not be easy, especially since many of them pre-date the Castro era.

Unwillingness to obey laws will be matched by the unwillingness to sacrifice and endure the difficult years that will follow the end of communism. A whole generation has grown up under the constant exhortations and pressures of the communist leadership to work hard and sacrifice for the sake of society. The youth are alienated from the political process, and are eager for a better life. Many want to immigrate to the United States. If the present rate of visa requests at the U.S. consular office in Havana is any indication, more than two million Cubans want to move permanently to the United States.

Under the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, Cubans will be free to visit the United States. Many will come as tourists and stay as illegal immigrants; others will be claimed as legal immigrants by relatives who are already naturalized citizens. A significant out-migration is certain, posing an added major problem for U.S. policymakers at a time of increasing anti-immigration sentiment.

While many Cubans want to leave Cuba, few Cuban-Americans will be inclined to abandon their lives in the United States and return to the island, especially if Cuba experiences a slow and painful transition period. Although those exiles who are allowed to return will be welcomed initially as business partners and investors, they are also likely to be resented, especially if they become involved in domestic politics. Readjusting the views and values of the exile population to those of the island will be a difficult and lengthy process. (The Role of the Cuban-American Community in the Cuban Transition, Sergio Diaz Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez).

The future of Cuba is therefore clouded with problems and uncertainties. More than five decades of communism have left profound scars on Cuban society. As in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua, reconstruction may be slow, painful, and tortuous. Unlike these countries, Cuba has at least three unique advantages: a long history of close relations with the United States; excellent preconditions for tourism; and a large and wealthy exile population. These factors could converge to transform the country's living standards, but only if the future Cuban leadership creates the necessary conditions for an open, legally fair economy and an open, tolerant, and responsible political system. Unfortunately, life in Cuba is likely to remain difficult for a while longer.

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Argument

The No-Show

What's really behind Vladimir Putin's surprising decision to skip the G-8 summit?

Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision not to attend the G-8 summit and send Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev as a stand-in has been seen by many as a bold snub to Washington and has raised important questions about the Russian leader's motivations. Beyond that looms the larger, and much more important, question about the future of Russia's foreign policy and its relations with the West. What if Putin's real motives, however, are exactly as advertised by his Kremlin aides -- that he needs to focus on forming a new government at home? If that's true, it offers a remarkable insight into the process of power balancing among the clans that make up Russia's cabinet. Either way, it's a hell of a way to begin a new term.

Unlike Putin and Medvedev's announcement last September that they had long planned to swap places, the G-8 decision must have been made only in the last few days. When Putin announced that he would not attend the May 20-21 NATO summit in Chicago, he did confirm for the May 18-19 G-8 summit, which was then moved to Camp David by Barack Obama's administration. Until early May, U.S. and Russian diplomats were working hard on the Obama-Putin meeting to be held at the White House on the margins of the G-8 summit. Putin's public statements on the eve of his May 7 inauguration indicated his willingness to work with the United States on matters of mutual interest and even "go really far" in that direction, as his foreign-policy aide put it. For that, of course, Putin requires a working personal relationship with Obama, the current and likely future president of the United States. Snubbing him would make no sense.

So, something must have happened quite recently to make Putin change his mind. Of recent developments, two things stand out: the demonstrations in Moscow on the eve of and on Inauguration Day and the remarkable tardiness in the shaping of the "Medvedev cabinet." The May 6 clashes with the police in the streets of Moscow added more bad press to Putin's mountain of criticism in the Western media. Were he to show up at the White House, he would run the risk of being asked uncomfortable questions at a Rose Garden news conference. Putin's irritation with the U.S. government's support for Russian NGOs active in election monitoring is well known, as is his criticism of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the State Department. The no-show at the media-heavy ritual of the G-8 summit, most of whose leaders congratulated Putin on his reelection only grudgingly or skipped congratulations altogether, thus appears to be a retaliatory strike.

It probably was not. Putin is anything but media-shy. In your face is what he likes. The May 6 Moscow "march of millions" attracted fewer people, despite the fine weather, than the massive February event a month before the presidential election, held in bitter cold. The march had no effect on Putin's inauguration and was overshadowed on the world scene by the French and Greek elections that same weekend. Western criticisms notwithstanding, Putin feels a winner -- and he certainly looked that way on election night. If anything, he likely would enjoy the spectacle of coming back to claim his place among the world's most powerful leaders, in spite of all the hopes, entreaties, and admonitions that he would not. Doing that in the United States, in particular, would have been a personal triumph and humiliation of his foreign foes.

But what looked initially a technical exercise -- forming the new cabinet -- appears less of a formality. Moscow is awash with contradictory rumors about who's in and who's out, and the general confusion is palpable. The truth is, the Russian government is a coalition, but not of political parties (which are insignificant as far as actual governing goes) as much as of the country's most powerful clans -- a diverse group that ranges from the titans of energy, metals, or other branches of industry to the captains of state-owned enterprises; from Putin's friends, Boris Yeltsin's old family, and Medvedev's classmates to the power players in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other regions.

The cabinet is not so much about policy as such, but about to whom and where money flows. Who controls what is essential to stability within the Russian elite who rule and own Russia at the same time. Arbitrating, brokering, and ultimately deciding the who and what in this situation is not something the new and once-again prime minister, Medvedev, can do alone. In a system where manual control takes the place of institutions, Putin is irreplaceable. The irony of the prime minister being sent on a mission abroad while the president single-handedly pulls the strings and forms his government for him underlines their respective roles -- and Medvedev's puppet status.

Putin's decision to stay away from Camp David means that he is putting the stability of his power structure above his diplomatic engagements abroad. This is not unusual for politicians. It also suggests, however, that striking the proper balance among the clans has become more difficult. If Putin, in his 13th year in power, is finding this a tricky task, the future of manual control does not seem bright.

Increasingly, Moscow's elites may think of turning to a more institutionalized method of balancing -- something of an agreement on the rules of the game, and an agreement, of course, to police that agreement -- so as to prevent any one clan from gaining too much power. When this happens, Russia's current absolute monarchy will evolve into a limited one. Putin believes, however, that Russia, in his time, can only be held together from above by a popular leader: himself. Call it authoritarianism with the consent of the governed.

Even if Putin's decision was primarily dictated by domestic concerns, his no-show will have foreign-policy implications. The G-8, which many in the West see as flawed because of Russia's membership -- and perhaps as overtaken by the economic realities of a changing world, better reflected in the G-20 -- is also being downgraded in the Kremlin's eyes. (Throughout the 1990s, the G-7+1 was the formula for Russian participation, but this was changed to the G-8 by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1998.) For Moscow, this is less a symbol of Russia's "belonging" to the global leadership team and more of a privileged contact zone, giving Russians access to the West, but without an obligation to align with it.

In the G-20, Russians are less conspicuous, but are also less put on the spot. The fact that Putin has decided to attend the G-20 summit in Las Cabos, Mexico, in June does not mean that he values the larger gathering more. Putin, the ultimate transactional politician, frankly hates international jamborees, seeing them as a waste of time. Mexico would have been a perfect destination for Medvedev, if only Putin had been able to travel to Camp David. Instead, now he has to make the trip in order to meet the only person whom he really wanted to talk to on the canceled trip to the United States: Barack Obama.

Much has been made in the media that Putin is now scheduled to visit China before he sees Obama in Mexico. There is less here than meets the eye, however. China and the United States are both hugely important to Russia, and an early visit to China -- to attend the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- makes a lot of sense, especially in view of political developments there ahead of the leadership change this October. Putin is unlikely, however, to build an axis with Beijing to spite Washington. Any remake of the Sino-Soviet alliance would just bring more trouble to the two countries than help advance their common interests, and it would be immensely awkward to operate.

With Putin formally back in the Kremlin, Russia's foreign policy will probably focus on gaining global expertise for domestic economic modernization, helping large international companies buy into Russia, promoting a form of global governance that would balance the West's dominance by means of such formal bodies as the U.N. Security Council and such informal ones as the BRICS, and protecting Russian security interests against threats both real and perceived, such as U.S.-NATO missile defense in Europe, by means of a massive rearmament program. Putin needs a meeting with Obama to determine how much alignment on these issues there can be between the two of them -- and how much he can get away with. Medvedev, at Camp David, will simply be on a reconnaissance mission.

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