Road Warriors

Who's the most traveled secretary of state of all time? It's complicated.

See an interactive map of the travels of the last four secretaries of state here.

How do you measure a legacy of an American secretary of state? Sure, there are dramatic moments -- treaties signed, crises negotiated, shuttles taken -- but much of the secretary's time is also taken up with lower-profile fence-mending and keeping up relationships with countries that don't get much media attention and where the tangible results of a meeting might not be so obvious. The world's eyes may have been focused on Hillary Clinton during the negotiations over Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng in May -- and the public had some concrete notion of what was and wasn't accomplished. Her visit to Bangladesh a few days later on the same trip? Not so much.

That may be why there's so much attention paid to the most tangible, if not most telling, way of measuring a secretary of state's performance: travel statistics. The State Department's website provides numbers for Clinton's total mileage (792,618), countries visited (98), total time in the air (71.9 days), and travel days (329). The website of her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, had a similar feature, listing her final stats as 93.7 days in the air, 85 countries visited, and 86 trips taken.

With her tenure winding down, Clinton is already "most traveled" in terms of countries -- just recently surpassing Madeleine Albright, at 96 -- and days, though she appears unlikely to catch up with Rice in miles, at 1,059,247. Clinton's predecessor made a flurry of long-mileage trips back and forth to the Middle East in the final months of George W. Bush's administration, and made 23 trips to Israel in total. Media reports have covered the "race" between the two secretaries at various points in Clinton's tenure, and while officials are publicly adamant to point out that it's not a competition, it's also pretty clear that the "most traveled" title is taken pretty seriously.

Colby Cooper, Rice's former chief of staff, says he had the idea early in Rice's time in office to spruce up the page on the State Department website tracking the secretary's travel -- which had began during Colin Powell's term.

"After a while, we realized she was approaching a statistical record on miles traveled," he remembers. "It wasn't so much a competition -- at the end of the day the secretary didn't give two hoots about this -- but it was fun keeping the aggregate of what she was doing from a numerical sense. When you start adding it up, you realize that you're about to broach a million miles. Even in this day and age, that's pretty impressive."

While working for Rice, Cooper compiled a complete record of the travels of all 67 secretaries of state, cross-tabulating which countries have been visited by which secretary. He also noted that Rice's travels were equivalent to 42.54 trips around the world at the equator or 4.43 trips to the moon.

The Clinton team also declares its secretary the "most traveled," but prefers a different metric.

"Woody Allen nailed it when he said 90 percent of life is showing up. She's already visited more [countries] than any of her predecessors. One hundred should be on our next trip to Europe. And she's got a lot of time left, so 110 is a fair guess [by the end of her term]. That would be 15 more than the previous highest, accomplished by Madeleine Albright," says Clinton's spokesman Philippe Reines.

Reines argues that countries visited are a better indicator of a secretary's diplomatic activity.

"Miles is obviously another valid indicator, but doesn't tell the whole story as much as countries visited, total trips, or number of days abroad do," he says. "As an absurd example, a Secretary who travels to Singapore 100 times is going to rack up 5,000,000 miles (and remember that many are visited multiple times like Israel, Egypt, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, on and on) while one who visits 100 countries could only travel 1,000,000 miles. Which makes more sense in furtherance of our foreign-policy goals?"

(In case you're wondering, a refueling stop doesn't count as a "country visited." The secretary has to have an official event.)

The Washington Post's Glenn Kessler, formerly the paper's diplomatic correspondent, keeps his own running tally of secretaries' travel days and quibbles with the official records kept by Rice and Clinton, since they count travel time as well as time spent conducting diplomatic business. "I deduct a day from every trip for travel time," he says. "That seems like the most fair way to do it." Kessler also dismisses the importance of mileage as "meaningless in terms of actual diplomacy." According to Kessler's numbers, as of April, Rice had 264 days on the road to Clinton's 239.

Clinton and Rice aren't the first secretaries to covet the "most traveled" title -- in 1996, Air Force staff served Warren Christopher a cake on his plane flying over East Africa at the precise moment that he broke James Baker's mileage record -- but the notion of a globetrotting secretary of state is actually a fairly new one. The first 23 secretaries -- including Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Daniel Webster -- never left the country at all while in office, conducting foreign relations through their ambassadors. In 1866, William Henry Seward became the first secretary of state to travel abroad when he visited what are now the U.S. Virgin Islands (but were then Dutch territory) on a jaunt that also included stops in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba. This "working vacation," as the State Department historian's website refers to it, during which Seward met with three presidents, was the only trip abroad by a secretary until 1905.

Travel by secretaries become more common throughout the 20th century as improved air travel made quick trips more practical. The current model of constantly on-the-move, face-to-face diplomacy became the norm in the 1960s, with both William Pierce Rogers and Henry Kissinger visiting more than 60 countries while in office. Kissinger, whose "shuttle diplomacy" involved frequent back-and-forth trips to the Middle East, is still in third place in terms of days on the road with 313, including a 33-day trip to the region following the Yom Kippur war in 1973.

When Colin Powell came into office, he sought to revive the more traditional model of a secretary conducting statecraft from Washington. Powell wasn't much of a travel-junkie, writing in his 1995 autobiography, My American Journey, "Having seen much of the world and having lived on planes for years, I am no longer much interested in travel." According to a 2004 Post article by Kessler, Powell had been inspired by a letter he received from legendary diplomat George Kennan, which argued that previous secretaries had "seriously misused and distorted" the office through constant travel. Kennan felt that absences from Washington "held to a minimum and not indulged in when suitable alternatives are available." Some have also speculated that due to his frequent disagreements with others in the administration during the lead up to the Iraq War -- particularly Vice President Dick Cheney -- he didn't want to be away from Washington for too long while key decisions were being made.

Kessler's article was widely cited, and Powell was frequently referred to in subsequent pieces as the "least traveled" of modern secretaries. He devotes a full chapter to the issue in his new book It Worked for Me, writing, "For some unknown reason, the media, led by the New York Times, started clocking my frequent flyer miles. I didn't travel enough, they claimed. I should be making more waves out there in the world rather than spending so much time in Washington or at the UN headquarters in New York. None of them answered the obvious question: Is this trip really necessary? What national purpose is served in having me out there?" (Powell is likely confusing the New York Times with the Washington Post here.)

Powell traveled only 750,187 miles while in office -- fewer than Rice, Albright, and Christopher -- though he did make it to 89 countries, putting him in third place by that count. "[I was] not exactly hiding in a bunker," he writes in the book.

So what does any of this tell us? Obviously, raw numbers don't tell you much about what the secretary was accomplishing while they were racking up all those frequent-flier miles, but the stats do -- in a crude way -- tell the story of a how diplomacy has changed.

"Consider the fact that that the first secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, never left the country. And Condi Rice, the 66th Secretary of State traveled a million miles and visited 85 countries on 86 trips. If that's the description of modern foreign policy, we've come pretty far," says Colby.

Reines says the increasing numbers also underlie the fact that face-to-face meetings have only become more important in the age of e-mail and videoconference.

"Think of all the technological advances of the last 20 years -- but the last four secretaries are the most traveled of all," he says. "While [Clinton] could replace meeting a world leader with Skype, how do you replace a handshake?"



The Rules of the Game

China's booming 
bureaucracy lit 
is part exposé -- 
and part how-to guide.

For more on why Chinese readers are so entranced by tales of low-level bureacratic intrigue, click here.

Zhao Deliang is Jiangnan's party secretary. Scholarly in appearance and modestly mannered, he is a master at playing by the opaque rules of Chinese politics. But now the system is working against him. He's an outsider in Jiangnan, flown in from Beijing to ensure that the province toes the Communist Party line. Zhao lacks the local connections to tell him whom he can trust, and he sorely needs them: A series of ambitious governors have successfully disgraced several of his predecessors. And so the stage is set for Zhao to fight his battle. If he succeeds, nobody on the outside will notice. Fail, and he'll be shipped off to a backwater.

For all its resemblance to the recent political intrigue in China, Zhao's story, like the province of Jiangnan, is fiction -- a plotline from author Huang Xiaoyang's series Second in Command, the hottest of China's red-hot "officialdom novels," so named because they bring readers into the rarified world of Chinese bureaucratic politics, drawing back the curtain on a civil service with thousands of years of history. The first of Huang's three planned volumes was published in May 2011 and sold 100,000 copies in its initial month on the market. By October, a month after the second book was published, the two volumes together had sold 630,000 copies in print. Their actual readership is likely many times higher -- the books, like many bestsellers in China, are widely available online, legally and otherwise.

But if Second in Command illustrates the explosive success of the officialdom novel, it also exemplifies the genre's precarious status in China. Truth, it turns out, has started imitating fiction in ways that have made the Chinese government most uncomfortable. Corruption scandals in China are nothing new, of course. But the explosive downfall of Bo Xilai -- the flamboyant party secretary of my home city of Chongqing, ousted in March as an investigation was launched into whether his wife had murdered a British businessman and amid much speculation that his growing power threatened Beijing's authority -- is unprecedented in post-Mao China. Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun, who sometimes performed his department's own autopsies and whose one-night refuge at a U.S. consulate in February eventually helped bring down Bo, seems more like a character in a Hollywood film than a Chinese official. So while Bo's personality may differ from the fictional Zhao's, the political struggles described in Second in Command were prescient enough that they quickly became a sensitive subject.

The novel's third volume, parts of which have been widely serialized online, was scheduled to be published last November. But it never was. In May, a source close to the publisher told me "authorities" had instructed the company not to print the book and not to publicize its cancellation. Two months before that, the source had said the publisher was concerned "the public might associate the book with Chongqing's officialdom." But that, of course, was exactly the novel's appeal.

CHINA'S OFFICIALDOM NOVELS date back many decades. They first boomed in popularity in the late Qing dynasty with books like Officialdom Unmasked (also translated as The Bureaucrat: A Revelation). Originally serialized in 1903 in a small newspaper founded by author Li Boyuan, himself a failed civil servant, the novel portrays the skulduggery -- from buying and selling official posts to slaughtering civilians to get credit for suppressing bandits -- of several dozen officials in the Qing Empire court. Many characters were modeled after real-life figures, giving these books a sharp critical edge and earning them the nickname "condemnation novels."

China's nascent tradition of social criticism flourished throughout the first half of the 20th century, reaching another high point in the late 1930s and 1940s amid the rank corruption of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, headquartered in Chongqing during World War  II. After Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China in 1949, however, social criticism became increasingly intolerable to the authorities, and when the 1957 anti-rightist movement shut down all dissenting voices in the country, officialdom novels virtually died out.

Socially critical fiction reappeared in the late 1970s after Mao's death, but the revival of the officialdom novel came much later. The current boom started in 1999, when Wang Yuewen, a midlevel civil servant for the Hunan provincial government, published Ink Painting, a novel about city administrator Zhu Huaijing. The protagonist's best friend, an eccentric and gifted artist, entrusts him with an ink painting, which the city's mayor covets. Forced to choose between his friend and his desire for career advancement, Zhu gifts the painting to the mayor, binding their careers together. Ink Painting's realistic depiction of modern government corruption resonated with readers, and it went on to sell 100,000 copies in two months, while pirated copies, sold off the mats of sidewalk hawkers, went the pre-Internet equivalent of viral. Wang was laid off from his government job a year later, officially because of downsizing. In a 2009 essay published in the Beijing News, Wang claimed the book had gotten him fired. Powerful people, he said, "thought I broke the rules of the game."

The newer officialdom novels offer not so much criticism as tips on how to get into the game -- a testament to China's growing culture of careerism. Picture the film Wall Street featuring a happy ending (the system is good!) with karaoke-singing women and baijiu liquor replacing strippers and cocaine, and earnestly corrupt, low-ranking officials instead of corporate raiders, and you're mostly there. As China's middle class has expanded over the past decade, novelists have shifted their focus from critiquing the government to explaining what is actually happening inside it. Today's bestselling officialdom novels are not necessarily aimed at exposing social problems or government corruption (though its depiction is unavoidable). Instead, they instruct readers on how best to climb the government ladder.

An entire litany of terms has sprung up to describe China's new reality. One popular expression is qian guize, or "hidden rules," now commonly used to mean dirty deals required for career advancement. The term was popularized by journalist Wu Si in his 2001 book, Hidden Rules: The Real Game in Chinese History, a collection of tales showing how unspoken conventions, rather than formal laws and high-sounding moral principles, actually govern China.

Enter Huang, whose Second in Command has the odd subtitle, "Being an Official Is a Job of Techniques." Huang writes on his blog that his intention was "to write about logic, order, and rules" for the Chinese civil service. In other words, he wants everyone to know the rules of the game.

Indeed, Second in Command is a kind of handbook for getting ahead -- a novelized The Art of War for aspiring bureaucrats. It offers tips for how to talk to one's boss in different situations. For example, when working for a government official, have three different addresses on hand: Call him by his title when he's next to a higher-ranking official to show formality, refer to him as "boss" (laoban) in private to show closeness, and when he's surrounded by his peers, call them each "chief officer" (shouzhang) to accord them all equal prestige. Another classic tip: Subordinates should try to ensure that their boss's car stops two steps away from anyone waiting to meet him so that he doesn't appear either overeager or distant.

It's no wonder, then, that according to a 2009 survey in the Chinese magazine Decision Making, which says its readers are "those who make decisions at every level of government, and those who serve the decision-makers," 59 percent of those who read officialdom novels did so to "understand the current situation in official circles," while only 48 percent did so to read about "exposing corruption." Second in Command and similar books, like Hou Weidong's Officialdom Notes, an eight-part series about an ambitious young man's ascent through party ranks, have been hailed by Chinese media and readers as "must-reads," "survival manuals," and "textbooks" for government employees.

Even for government officials, these novels offer some of the clearest explanations of China's notoriously closed-off political system. For readers without government connections, the books satisfy a craving for a peep behind the bamboo curtain of high politics. "People want to climb up officialdom ladders but can't," explains Chongqing critic and historian He Shu. "People dare to be angry at, but don't dare to speak against, government officials. They all need to find an outlet."


"WHAT IS THE MOST mysterious organization in the world?" a widely circulated Chinese joke goes. The answer is the "relevant department." It is a truism in China that when a citizen comes forward with a complaint, officials simply say the "relevant department" is handling it -- never disclosing which department that is. The term made a memorable appearance in a March speech by Premier Wen Jiabao that foretold Bo's demise the next day. "I can tell everyone that the central government has attached great importance [to the case] and immediately instructed the relevant departments to carry out a special investigation," Wen said.

Keeping officialdom politics secret has been the intent of Chinese rulers from ancient emperors to Mao to the current leadership. With the advent of these new scandals, however, it's becoming harder for the relevant departments to keep the lid on. As China's burgeoning social media landscape exposes the world of government bureaucrats, public calls for transparency have grown louder. In a way, that's what the novels offer: Many authors of these books are former officials themselves or else have close contacts with officials, enabling them to provide realistic and meticulous details about Chinese political culture -- so lifelike, in fact, that they nearly mirror real events.

Consider the following scenario from Second in Command, published months before the Bo scandal. Party boss Zhao knows only two locals when he arrives in Jiangnan, both former classmates -- one from university and one from the Communist Party School, a training institute for government officials. They introduce Zhao to some of the province's key power brokers, and after he runs a "sweep the black" campaign (eerily similar to Bo's real-life "smash the black" campaign against alleged mobsters in Chongqing), his hold seems secure. But shortly before the provincial party congress, held every four years to decide provincial power transitions, the governor's allies secretly arrest Zhao's university friend, a rich businessman, on unspecified charges and torture him to try to obtain corruption evidence against Zhao. Like the Bo scandal, this intense power struggle occurs just months before a major political transition and features incidents of extrajudicial brutality, much like Chongqing under police chief Wang.

Was Second in Command meant as a critique of the kind of political corruption exemplified by Bo and Wang? When I contacted Chongqing Publishing House in March, the novel's editor declined a request for an interview because, as she put it, officialdom novels are "sensitive" at the moment. "I hope you don't write about the book," she said. Another editor at the same publishing house, Chen Xiaowen, who was not involved in publishing Second in Command, emailed me to say, "Though officialdom novels reflect aspects of the current situation, such as corruption and 'hidden rules,' they're for consumption, not criticism." As for Huang, who had ignored my messages in an online chat in February, he replied a month later -- after Bo's ouster -- saying that answering my questions would be "inconvenient."

But Huang's novel speaks for itself. In the book, Zhao knows that the governor illegally imprisoned his friend to obtain corruption evidence against him. Zhao, who is largely clean (he does not need money because his wife is a wealthy businesswoman, like Bo's wife), does not openly investigate the case or try to harm his opponent. That would indict too many officials, disturbing both the province's political order and Zhao's career. Instead, he works within the system, suggesting that his subordinates elect his imprisoned friend as a party congress representative, trying to force the friend's release, and promoting several of his opponent's co-conspirators despite their misdeeds. Huang portrays Zhao's moves as political masterstrokes because they resolve the crisis without interrupting "harmony," at least on the surface. In the idealized world of Huang's novel, China's "hidden rules" are replaced by explicit rules, making the advancement game equalized and merit-based; if you want to succeed, you play your role properly rather than trying to subvert the system.

This advice, of course, comes too late for Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun, who behaved less rationally than the characters in the novel. Indeed, Huang at first refused to believe Wang could do such a stupid thing as fleeing into a U.S. consulate, writing in February on his microblog that the story "doesn't follow officialdom logic" and was therefore "a poorly made rumor." In April, when the news became widely known, Huang shifted to arguing that Bo and Wang had brought the scandal upon themselves. "To be invincible," he wrote, "one must follow the rules."