Why America Can't Have It All

Anne-Marie Slaughter is on to something bigger than she realizes.

Anne-Marie Slaughter's article "Why Women Still Can't Have It All" in the current issue of the Atlantic has sparked a firestorm of debate. Drawing on her personal experience balancing her distinguished foreign-policy career with the demands of raising two sons, the piece exposes an internal struggle within Slaughter and other women aspiring to both career success and a rewarding home life. But in so doing, it may do something more than that. Slaughter, the former head of Policy Planning in Hillary Clinton's State Department, may have unintentionally -- or subconsciously -- offered up a powerful insight into the challenges faced not only by working mothers but those confronting America's top international and domestic policymakers as well.

The article explores the conundrums successful women face in achieving work-life balance with the kind of candor and nuance it rarely receives but richly deserves. And though Slaughter reasserts her belief that it is theoretically possible for women (and men) to "have it all," she notes that under current conditions, with American society, laws, and customs as they are, it can't be done today.

But contained within in this discussion are signs of a deeper problem dogging America, one that goes beyond this core social issue and extends deeply into the national crisis we are currently confronting. It is that we are society that believes in and actively promotes the myth of "having it all" in the first place. We elevate the rejection of compromise to the level of national ideal.

You see it in the imagery offered up in the fiction of Hollywood, not to mention the confections of Madison Avenue, Wall Street, and Washington, D.C. In each, images of achievement without sacrifice, of weight loss without diet or exercise, of gain without risk, and of economic growth without investment or prudence are dispensed like crack in a schoolyard. With each tantalizing idea -- live large today, pay later, follow Dr. Phil's three-minute prescriptions and enjoy love like you read about it in romance novels -- Americans are more drawn to a web of interconnected, impossible ideals and hooked on the expensive loans, get-rich-quick courses, wonder drugs, political schemes, and schemers who are the only beneficiaries of the perpetuation of such rose-colored fantasies.

This is not to say that the American dream is not real. But the dream was never having it all. It was always about having enough and perhaps, generation to generation, having it a little bit better. It was about tapping potential, not about confounding the laws of physics, biology, finance, or reason.

Yet, here is America trapped in political and policy debates that suggest having-it-all-ism might not just be a big problem for us -- it may be our downfall. Mitt Romney is out selling the standard Republican line that it is possible to fix budget deficits by cutting taxes further (the political equivalent of a quick weight-loss regime that lets you eat more and exercise less). However the Supreme Court rules on health care this week, it will not reverse the reality that Democratic reforms have failed to meaningfully change the rules, retirement ages, payouts, and fee structures that are driving the system into bankruptcy. Both political parties seem to want to remain the world's hyperpower without actually doing the hard work of setting priorities and accepting the sacrifices that go with maintaining that power. And the voters are letting them get away with it.

Internationally, America also wants to have it all. We want to cut back our spending on international institutions, foreign aid, and military interventions and still maintain the influence we had before. We want to be seen as welcoming the rise of new powers without actually ceding any power to them in the international system. We want to champion global ideals while still selectively obeying the international system of laws we helped established.

The reality is that having it all, for people and countries, is in the best instances a poor choice of words and in the worst, an illusion. For women seeking work-life balance, it is not about "having it all" (as Helen Gurley Brown described the goal in her book on the subject 30 years ago) but rather being able to make career and lifestyle choices that have long been available to men. That means the freedom to choose. And make no mistake: choices have to be made. But in life as in public policy, the only way to the best possible outcome is through having the courage to make tough calls. Even when the United States was in its ascendancy -- think Vietnam -- the sweet siren's song of politicians offering it all has always led to the rocky reality that you can't spend dollars and save them too. Eventually you've got to choose between guns and butter.

On a deeper level, America's problem turns on precisely the core issue Slaughter identifies: The current generation of U.S. leaders has lost sight of the fact that the primary responsibility of any generation is not to itself but to that of the generations to follow. This is why "the Greatest Generation" is acknowledged as such -- they sacrificed to ensure better futures for their families. We Baby Boomers have earned no such accolades, nor will we, borrowing from our children and our grandchildren to pay for our excesses.

Because in the end, it all comes down to our children. As Slaughter puts it, we must "properly focus on how we can help all Americans have healthy, happy, productive lives, valuing the people they love as much as the success they seek." If that's our guide, we're more likely to start making better choices -- and start realizing that it's not about having it all but rather, about passing along what we can to those who will come after us.  That is not only the formula for strong families but for strong nations.


David Rothkopf

For Multilateralism, Is This the Dark Moment Before the Dawn?

Let's hope so.

RIO DE JANEIRO – Remember when "leading from behind" was an insult? Right now, it would be a masterstroke.

We have gone in a matter of not too many months from a golden moment of optimism about multilateralism to grappling with the dark frustrations of aimless muddlelateralism.   Hope is now the thing we are trying scrape off the bottoms of our shoes while Europe, the Middle East, and our entire global ecosystem shudder from the after-effects of a world that seems to be lacking effective global institutions.

Was it only in 2008 that George W. Bush, at the height of the financial crisis, invited the G-20 to get involved as the leading mechanism for coordinating an international response? Was it only months later that new President Barack Obama spoke of seeking multilateral solutions, of trying to create an international system that reflected the new global power structure? Wasn't it not too much after that when Libya was offered up as an example of a new model for how America and its allies would work together to get things done?

Yet now, evidence is everywhere that the promise of those moments has been undone.  Look at the still festering eurocrisis, at bleeding Syria, at the one-step-forward, two-steps-back pace of the Iranian nuclear negotiations, at the low hopes for material progress at the G-20 meeting in Los Cabos, and at the perplexing spectacle of Rio+20 that I am now attending, an event that is likely to be both one of the largest and least consequential in the history of the United Nations.

This certainly does seem to be a G-Zero moment, to borrow a phrase from the Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer. But will it lead to a period of protracted global rudderlessness? Or will this depressing panoply of multilateral misfires be precisely what we need to trigger the even deeper crises that will finally deliver home the message that we need better global governance sooner? (That one's for you, silver lining fans.)

One reason today's seeming global power void is so frustrating is that we actually live at or near the moment of the world's greatest aggregate wealth, a time when more nations possess more engines and instruments of real power than ever before.

Our problem is not that the biggest powers are incapable of action to address current problems. It's that just when the promise of a new post-Cold War, post-single-superpower era of collaboration among nations seemed to be greatest, many of the big powers have revealed themselves to be unwilling to assume the responsibilities of true global leadership -- of motivating, cajoling, inspiring, intimidating, confronting or blocking actions by other powers. It's not so much that we are in a G-Zero world as it is that most of our leaders are zeroes.

A few of those bear special responsibility for taking the bloom off the multilateral rose. Angela Merkel has steered a course for Germany that has alienated much of Europe and put the European experiment at risk. She has implicitly suggested that Europe exists to serve the interests of Germany and, more disturbingly, that the middle and lower classes of the struggling countries at Europe's periphery deserve to work for the next decade or so to ensure that Europe's bankers don't suffer their consequences of their irresponsible lending practices. Russia and China have blocked action in Syria on the premise that pushing out Bashar al-Assad would likely open the door to worse. They fully realize that their own governments might one day be targets of the kind of uprisings facing the regime in Damascus and they want to reserve their sovereign right to rough up their people however they may choose.

Obama has engaged with virtually all of these situations to little effect, offering much rhetoric but not much shoulder. He may well be appropriately focused on economic issues at home, but there is no denying that at the G-20, in the UN, at the world's international financial institutions, and confronting key challenges, no one is touting the transformational presence of Obama the multilateralist as they did a couple of years ago.

One sign of this is the G-20 meeting in Los Cabos this week, which has an official agenda that is almost laughably remote from the big issues of the day. In the past year, the group has played a much smaller role than was envisioned at the height of the financial crisis -- a reality that will be underscored as the reactive, last-minute agenda to address Europe's continuing crisis dominates the meeting, mostly through a flurry of bilateral leader conversations on the perimeter of the official event. There will be strong language, lectures to Europeans and pushback from them, signs of the deepening tensions between the United States and Russia, and a few essentially meaningless gestures that will do little to resolve anything ... and then will shift the main venue for addressing the global economic crisis back to the G-7, the European Union itself, and the other fora that have supplanted the unwieldy G-20 over the past three years.

Still another sign of the problem is that the U.N. meetings here in Brazil will draw more than 50,000 people and more than 100 heads of state, but many of the most important ones will be missing -- including Obama. The process for producing its primary communiqué was described to me by one senior U.S. official as a "hopeless clusterfuck." (And speaking of signs, one that seemed to hit the nail on the head could be found stuck into the beach along the sidewalk in Copacabana. It said: "Rio+20, to decide to not decide is the worst decision of all. You are putting not only nature, but lives at risk.") Failure to address the climate issues here in Rio will almost certainly be seen by history as the single greatest failure of the current multilateral system and today's leaders -- far outstripping the issues currently dominating the headlines, from Greece to Egypt, the eurozone to Syria.

The general sense of the drift away from the stronger multilateral institutions we so clearly need to manage our climate or regulate global markets or take on international threats like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been going on for months. The crisis in Europe has fed it. The lost hopes of the Arab Spring fed it. The fact that Libya was so deliberately sui generis and that Syria proved it has fed it. The U.S. hypocrisy in clinging to an antiquated system of choosing the next leaders of the IMF and the World Bank fed it. And the ineffectiveness of the ongoing nuclear negotiations with the Iranians has fed it.

Nor are the momentarily encouraging Greek election results, despite shoot-from-the-lip cable TV pronouncements declaring them a victory for Europe and the eurozone, a sign that multilateralism is making a comeback. Market reactions demonstrated that. And besides, Greece is -- shock headlines aside -- a side show. Much larger debt crises in Spain and Italy (and perhaps France) loom ominously. But the real problem is with the European banking system itself, which is plagued, top to bottom, by bad debts -- starting with the lousy home loans made by Spanish cajas and extending up to the European Central Bank's asset base, much of which is comprised of loans that have yet to truly be marked to their diminished market value.

My instinct is that the Greek result will in any case be seen as a harbinger. Neither the EU nor the eurozone is going away. More likely, both will be stronger as public recognition that they are needed and must be further strengthened through addition of fiscal union and tougher banking regulations grows amid the long, slow gaze into the abyss that would be created by their potential absence. (As for Greece, it may leave the eurozone, but it will leave a eurozone stronger for the circumstances of its departure.)

Similarly, whether it is the failure to stop Iran's nuclear march or the failure to stop Assad in Syria or the inability of the World Bank to stabilize economies and help create jobs, or whether it is the inevitable recognition that our planet actually demands cooperation among all nations to preserve its climate, I continue to believe that circumstances will be more effective than our current weak crowd of leaders at persuading the world that we need the strong global governance that seemed closer two years ago than it does today.

In other words, it will get worse before it gets better. What we are seeing today is the kind of failure of leadership likely to produce consequences so disturbing that ultimately they will help move us past the multilateral rhetoric of idealists to the urgency that comes of clear-eyed realism about what works, what doesn't, and what we really need.  Multilateralism will ultimately flourish not because it is more equitable but because we cannot solve global problems without it. Today's leaders -- through their inaction and missteps -- may inadvertently be doing more to ensure cooperation among their successors than they did when they actually seemed to care about such issues earlier in their careers.

David Rothkopf