Boom Time

Energy independence is in the United States' reach.

Michael Levi ("Think Again: The American Energy Boom," July/August 2012) would have better served his readers by urging them to think deeper about energy production. Although the unconventional-energy boom that he discusses is largely concentrated in the United States, it also extends to Canada, where pipeline politics have made it close to impossible to build export pipelines to the Pacific, effectively trapping surging Canadian output in North America. By 2020, U.S. and Canadian output should be sufficient to meet North America's energy needs, pushing out all other U.S. imports. Canadian oil is hard to refine and will displace similar-quality oil from Venezuela, Mexico, and the Middle East. These producers, in turn, will need either to steeply discount their oil or to reduce production because the United States, with its vast, sophisticated refining system, is virtually the only market for their heavy crudes.

It won't be easy for Saudi Arabia or any other OPEC country to increase production in an effort to bring down prices and prevent investment from flowing into North American production. OPEC countries need increasingly higher prices to meet their fiscal needs, and their market power allows them to put a high floor under prices to achieve their revenue goals. At the same time, these higher prices guarantee that North American production, which is costlier than production in OPEC countries, will be profitable.

Levi is right in saying that costs are currently high for unconventional North American oil. But he evidently doesn't understand that high costs bring technological change and innovation, and that historically costs ultimately go down. This is bound to continue to be the case when it comes to North American shale, oil sands, and deepwater output.

Although Levi is right in saying that the oil and gas industry cannot by itself secure prosperity or full employment, it remains the case that relatively low-cost natural gas and relatively abundant oil are, when combined, transformational in boosting energy-intensive industry -- from petrochemicals to fertilizers to all sorts of metal fabrication, including steel -- to say nothing of the transformational impact that natural gas use can have on the trucking and passenger-vehicle fleet. Energy independence is within reach, and with it a more secure future, a stronger U.S. dollar, and a stronger sense of national security than anyone would have dared dream even five years ago.

Global Head of Commodities Research
New York, N.Y.

Michael Levi replies:

Ed Morse has done more than anyone else to identify and draw attention to the boom in U.S. oil production. His letter highlights several important dynamics that are playing out as a result of this most welcome development. None of them, though, undermines the basic claims made in my article. In particular, while Morse is right to flag the possibility that North America might eventually produce as much oil as it consumes, that will not make the United States "energy independent."

I would be remiss if I did not address the one specific criticism that Morse makes of my arguments. He writes that "[Levi] evidently doesn't understand that high costs bring technological change and innovation, and that historically costs ultimately go down." Morse is correct about innovation but mistaken about my beliefs. My article cites current production costs in an effort to explain why new technologies have begun to flourish. It makes no claims about future costs.

That aside, the United States is "dependent" on oil-related events in the Middle East and beyond because disruptions there affect fuel prices here -- and rapidly rising fuel prices put the U.S. economy at risk. U.S. policymakers must confront that potential chain reaction every time they contemplate action abroad. New U.S. oil and natural gas production will deliver many things. As Morse notes, it will help energy-dependent industries, delivering as much as a 3 percent boost in GDP over the next decade, according to his group's research. Moreover, in the case of gas, it could eventually help wean the U.S. transport system off oil.

Still, no serious analyst, Morse included, has claimed that more U.S. production will spare the United States from price volatility in the face of turmoil in the Middle East. Nor has any economist argued that the U.S. economy will be immune to the consequences of volatile prices simply because the United States produces its own oil. Put together, these facts mean that more U.S. production will not make the United States independent. U.S. policymakers will continue to find their hands tied when dealing with oil-producing regions, notably the Middle East, until Americans are able to substantially reduce their oil demand.  


Revolutionary Calculus

Hussein Ibish is too quick to dismiss the Arab Spring as a failure.

Two years ago, nobody would have predicted that Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, and Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh would be out of power while other regional leaders would be either clinging violently to power (Syria's Bashar al-Assad) or bribing their populations to remain there (Bahrain's ruling family).

Despite these unforeseen achievements, it would be naive to think that because the dictators are down, life is suddenly better -- and the data highlighted by Hussein Ibish ("Was the Arab Spring Worth It?" July/August 2012) certainly prove that right now it is not. Although these momentous changes have not immediately brought about a dramatic adjustment in the standard of living for the populations concerned, we must recognize the positive trajectory that these countries have established for themselves.

Undoubtedly, the trend of history has been toward democracy because it is the system that is necessary for the full enjoyment of human and civil rights. But there are few, if any, examples of a country making a smooth, gradual transition from authoritarian to democratic government. As history moves in leaps rather than in steps, society must scramble to keep up. Unlike violent political upheavals, nonviolent revolutions are a process -- not one-day dramatic events. And no country that successfully overthrew its dictator last year has completed that process yet by democratically electing a new government supported by the appropriate institutions.

What we must always keep in mind is that nonviolent social change consists of three important elements: challenging and defeating the autocrat, preventing a coup, and electing a democratic government while gradually building democratic institutions. It's an ongoing process even in Serbia, where the iconic nonviolent revolution that brought down Slobodan Milosevic on Oct. 5, 2000, has been followed by a fairly successful transition to democracy.

The toll of the Arab Spring has certainly been high, but the mark it has left on history will forever make life better for the people who live in the region. An entire generation of young, educated citizens has been politicized and engaged. As American labor leader Cesar Chavez said, "Once social change begins, it cannot be reversed. You cannot uneducate the person who has learned to read. You cannot humiliate the person who feels pride. And you cannot oppress the people who are not afraid anymore."

Executive Director, CANVAS
Belgrade, Serbia

Hussein Ibish replies:

I fully agree with Srdja Popovic's passionate defense of overthrowing dictators, especially through nonviolent means, and I generally share his implicit optimism about the long-term prospects for post-dictatorship Arab societies. It is important, however, to note that many of the Arab uprisings have not been nonviolent. Even in Egypt, a country that avoided civil war, the crucial turning point in overthrowing President Hosni Mubarak involved violent confrontations between rock-throwing protesters and security forces, which were eventually overwhelmed by the demonstrators. In Libya and Syria, nothing short of civil war developed.

It is also important to accept that positive outcomes are not preordained. There are at least three potential pitfalls to the Arab uprisings: de facto or de jure military rule, failed-state status, and the emergence of tyrannical majorities -- probably of an Islamist variety -- in parliamentary systems that fail to provide adequate protections for the rights of individuals, women, and minorities. Egypt is struggling to avoid military rule. Yemen and possibly even Syria are drifting in the direction of becoming failed states. And the specter of heavy-handed Islamist-led parliaments haunts two post-dictatorship Arab states that have held elections: Tunisia and Egypt. So though we all hope for the gradual emergence of fully developed Arab democracies, this is by no means a guaranteed outcome of the uprisings.

Given that the outcome in many states is still very much in doubt, counting the costs seems a particularly useful exercise. As I noted, in most Arab Spring states, the most common answer to the question "Was it worth it?" is still almost certainly "yes." I trust and hope that this will remain the case, but it's only responsible to remain cognizant of the dangers of the uprisings and, of course, their very real costs.