The Meles Inheritance

Ethiopia's late dictator antagonized his country's Muslims for years. His successors may pay for it.

When Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia's leader for more than two decades, died this week, he was mourned by many as a "stable" force in a chaotic region. South African President Jacob Zuma praised him for "lifting millions of Ethiopians out of poverty" while British Prime Minister David Cameron remembered him "as an inspirational spokesman for Africa on global issues", who had "provided leadership and vision on Somalia and Sudan." Microsoft founder Bill Gates even praised him as "a visionary leader who brought real benefits to Ethiopia's poor."

Ethiopians themselves have more complicated feelings about the late prime minister. Yes, the country emerged as a regional power and one of Africa's most dynamic economies under his rule, but Ethiopians also saw Meles crush political opponents, surround himself with yes-men, muzzle the free press, and purge dissenters even from his own party.

His death has been as controversial as his tenure. Meles, 57, had been missing since June 26, the last time he was seen in public before his demise. Officials dismissed earlier reports that he had died, insisting instead he was vacationing or on doctor-prescribed sick leave. The state of his health and an ensuing power struggle within the ruling party has been a subject of online speculation for the last two months.

Meles's death also comes at a moment when Ethiopia is witnessing an unexpected and hitherto unknown phenomenon: popular protests. For the last eight months, hundreds of thousands of Muslims have been nonviolently protesting a series of religious decisions by the government and a quasi-independent religious council. How the government handles the protests could affect the fragile transition.

Ethiopian Muslims, who make up a third of the country's 94 million people, began demonstrating in the capital in January, after students at the country's only Islamic university, the Awolia Institute, walked out of classes to protest a proposed curriculum change mandated by the government and the removal of some teachers. The students accused Ethiopia's government of imposing the teachings of Al-Ahbash, a foreign sect with Ethiopian roots but better known in Lebanon.

Al-Ahbash is a supposedly moderate Sunni sect founded in Lebanon in 1930 as a philanthropic project and reorganized into a religious movement in 1980s by followers of exiled Ethiopian Muslim scholar Abdullah ibn al-Habashi, who was forced out by Emperor Haile Selassie's regime. Ahbash has followers throughout the Middle East, who have often clashed with Salfi Islamist groups, but until recently has remained fairly obscure in Habashi's home country. The protesters claim the government is forcing them to accept Ahbash's teachings as a way of containing what it sees as a growing radicalization of Ethiopian Muslims.

The government denies any effort to promote Ahbash and claims the university reorganization was the work of the nation's main Islamic authority, known as the Majlis. Though officially independent, the Majlis, formally the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Council, is widely seen as a quasi-governmental agency.

Contrary to Ethiopia's firm denial, a U.S State Department terrorism report released last month acknowledged that Ethiopia's Ministry of Federal Affairs had indeed launched a controversial nationwide training program to counter violent extremism by promoting Ahbash. The Ethiopian government quietly launched the training in July 2011 at Haramaya University, in the eastern Oromia region. The catechism, billed as "Training Religious Tolerance" and attended by some 600 religious leaders from around the country, was given by clerics invited from Beirut, Ubah Abdusalam Seid, a researcher on Islam in Ethiopia, wrote earlier this year. Unpublicized training courses, aimed at reorienting all mosque leaders and Majlis representatives around the country to the Ahbash teachings, took place in major cities like Addis Ababa, Harar, and Bahir Dar later that year, according to Seid. The protesters liken requiring religious leaders across the country to go through Ahbash courses to forced indoctrination.

State media encouraged the campaign with repeated claims that Wahhabists are seeking "to establish an Islamic state in an illegal and unconstitutional way." The Islamic press in the country countered these claims by offering anti-Ahbash commentaries. Three Islamic newspapers have since been gagged because of their coverage of the protests and opposition to Ahbash, and at least one journalist have been detained, according to Committee to Protect Journalists.

Ever since 2005, when security forces in the capital gunned down more than 200 protesters demonstrating against a botched election, protests have been uncommon in Ethiopia. But there are increasing signs that the government is losing control of the backlash to the Ahbash promotion.

In January, shortly after the protests broke out at Awolia, Muslims in Dessie, a town 150 miles northeast of Addis Ababa, held a huge impromptu demonstration after Majlis leaders tried to take over the regional mosque and an Islamic school there. Fearing a backlash, the Majlis pulled back.

As the protests in the capital continued and intensified over the last seven months, demonstrators' demands have grown beyond the issue of school curriculum to larger grievances over the Christian-dominated government's policies toward Muslims. In particular, demonstrators are now demanding that the Majlis leaders be elected in mosques rather than at government centers.

Weekly Friday protests have been held in Addis since the initial confrontation at the university and have attracted thousands, with the crowds growing every week. The worshippers have adopted various nonviolent strategies such as silent protests and sit-ins at mosques. After initially attempting to broker talks between the Majlis and protests, the government escalated the tension by breaking into the Awolia mosque on July 13, to stop plans for further protests during the African Union summit, taking place in town that week. That was followed by the arrest of members of the committee elected to represent the protesters a week later. The government accused the 17-member committee of extremism.


The decentralized movement has now grown into a nationwide resistance against the unelected Majlis leaders. On August 17, hundreds of thousands turned out in the capital Addis Ababa demanding the release of their jailed leaders. The government crackdown has backfired, prompting Muslims across the country to join in the protests. The largely youth-led movement is now emulating the weekly Friday prayer protests that started in Addis Ababa.

Similar protests were held throughout the country over the last two weeks. On Aug. 10, a small protest spiraled out of control in the northern city of Dessie, with police firing teargas and storming the local mosque. The scuffle began when worshipers tried to pray on the streets after the mosque reached capacity and were instructed to refrain from praying outside the building by the police. A clip of the skirmish posted on a video-sharing website, EthioTube, shows police chasing and beating protesters on the ground. Similarly, in Shashemene, a market town in southern Ethiopia, a small protest that started two weeks ago at the main mosque has now spread to all the town's three mosques. Large-scale protests have also broken out in the northern town of Kamise and the eastern historical city of Harar, often called the fourth holiest city in Islam.

Meles addressed the growing discontent on April 17, during his final appearance before Ethiopia's one-party parliament. The prime minister denied allegations of state interference in religious affairs but acknowledged that senior government officials had held meetings to discuss plans to educate the populace about the rule of law. Meles blamed the protests on radical Salafist and accused them of preaching intolerance and calling for an Islamic state. He also announced that al Qaeda cells had been uncovered in Ethiopia's Oromia region and warned that without an aggressive response, the country experience the kind of instability seen in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria. "This has to be stopped before it's too late," he said.

The warning was a typically canny move from the late prime minister. Throughout his rule, Western powers were reluctant to criticize domestic repression in Ethiopia as long as Meles continued to provide support in the fight against Islamist militants in East Africa, including sending troops into neighboring Somalia in several U.S.-supported operations.

The prime minister's statements angered the peaceful protesters, but seem to have convinced the international media that the government is battling against a growing tide of radical Islam, with headlines such as "Radical Islam Rises in U.S. Ally Ethiopia." But the Western media's focus on Islam misses the larger story: The disciplined nonviolence of Ethiopia's protests has united the country against a repressive government, for the first time in its two-decade rule.

There are also increasing signs that the discontent is spreading beyond the Muslim community. An exile group affiliated with Ethiopia's oldest Orthodox Church, which has led similar protests last April against the proposed demolition of a fifth century monastery in Northern Ethiopia, has called for all-Ethiopian solidarity with Muslim protesters. Earlier this month the chairman of the opposition All-Ethiopian Unity Party, Hailu Shawel, backed the protesters, saying their demands are not illegal. At a recent rally held in front of the U.S State Department, Ethiopian Christians held signs that read, "We support the peaceful struggle of Ethiopian Muslims."

The leadership vacuum created by Meles's death may well embolden the movement to speed up calls for greater religious freedom. The national week of mourning, now in effect, also coincides with government's attempt to push forward with the election of Majlis leaders. The protesters are calling on all Muslims to boycott the election and refuse the ballots being given out at regional administrative centers. It is not clear whether the protesters will call off their weekly demonstration to honor the mourning week this Friday.

The newly minted prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegne, is a relative newcomer to Ethiopia's political scene and there is widespread talk of a succession struggle behind the scenes and rival factions emerging within the ruling party. In what appears like early signs of power struggle, the government abruptly canceled, with no explanation, plans to swear in Hailemariam in an emergency parliament session called for Aug. 23. How long he lasts in the job may well depend on how the government handles the growing discontent both inside and outside the government in coming weeks.



Pipe Dreams

Why Mitt Romney can't free America from Middle East oil.

Mitt Romney has slammed Barack Obama's administration for its handling of energy since day one of his presidential campaign. On Thursday, the Romney team released its own plan, promising energy independence by the end of this decade. That plan contains important elements that Obama would benefit from adopting as his own. But ultimately, the Romney plan overpromises on results while ignoring many of the biggest energy problems the United States faces.

Republicans have frequently criticized Obama for his admittedly hodgepodge energy strategy, a charge repeated in the new plan. The Romney plan solves that problem by substituting a narrow fossil-fuel production strategy for a genuinely comprehensive plan. Much in that fossil-fuel strategy is reasonable. Romney would shift more power to the states by allowing them to approve drilling on their lands and near their coasts without federal intervention. He would streamline environmental reviews, in part through clear deadlines, and in part by handing more control to the states. If that were accompanied by more federal capacity to process permit applications -- something that Romney has decidedly not promised to do -- the result could be a win-win for business and the environment. Romney also promises to streamline cross-border permitting and expand North American regulatory cooperation, steps that could benefit clean energy and fossil fuels alike.

But the Romney plan promises far too much as a result of these policy shifts. It extensively cites recent Citigroup research to back up its claims its contention that North America could eliminate all imports by 2020 as well as to support its claims about jobs and economic growth. Yet that study is not just about oil supplies -- it assumes that the United States will continue with strict fuel economy standards that lower its oil demand. Romney, though, has argued that such standards are the wrong way to go, and proposes no alternative scheme in his energy plan.

The plan also promises "freedom from dependence on foreign energy supplies." As I explained in a Foreign Policy essay earlier this year, achieving energy independence through expanded supplies is a pipe dream. So long as the United States is part of a global market, domestic crude prices will rise in the face of turmoil overseas, putting the U.S. economy at risk and constraining U.S. freedom of action. The only way to break that link without clashing U.S. oil consumption is to bar energy exports from the United States altogether -- something that Romney, quite correctly, has explicitly opposed. Indeed, one study that the Romney plan cites extensively to back its energy independence claims says the that self-sufficiency "will neither insulate the country from the rest of the global oil market, nor diminish the critical importance of the Middle East to its foreign policy."

Romney also promises cheaper oil as a result of his plan. More oil production would do that, though how much lower remains an open question. The Romney plan pushes this claim further by emphasizing that Canadian and Mexican oil sell at a discount to OPEC crude. Yet the Romney plan would (rightly) permit pipeline infrastructure that would raise the price of Canadian oil by giving Canadian producers full access to the world market. Mexican crude, meanwhile, sells at a small discount because it is of relatively low quality and thus requires more expensive equipment to refine.

What about the 3.6 million jobs the Romney plan promises? Many of those are real: additional oil production would spur job growth at a time when the U.S. economy is hurting. Many others, though, result from oil and gas development that would likely happen during a second Obama term as well. And, according to the Citigroup study that is the source of the Romney figure, 785,000 of the jobs would come from the improved fuel economy that Romney would no longer pursue.

The biggest problem with the plan, though, is not what it does or promises -- it's what it leaves out. The United States remains vulnerable to global oil markets and constrained in its foreign policy because of its massive consumption of oil from all sources. Yet the Romney energy strategy does nothing to address this Achilles heel aside from promising to continue support for basic research.

The plan is also mum on the other grave energy challenge the country faces: climate change. Reasonable people can differ on how much emphasis to place on climate change in U.S. energy policy, but it isn't reasonable to ignore it entirely. The Romney plan does not mention climate at all. To be certain, surging production of natural gas can help curb U.S. emissions, but it will come nowhere close to delivering the reductions the country needs alone. Romney likes to quip that people "do not call [climate change] America warming, they call it global warming," his way of saying that climate change can't be confronted unilaterally. But his plan does not include a multilateral strategy either -- something that other Republicans could easily have helped him craft.

There are many good reasons to embrace rising U.S. oil and gas production and to reform the way government regulates their development. The Romney strategy for fossil-fuel development has some reasonable proposals on both fronts. But when it comes to comprehensively exploiting energy opportunities and confronting energy-related risks, the strategy falls woefully short.