National Security

Confusion

What if we can't catch terrorists in America because there aren't any?

Considerable hackles were raised last week by a critical report from the investigatory arm of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

It focused on the Department of Homeland Security's beloved "fusion centers" -- clusters of state and local law enforcement people set up to collect intelligence on terrorist and other criminal activity in their area and then to send reports on their findings to DHS for evaluation.

Amazingly, after concluding -- mildly but pointedly -- that the utility of the terrorism-related reporting from the fusion centers has been "questionable," the committee recommends that even more money should be spent on them. Local intelligence reporting efforts, it proclaims, should be reformed to eliminate duplication, the training and numbers of intelligence reporters should be improved, and better efforts to evaluate their output should be put into place.

Never once does the report consider that the reason intelligence reporting on the terrorists lurking in our midst is so limited in quantity and so abysmal in overall quality is that there is virtually nothing to report. Absence of evidence, it implies, cannot possibly be evidence of absence. We just have to work harder to find what surely must be out there.

DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano has called the fusion centers "one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy," and DHS's top intelligence official deems them "a vital tool for strengthening homeland security."

No one seems to know how much these centerpieces, or vital tools, have cost. DHS estimates it has awarded somewhere between $289 million and $1.4 billion for fusion centers since 2003 -- an uncertainty gap of over a billion dollars that is impressive even by Washington standards.

Moreover, it is not even clear how many fusion centers exist. DHS claims there are 72, but at least four of these were "not functional at a level to receive a visit," including one which "was not operational" at all. One official helpfully suggested to the committee staff that some may operate as "virtual fusion centers."

To evaluate the output from the centers -- whether real or virtual -- investigators shuffled through fusion center intelligence reports submitted to DHS over a 13-month period in 2009 and 2010. There were 610 of these from 31 states -- centers in the other 19 submitted none at all -- and more than half came from just two states: Texas and California.

Of the 574 unclassified reports filed, 188 were "cancelled" by DHS reviewers, generally because they contained "nothing of value" or simply failed to be devoid of "any actual intelligence." While the overall cancellation rate for the reports was around 30 percent, nearly half of those dealing with terrorism were rejected out of hand.

That didn't leave many. Of the 386 reports accepted, most relayed information from arrests or encounters relating to drug trafficking and alien smuggling. Only 94 -- considerably less than two a week -- related "in some way" to potential terrorist activity.

Moreover, more than a quarter of these 94 reports simply duplicated information already known to the FBI, and "some were based on information drawn from publicly available websites or dated public reports." One, in fact, cheerfully relayed information from a Department of Justice press release that had been published months earlier.

More importantly, says the report, DHS has "struggled" to identify a clear example in which a fusion center provided intelligence that helped disrupt a terrorist plot. And, when investigators looked at the four "success stories" touted by DHS, they were "unable to confirm" that the fusion centers' contributions were "as significant as DHS portrayed them; were unique to the intelligence and analytical work expected of fusion centers; or would not have occurred absent a fusion center."

But things are considerably more problematic than that.

The report insists that, whatever the investigatory irrelevance of fusion centers, local and federal law enforcement have nonetheless "thwarted dozens of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and against U.S. interests in the past decade."

However, few of these cases ever reached the point -- or were every likely to reach the point -- where they could reasonably be considered to be "attacks," and a great many were "thwarted" only because law enforcement had substantially invented them.

I've edited a web book containing a collection of studies of the 50 cases of Islamist extremist terrorism that have come to light since 9/11, whether based in the United States or abroad, in which the United States was, or apparently was, targeted. These make up (or generate) the chief terrorism fear for Americans.

In general, this set of case studies supports the conclusions of the committee report about the irrelevance of fusion centers. A similar conclusion can be derived from other related analyses of domestic terrorism.

Actually, however, it is not clear that any of the billions of dollars added to counterterrorism policing since 9/11 has been all that necessary. Michael Sheehan, New York's deputy director for counterterrorism, has argued, "The most important work in protecting our country since 9/11 has been accomplished with the capacity that was in place when the event happened, not with any of the new capability bought since 9/11. I truly believe that those huge budget increases have not significantly contributed to our post-9/11 security....The big wins had little to do with the new programs."

Sheehan's observation may be a bit excessive. It is not clear, however, that dealing with the vast majority of the terrorist plots and cases over the last decade has required expensive new technologies or dot-connecting "synergies" among policing agencies. For the most part, the potential perpetrators, in the words of the case study authors, were incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish. As such, they generally were fully susceptible to being uncovered by standard policing methods.

Although some of the plotters did harbor visions of toppling skyscrapers, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge, all such ventures were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the would-be terrorists' capacities. None has ever been able to detonate even the simplest of bombs (nor, except for the Underground bombings in London in 2005, have any of their counterparts in the United Kingdom). In fact, in most cases it seems likely that, despite the often childish fulminations of the participants, the plotters would never have fomented any violence at all. Indeed, in quite a few cases, they were "thwarted" even as they were in the process of abandoning their plot.

Moreover, in fully half of the cases, the agile activities of undercover police operatives were vital to the fabrication and particularly to the development of any plot by their gullible associates. As the judge in one terrorism trial concluded, "I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime here except the government instigated it, planned it and brought it to fruition."

Exaggerations and distortions of the threat presented by terrorism have inspired a determined and expensive effort to ferret out, and even to create, the nearly nonexistent. The FBI, for example, occupies itself by questing after 2,000 "threats" a day, an exercise some in the agency have dubbed "ghost chasing."

The committee has documented how useless fusion centers, one much-vaunted expenditure of energy and funds in the counterterrorism enterprise, have turned out to be. Yet, it seems unwilling to recognize that its own results indicate that the effort, and by extension much of the costly and massive campaign of which it is a centerpiece, is a highly questionable undertaking.

Despite its admirable and impressively researched efforts to critique one element in the quest to police domestic terrorism, the committee's investigation may serve more nearly to perpetuate the process than to stimulate a fundamental and long-overdue re-evaluation of it.

DON EMMERT/AFP/Getty Images

Argument

Venezuela's Next Inning

Chávez may have won another election, but it's the opposition that should be celebrating.

Just months after he was first elected president of Venezuela in 1998, at an event in Washington organized by the Inter-American Dialogue, Hugo Chávez was asked how he would maintain a democratic equilibrium absent an effective opposition. Chávez, an avid baseball fan, was quick to respond. "That's not my problem," he quipped, "I field my team -- the other side fields theirs. That's how the game is played."

But Team Chávez is one dynasty that looks a lot less dominant than it was back then. He won his first election with a 16-point margin. The following contests -- in 2000 and 2006 -- he won even more resoundingly, by 22 and 26 points, respectively. On Sunday, Oct. 7, the populist leader vanquished his fourth challenger, Henrique Capriles Radonski. This time, however, the gap had shrunk to 10 percentage points. And, most crucially, the country's political tenor had dramatically changed.

In the end, Chávez prevailed by relying on the magic formula that has worked so well for him (and for all populists) -- he spent lots of public money on an array of consumer goods, housing, and other benefits for his supporters to guarantee their political loyalty. In this case, keenly aware of his increased vulnerability, Chávez cranked up the patronage machinery nurtured over his nearly 14-year rule and engaged in a spending orgy to neutralize a superior opposition challenge. Although Venezuela's economy is deeply troubled, it still helps to be sitting atop the world's largest oil reserves. PDVSA, the state petroleum company, though suffering sharp declines in production and investment, nonetheless had enough money to sustain Chávez's social programs.

Chávez, who came to power by identifying with the legitimate grievance of social injustice felt by many Venezuelans, also proved that he retains a powerful sentimental bond with the country's poor. Since being stricken with cancer in June 2011, Chávez, 58, has slowed down considerably, as reflected in the latest campaign. But his charisma and seductive rhetoric haven't disappeared. And his control over the media and key government institutions is intact.

Beyond Chávez's notable staying power, however, the big story emerging from the election was the impressive challenge mounted by a unified opposition. Capriles, a former governor elected in a primary contest last February, ran a remarkably smart campaign. For the first time, a Chávez challenger directly competed for the Venezuelan president's core constituency -- the very poor. He wisely advanced a social democratic agenda and invoked Brazil's popular former leftist president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as his political model.

Capriles did not deny that many of the poor had benefited under Chávez's rule (keep in mind that oil was only $10 a barrel when he came into office). Rather, he persuasively made the case that the tremendous opportunity to improve the well-being of most Venezuelans -- in a political environment marked by consensus, not polarization and rancor -- had been squandered. He noted the country's dismal governance -- as exemplified by decaying infrastructure, shortages of basic goods, and skyrocketing crime -- relative to the ample resources at its disposal. He developed well-thought-out alternative proposals for governing Venezuela.

What's more, Capriles, unlike many other opposition figures (and often the United States in years past), remained refreshingly focused and disciplined in the face of Chávez's characteristic taunts and provocations. In comments broadcast on state television on Sept. 10, Chávez said, "He's a little rich boy dressed up as a poor kid from the barrio." Chávez also charged that Capriles, who comes from a family of Polish Jewish Holocaust survivors, belongs to a "fascist" Catholic group. Capriles ably defended himself, but by refusing to go for Chávez's bait, he was never thrown off balance. He gave Venezuelans a taste of what nonconfrontational politics would be like.

Fighting an uphill battle -- Capriles had often referred to the election as David vs. Goliath, echoing the president's own rhetoric about his struggle against the United States -- the opposition garnered 45 percent of the vote, no mean feat given Chávez's access to state resources and control over much of the media. Compared with the last presidential election in 2006, Chávez's support shrank substantially. In the final weeks of the campaign, Capriles had the momentum and, with more time, might have overtaken Chávez or at least made the outcome tighter.

But the most notable accomplishment of Capriles and the opposition movement he leads was not this election's result, as impressive as it was, but rather their long-term contribution to Venezuela's well-being, governance, and social peace. The principal concern and topic of speculation has been the potential for violence, given the deep distrust between Chavistas and anti-Chavistas and the fact that many Venezuelans, on both sides, are armed. Capriles's conciliatory, high-minded discourse and successful electoral strategy of appealing to moderate Chávez supporters constructively shaped the political climate and prepared the country for a smooth transition, whenever that might happen. That is Capriles's greatest legacy.

It would be naive to believe that Chávez will receive the message from this election and shift toward a more conciliatory relationship with the opposition and pursue a more moderate agenda. Rather, Chávez is likely to interpret his 55 percent result as a mandate to do what he can to deepen his 14-year Bolivarian Revolution. That translates into even more state control of the economy and further concentration of his already formidable powers. It also means continued political defiance of the United States (even though he sells the Goliath to the north a larger share of Venezuelan oil than ever) and closer ties to Iran, Russia, Cuba, Belarus, and other governments not terribly friendly toward Washington. The key question, however, is whether Chávez will succeed in carrying out an even more radical agenda in a society that is now awakened and more organized than before.

The resistance will be significant. To be sure, there is a chance that the opposition, which expected to do better on Sunday, will be demoralized and fracture. But there is no reason the opposition should not continue to exhibit the same intelligence it has shown in recent months and simply focus on methodically building its organization and support. Capriles and others will now set their eyes on critically important upcoming elections for governors in December and for mayors next April. They should not lose the moment, and the momentum.

Capriles, only 40 yet understandably disappointed by the first defeat of his political career, would be wise to be patient and persistent. After all, it took Lula, now widely regarded as Latin America's premier political wizard, four attempts before he attained the Brazilian presidency. The United States should follow Capriles's lead, maintain its current posture, and resist the temptation to intervene in Venezuelan politics. It is unrealistic to expect any rapprochement between the two countries, no matter who wins the U.S. elections in November.

To be sure, the situation in Venezuela remains highly uncertain. Chávez's health is a wild card, as is the price of oil. There are a number of plausible scenarios. But what has fundamentally changed -- and it's good news for Venezuela, the region, and the United States -- is that there are now two teams on the field. Chávez may still be at bat, but for the first time in 14 years, the pitcher is throwing heat.

JUAN BARRETO/AFP/Getty Images