Last week, a New York Times editorial argued that it is time for U.S. forces to leave Afghanistan -- a process that it said should not take more than a year, a much faster timeline than the president has proposed.
The editorial reflects the growing effort to justify and rationalize our abandonment of Afghanistan, just as we did after the Soviets left. The international community has repeatedly promised the Afghan people that it would not do that again, specifically because we know many Afghans are concerned their country will fall apart when U.S. and international troops leave at the end of 2014. And yet, as the Associated Press reported in August, there is a sense in Afghanistan that history could repeat itself.
When the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, U.S. support to mujahedeen fighters who had been battling the Soviets dried up quickly, and the country sank into civil war as militias and warlords battled for power, devastating Kabul. That was followed by the rise of the Taliban and years of rule under their repressive regime.
Foreign Policy's own coverage has noted a shift in the conversation from fighting into 2015 or sticking around through 2014 to whether the United States even makes it to 2014. Ahmed Rashid, author of Taliban, has noted, "Pundits and politicians, as well as think-tanks and military officers have been full of doom and gloom."
But many of us on the
ground don't understand the recent pessimism. As U.S. Marine Maj. Gen. Mark
Gurganus, the regional commander for southwestern Afghanistan, told
a group of media from Kabul about the negativity of recent press coverage,
"When I read them I have to back up and say, are we talking about the same
place?" He added: "We are
still a province at war, but look at the progress that has been made in Helmand
Province over the past three years." Indeed, even the Times editorial acknowledged that "[t]he Taliban has not retaken
territory lost to coalition forces."
We are reaching the point in which the misperception being created by the media is undermining our ability to achieve their own definition of success in Afghanistan: denying al Qaeda a safe haven via a strengthened Afghan security force that is capable of taking over lead responsibility in the future.
Have insider attacks and sensational
Taliban attacks taken place?
Yes, and we are accountable for that.
But there is something to the comments made by senior officials that the sensational attacks are reflective of a desperate insurgency. If you were a Taliban commander losing an insurgency for the past couple of years since the surge, wouldn't you feel the need to conduct sensational attacks to give the perception your narrative is winning out and to reassure your followers?
If the Taliban had genuinely gained ground or momentum, reporting
that creates the perception the insurgency is everywhere and can do everything
would be understandable; but harassing attacks by insurgents have not adversely
affected our operational planning or the transition.
After the Sept. 14 attack on Camp Bastion, we observed a motivated insurgency in Helmand province planning more attacks to get some momentum going. Approximately 100 Taliban were staging attacks in the districts of Marjah and Nad Ali.
Then something happened that hadn't before: The northern district police chiefs coordinated sweeping clearing operations that killed approximately half of the would-be attackers and demoralized the rest.
The results of the surge -- specifically, the growth of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) in both size and capabilities -- has made it possible for the coalition to transition to what we call a Security Force Assistance mode of operations. With this change, the campaign has progressed from one focused on coalition-led operations, to one that supports the development of the Afghan security forces (the intelligence services, the military, and the police), enabling them to conduct independent operations.
The transition to a Security Force Assistance mode of
operations in the southwest began in April, and where transition to the ANSF
has taken place in our area of operations, there has been no
significant increase in either insurgent or criminal activity. This
includes the entire province of Nimroz and 8 of the 14 the districts in
In order to strategically defeat the Taliban we need to highlight the successes of the ANSF and reassure the Afghan people that the international community will not abandon them. The 800-pound gorilla in the room is the lack of confidence the Afghan people have in their security forces being able to hold their own after the coalition leaves, and in some cases, it is the security forces themselves that lack the confidence.
The ANSF and the Afghan people don't know just how good their security forces really are -- and will be in the future. Should Afghans see confidence and esprit de corps in the ANSF, we could see something similar to the "Anbar Awakening" in Iraq.
That confidence is starting to build. In the first two weeks of September, insurgents moved in after 1st Battalion, 7th Marines pulled back from areas in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province. Once the local officials and ANSF perceived this development as a problem, they ordered the area be retaken. Face-to-face and toe-to-toe, the Taliban had to back down, and we saw some bravado emerge from the ANSF that soon carried over to operations in Sangin.
This past week all of the casualties for our area of operations were members of the ANSF. Don't underestimate ANSF's bravery or their willingness to put their lives on the line for their country because they are doing it every single day. They are not afraid of the Taliban, and they move quickly to the sound of the gun.